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ABSTRACT
This study is an analysis of the historical preliminaries, current state and 
directions of further development of the language policy in the forme Soviet and 
presently independent Republic of Kazakhstan. Such an analysis is of special 
interest for sociolinguistic theory. The uniqueness of the linguistic situation 
challenging contemporary Kazakhstani language policy-making consists in the fact 
that Kazakh, the native tongue of the ethnic majority and the de jure state language 
of the independent Republic of Kazakhstan, is too lexically underdeveloped to 
successfully compete in most of the communicative domains with Russian, the 
state language of Soviet Kazakhstan and the alternate present official language. 
Regardless of the goals (building of a multiethnic Kazakhstani nation or a 
multinational Kazakh state) of the nationality policy assumed by the government, 
the stability of interethnic communication in Kazakhstan and the success of an 
important (Russian) aspect of its foreign policy depend on the legislative decisions 
and practices aimed at the development and promotion of the Kazakh language 
without undermining the status of Russian or disregarding the languages of 
numerous ethnic minorities/nationalities.
This study attempts to conduct a diachronic and synchronic analysis of 
multilingualism in Kazakhstan, to trace the history of language legislation and 
political practices throughout the duration of existence of Russian-Kazakh diglossla, 
to evaluate contemporary language-related governmental efforts from the point of
viii
view of officially formulated goals, and to identify possible directions of the policy's 
further development. The findings of the investigation are presented in the form of a 
proposal for a strategy for future legislation and policy implementation.
The analysis is based on the results of an extensive review of four sources of 
literature: official documents pertaining to language policy; publications in 
professional journals specializing in history, linguistics, education, sociology, 
philosophy and politics, as well as similar publications elsewhere; articles in 
newspapers and magazines; and classic and contemporary fiction 
and editorials.
The study should serve as a demonstration of professional knowledge and 
masters level research skills, its end product being a contribution to the of field of 
language planning. The final proposal is expected to serve as a "white paper" 
suitable for reference by Kazakhstani and other language planners, educators, 
politicians, journalists and academics
IX
This thesis is dedicated to the people of independent Kazakhstan
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION 
Statement of the Problem
This study attempts to make a contribution to and suggest a resolution of a 
language-related problem faced by the newly independent Central Asian nation of 
Kazakhstan. The Republic of Kazakhstan was formed in 1991 as a result of the 
dissolution of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics. One of the problems 
that it inherited from the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics was the problem 
of nation building in a multiethnic state and the related problem of language 
planning in the conditions of multilingualism and diglossia.
Kazakhstan is the home to people of more than 100 different nationalities and 
ethnicities, the biggest of which are Kazakhs (Qazaqs) 53.4%, Russians 30%, 
Ukrainians 3.7%, Uzbeks 2.5%, Germans 2.4%, and Uighurs 1 4% (1999 census). 
At the time of dissolution, most of these people felt about themselves as 
belonging not only to their ethnic groups, but also, as a result of continuous efforts 
of Soviet nationality-policy-makers, to a sup'-a-ethnic unity of the Soviet people. In 
1991, the Soviet state, which formed the foundation for the sense of common 
identity, disappeared from existence. Providing its culturally diverse and otherwise 
completely unrelated citizens with a common ground not .conflicting with their 
national identity became one of the most important areas of concern for the
1
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country which emerged on the territory of the former Kazakh Soviet Socialist 
Republic. The negative experience of their Soviet predecessors, especially the 
nationality crisis of tue 1990s manifested in the high incider.ce of interethnic 
conflicts and the rise of nationalist fronts, as well as the uncontrollable wave of 
immigration of ethnic minorities out of the country during the first years of 
independence, demonstrated to Kazakhstani policy-makers the danger of 
disregarding the importance of nationalism in political decision-making. They 
seem to realize that the relative political stability in the country and the success of 
economic and political reforms depend on how fast the new supra-ethnic identity 
is cultivated. They also seem to understand the crucial role that language plays in 
the formation of national identity and, consequently, in the resolution of problems 
of cultural pluralism.
The uniqueness of the linguistic situation challenging contemporary 
Kazakhstani language policy makers consists in the fact that Kazakh (spoken by 
64.4% of the population according to 2001 estimate), the native tongue of the 
ethnic majority and the de jure state language of the independent Republic of 
Kazakhstan, is de facto too lexically underdeveloped to successfully compete in 
most of the communicative domains with Russian (spoken by 95% of the 
population), the state language of the Soviet Republic of Kazakhstan and the 
alternate present official language. Thus, the formation of the new common 
Kazakhstani identity is complicated by the necessity of the development of the 
stare language, which is supposed to be one of the major forces of unification and 
which happens to be the language of ethnic majority, whose support can be easily
3
confused with the attempt of building a monoethnic state, a perception which 
counteracts the efforts of the cultivation of identity.
Purpose, Methodology, and Anticipated Results of the Study
This study has been an attempt to conduct a diachronic and synchronic 
analysis of multilingualism in Kazakhstan with the intention to
1) trace the history of language legislation and political practices 
throughout the duration of existence of Russian-Kazakh diglossia;
2) evaluate contemporary language-related government efforts from the 
point of view of what is desirable for success in nation building and what 
is officially proclaimed as a goal;
3) identify possible directior - of the policy's further development.
The findings of the investigation have resulted in a set of proposals for a
strategy for future legislation and policy implementation.
The analysis is a product of an extensive review of four sources of literature: 
official documents pertaining to language planning and nationality policy; 
publications in professional domestic and international journals specializing in 
history, linguistics, education, sociology, philosophy and politics: articles in 
newspapers and magazines; and classic and contemporary fiction and editorials 
which discuss the problem under consideration in indirect, but nevertheless 
valuable, ways.
The study has been organized in five parts. First, basic concepts have been 
defined and available findings of research on nationalism and language planning
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based upon international experience have been investigated in a literature review 
section. Next, a diachronic analysis of the linguistic situation in Kazakhstan has 
been presented. This analysis is expected to serve as a source for subsequent 
formulation of a language-planning model optimal from the point of view of the 
nationality policy and conditions of the current economic environment. Further, a 
synchronic analysis of contemporary language-related legislation and praciices 
has been undertaken in order to evaluate them with respect to the previously 
formulated model. Afterwards, an attempt has been made to identify possible 
directions of the policy’s future development. Finally, a set of proposals for 
legislators, researchers and practitioners has been suggested.
The study’s end product being a contribution to the of field of language 
planning, the resulting set of proposals constitute a "white paper" suitable for 
reference by Kazakhstani and other language planners, educators, politicians, 
journalists and academics. If accepted and implemented, the end product is 
anticipated to contribute to the successful resolution of the 
nationalism/multilingualism problem in the republic. The accompanying insights 
are expected to contribute to linguistic theory by improving our general 
understanding of bilingualism/diglossia phenomena and language-planning 
practices.
Underlying Assumptions
A number of assumptions have been made at the start of this study. The first 
is that all sources of information used in the study are trustworthy. The second is 
that the existing theory accurately explains reality. The third assumption is that
5
language planners, researchers and practitioners in the new state, the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, are sincere in their desire to improve the existing linguistic situation 
and that in their effort they are committed to act in the interest of all the citizens of 
an independent Kazakhstan. The last assumption is that a set of meaningful 
proposals based upon a literature review rather than results of a polling 
experiment can be of value in the actual practice of language planning.
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
The Role of Language in Nationism and Nationalism 
Since multilingualism is one of the outcomes of ethnic diversity, it would be 
helpful for further discussion to define the notion of ethnicity and the related 
notions of nationality and nation before we proceed with the actual analysis.
A widely recognized definition of the terms in relation to one another was given by 
Joshua Fishman (1968, 39-52). Following is a summary of Fishman’s ideas.
The notions of ethnicity (alternatively: ethnic group) and nationality refer to 
two levels of sociocultural organization. Both terms denote “a group of people who 
think of themselves as different from other groups.” The difference between them 
is determined on the basis of whether or not the group identity is localistic, i.e. 
whether a territorial association is necessary for the members to experience the 
feeling of group belonging. In this respect, ethnicity is localistic, while nationality is 
not (Fishman, 1968, 41-2). Thus Russian people comprise a nationality. A 
Russian is likely to claim his Russian national identity even when not residing in 
their Motherland. A small people of Chuvashia, representing one of the Russian 
minorities, form an ethnicity. A Chuvash is more likely to assimilate with Russians 
if (s)he lives away from the Chuvash Autonomous Republic.
6
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The concept of nation refers to “any political-territorial unit, which is largely or 
increasingly under the control of a particular nationality”. An example of a nation is 
Spain which is under control of the Spanish nationality. Unlike a state, polity or 
country, a nation is necessarily independent of external control. Thus, a colony 
cannot be a nation. Unlike a state, it is also under control of a single nationality 
(Fishman, 1968, 42). For example, a state, which has been experiencing a 
prolonged war between two conflicting nationalities, is not a nation.
If the pairs ethnicity/nationality and nation/state are combined, they could be 
placed on a continuum, such that, on the one hand, there will be multinational 
states and, on the other, multiethnic nations. The first structure exists when 
“sociocultural groups in a country feel that they themselves are a nationality, who 
merely happen to live under someone else’s governing control”; while the second 
structure exists when “the members...feel that they are simultaneously citizens of 
the nation thev live in and members of their particular group”. The two structures 
differ in the degree of political stability with a multiethnic nation being more stable. 
There is also a third possibility, one where “ethnic groups have no interest 
whatsoever in the country they live in, either as its loyal citizens or as an 
oppressor to be resisted". If all the groups in the country with the exception of the 
controlling nationality were of this type, the country would be a multiethnic nation 
(Fishman, 1968, 45-7).
Language performs different and, in fact, conflicting roles in nationism and in 
nationalism. Nation building requires unimpeded communication, especially, in the 
areas of government interaction and education. It encourages the use of a single
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language that everyone in a nation can understand. Nationalism, on the other 
hand, requires language as an important component of a group identity in the 
same way as it does with culture, religion and history. As such, language plays a 
major role in the contrastive self-identification of a nationality. In fact, a distinction 
between nationality and ethnicity can be based on the degree to which a group 
maintains and advocates the use of its language. Elimination of a language is thus 
dangerous for existence of a nationality, and, consequently, multinational states 
almost never tolerate monolingualism (Fishman, 1968, 48-51).
Multilingualism as a Problem and as a Resource
Multilingualism can serve both as a problem and a resource in nation-building 
and nationality policy.
Ralph Fasold enumerates a number of problems that multilingualism poses 
for nationalism (Fasold, 1-34). The most straightforward one is difficulty in 
communication that can act as an impediment to commerce and industry and can 
be socially disruptive. A subtler problem with multilingualism is that it acts against 
nationalism. Given the importance of language for nationalism, it is more difficult 
for multilingual states than for monolingual ones to develop a sense of common 
group identity. For such a sense to be formed, a multilingual state either has to 
attempt to develop a national language or try to develop a group identity on a 
ground other than language. The former route leads immediately to the problem of 
selecting the national language, promoting its acceptance by those who are not its 
native speakers, and, often, developing the language itseif so that it could 
appropriately serve the needs of the state (Fasold. 4).
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The problems posed for nationism are pragmatic rather than symbolic in 
character. As a result, a solution to a nationalist problem may create a nationist 
problem, Fasold explains the discrepancy with an example of a choice of 
language of government communication for a former colony. He reasons that 
.. on pragmatic grounds, the best immediate choice for the language of 
government in a newly independent colony might be the old colonial 
language. The colonial governing institutions and records are already in 
place in that language and those nationals with the most government 
experience already know it. But the colonial language is usually a terrible 
choice on national grounds. For a nationality, which has just acquired its 
own geographical territory, the last language it would want as a national 
symbol would be the language of the state that had denied it territorial 
control. (Fasold, 4)
He also mentions the existence of a similar discrepancy for the language of 
education. On practical grounds, the best strategy is to use the languages of the 
various ethnic groups, which serve as the children’s mother tongues. However, 
when children receive education in their ethnic languages, “these may increase in 
importance and become symbols of contra national nationalism" (Fasold, 5).
Multilingualism can be also seen as a resource. First of all, it can be a 
temporary solution to a nationist-nationalist problem, if during the transition to a 
new official language the previously colonial (for nationist reasons) and the 
national tongue (for nationalist reasons) are used simultaneously. In education, 
the conflict between using ethnic languages as media of instruction for nationist
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reasons of efficiency versus using the national language for nationalist reasons of 
unity can be resolved by using the ethnic languages for initial instruction and the 
national language for advanced education. At the individual level, multilingualism 
provides a multilingual speaker with a greater variety of interactional resources 
whose use is differentiated by communicative situations. In addition, societal 
multilingualism can contribute to a more dynamic society with a multiplicity of life­
styles and worldviews (Fasold, 8-9).
Taking the problems and advantages suggested by multilingualism, one can 
conclude that an ideal multilingual society is “a multiethnic nation where 
sociocultural groups are aware of their cultural and linguistic identity at the local 
level, but still consider themselves part of the nation as a whole” (Fasold, p.9).
Diglossia
As has been mentioned before, in the situation of societal multilingualism 
the participating languages are often assigned different communicative functions. 
The distribution of communicative roles between several languages in a particular 
society is referred to as diglossia. The concept of diglossia was first proposed by 
Charles Ferguson in 1959 (1972, 232-50) and was further developed by Joshua 
Fishman (1967, 29-38) and Ralph Fasold (1985, 1-37).
Ferguson defined diglossia as
... a relatively stable linguistic situation in which, in addition to the primary 
dialects of the language (which may include a standard or regional 
standards), there is a very divergent, highly codified (often grammatically
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more complex) superposed variety, the vehicle of a large and respected 
body of written literature, either of an earlier period or in another speech 
community, which is learned largely by formal education and is used for 
most written and formal spoken purposes but is not used by any sector of 
the community for ordinary conversation. (Ferguson, 1972, 245)
He called the codified variety High (H) and the primary dialects-Low (L).
Below is a more detailed explanation of the differences between the two:
1) function-the functions of H are formal and guarded; those calling for L 
are informal, homey and relaxed;
2) prestige-H  is believed to be superior, more elegant and logical: L is 
treated as inferior to the point that its existence is denied;
3) literary heritage-H  serves as a language of literature which is much 
admired as either inherited from the past or continuing the heritage in 
the present;
4) acquisition-L is used to speak to children and by children among 
themselves, and, as a result, it is learned in an unconscious way, H is 
acquired by formal teaching at school much in the fashion of foreign 
language acquisition in terms of the amount of conscious effort and 
memorization;
5) standardization--H is standardized and all the grammars and 
dictionaries are written for it, rather than for L;
6) stability~ H is more stable than L and is often perceived as more 
archaic than L; tension between a more dynamically developing L and
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the conservative H is resolved by the emergence of an intermediate 
form of language, which has features of both;
7) grammar -based on an intuitive notion of ‘simplicity’ in grammar, the 
grammar of L is simpler than the grammar of H; the difference can be 
manifested in the number of grammatical categories, in the complexity 
of syntax and etc;
8) lexicon -  H lexicon contains more technical terms and other learned 
words, while L lexicon is full of words for homey objects; often for some 
of the words in L lexicon there exists a correspondence in the H lexicon;
9) phonology -  L phonology is a basic system; H phonology is either a 
subsystem ora parasystem. (Ferguson. 1972, 246-8)
Diglossia can remain stable for a long time. Under certain conditions, though, 
it can become unstable. This instability can be increased by the spread of literacy 
and broader communication throughout the country. These two factors may lead 
to a blurring of the linguistic distinctions between H and L. A third factor is the 
development of nationalism based on a national language as its symbol 
(Ferguson, 1972, 250).
Ferguson’s original definition of diglossia was later revised and expanded by 
Fishman. Fishman modified the classical definition in two ways. First, he 
expanded the phenomena covered to situations with more than two linguistic 
varieties (Fishman, 1967, 35). Second, he claimed that “diglossia exists not only 
in multilingual societies which officially recognize several ‘languages’, or societies 
that utilize vernacular and classical varieties, but also in societies which employ
13
separate dialects, registers, or functionally differentiated language varieties of 
whatever kind” (1972, 91-100). In addition, he investigated the relationship 
between individual bilingualism and diglossia with the result being represented as 
a typology of bilingualism/diglossia combinations:
1) both diglossia and bilingualism-a situation when almost everyone in the 
community knows both H and L, and the two varieties are distributed in 
a manner typical of diglossia;
2) diglossia without bilingualism-a situation when there exist two disjunct 
groups within a single political, religious, and/or economic entity; one is 
a ruling group who speaks only the H language, the other, normally a 
larger group, has no power in the society and speaks exclusively the L 
language;
3) bilingualism without diglossia— refers to communities with a large 
number of bilingual individuals, but where there is no functional 
distinction between language varieties;
4) neither bilingualism nor diglossia—a hypothetical situation when a small 
linguistically isolated community does not have any sort of functional 
differentiation or societal bilingualism.
Out of the four combinations, the only stable one is diglossia with bilingualism
(Fishman, 1967, 29-38).
Fasold expanded Fishman’s ideas even further. First, he argued that there 
could exist several diglossic communities sharing the same H (see Figure 1), thus
14
explaining the relationship between digiossia and standard vs. dialect variation 
(Fasold, 44).
He also resolved the problem of binarity in Fishman's and Ferguson’s 
definitions by explaining multi-language differentiation with the existence of 
essentially binary double overlapping and double-nested diglossias. The first type 
of digiossia refers to the intersection of diglossic situations (see Figure 2).
15
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Low 1 Low 2 Low 3 Low 4
Figurel Speech communities sharing the same H but distinguished by 
different Ls.




Figure 2 Double overlapping digiossia in Tanzania (English is colonial lingua 
franca, Swahili is the national language). (Fasoid, 45)
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Double-nested digiossia refers to a situation of existence of “little diglossias” 
within the “big digiossia’’ (see Figure 3).
The suggested types of digiossia do not require anything more than a 
refinement of the concept of binarity. in one case, there are two sets of two, the L 
of one set being the same as the H of the other, in the other case, there is a large 
diglossic pair, within each member of which there is a more refined diglossic 
distribution. In both cases, the combinations are binary sets. However, Fasold 
also identified one non-binary situation of linear polyglossia in which several 
language varieties are involved with the L form of any of the languages being 











Double-nested diglossia in Khalapur, India (Hindi is the formal 
national language, Khalapur is a local dialect. There are low—  
conversational Hindi and MotT boll Khalapur, and high-Oratorical 
Hindi and Saf bolr Khalapur, varieties within both languages; so 
that the high/low within each o f the languages is nested within 
high/low between Hindi and Khalapur). (Fasold, p. 48)
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Figure 4
Formal Malaysian English H1 iV
Bahasa Malaysia H2 i f
Mandarin DH
Colloquial Malaysian English M1
Dominant Chinese langu age M2
‘Native’ Chinese language L1
Other Chinese languages L2-Ln
Bazaar Malay L -
Linear polyglossia for English-educated Malaysian Chinese. The 
Vertical arrows between the two Highs are intended to indicate that 
Bahasa Malaysia is gaining ground at the expense o f English as 
the ‘higher’ High. Mandarin is a high variant o f Chinese. Bahasa is 
a high variant o f Malay. Bazaar Malay is a low variant).
(Fasold, 50)
1S
One other problem that Fasold tried to resolve was the question of the degree 
of relatedness between the language forms participating in diglossia. As a result 
of analysis of a number of multilingual linguistic communities, he came to the 
conclusion that
...people have a universal tendency to reflect their perception of the 
intimacy or formality of a situation in their speech. This may be done by 
means of subtle stylistic shifts within the same language, by switching 
between two moderately distinct ‘dialects’, or by selecting entirely different 
languages. The social phenomenon is the same, regardless of the nature 
of the linguistic means used to accomplish it. (Fasold, 52)
His conclusion led to the necessity of expanding the notion of diglossia to 
include not only separate languages, but style-shifting and other functional 
variations as well. In addition, his conclusion made it clear that since style-shifting 
involves the whole set of varying linguistic alternatives from colloquial to formal, it 
cannot be represented in a binary form and, consequently, binarity cannot be an 
absolute attribute of diglossia (Fasold, 50-2).
Finally, Fasold also contributed to the understanding of diglossic stability by 
identifying the role of functional specialization and formal distinctiveness between 
H and L. Agreeing with Ferguson about relative stability of functional 
specialization, Fasold indicated that whiie some overlap between functions is 
possible, a high degree of overlap is usually a sign of the incipient breakdown of
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the diglossic relationship (Fasold, 52). In general, Fasold identifies two 
characteristics of changing diglossia: 1) leakage in function; 2) mixing in form. 
(Fasold, 55)
On the basis of h«s additions and corrections, Fasold suggests a definition of 
broad diglossia that will be used in further analysis:
Broad diglossia is the reservation of highly valued segments of a 
community’s linguistic repertoire (which are not the first to be learned, but 
are learned later and more consciously, usually through formal education), 
for situations perceived as more formal and guarded; and the reservation of 
less highly valued segments (which are learned first with little or no 
conscious effort), of any degree of linguistic relatedness to the higher 
valued segments, from stylistic differences to separate languages, for 
situations perceived as more informal and intimate. (Fasold, 53)
Fasold then determines the place of the classic definition of diglossia in his 
conceptual framework by identifying three types of broad diglossia:
1) classic diglossia, which exists whenever divergent dialects can be 
found;
2) superposed bilingualism, which refers to functional differentiation of 
separate languages;
3) style shifting, which takes place in the case of stylistic differences 
between varieties. (Fasold, p.54)
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Language Maintenance and Shift
One of the ways to characterize the stability of diglossia is with the help of the 
concepts of language maintenance and language shift. Language maintenance 
refers to the stable preference of the speakers of a language community for the 
use of a particular language as the main means of communication. Language shift 
refers to a change in language as the main means of communication. The 
concept of language shift serves to identify a change in language attitudes at the 
societal level, when the members of a community have collectively chosen a new 
language as a means of communication. One special case of language shift is 
called language death. It takes place when a community consisting of the last 
surviving native speakers of a language shifts to a new language totally so that 
the old language is no longer used (Fasold, 213).
There are a number of important conditions associated with language shift 
that will be useful in our subsequent discussion of the language situation in 
Kazakhstan. A necessary condition is presence of societal bilingualism. 
Bilingualism, however, is not a sufficient condition. The second condition is 
existence of bilingualism during several generations: in almost all cases, societal 
language shift comes about through intergenerational switching 
(Lieberson, 11-29). Language shift is also typically attributed to such causes as 
migration, industrialization, urbanization, educational and other government 
pressures, decline in speaker population, and changes in language prestige 
(Fasold, 217).
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Language Planning and Standardization
Since the focus of our discussion is language policy, it might be beneficial to 
define some basic concepts connected with policy making in the domain of 
language.
One such basic concept is language planning, which means an explicit choice 
among alternative languages, design of a program that would allow a shift to 
occur in the direction of the chosen alternative and subsequent evaluation of the 
program in relation to the previously existing situation.
Bjorn Jernudd mentioned two aspects of language planning: language 
determination and language development (16-7). Language determination refers 
to 'large-chunk‘ choices of languages that need to be used for specific purposes 
(official language, language of instruction, etc). Language development refers to 
the promotion of variants within a language.
The most important language determination issue around the world is f  ° 
choice of national languages. The choice is determined by a set of functions that a 
national language is expected to fulfill. The most important of the functions 
mentioned in the available literature include:
1) symbolic (separatist+unifying), which, in fact, defines a nation as a 
social entity, prevents a nation from falling apart by maintaining the 
common identity of all the citizens of the nation (unifying function) 
which is distinct fro m  ^ o n t i r -  3 of other nations of the world
(separatist function);
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2) communicative, which provides for effective interaction between 
citizens of a nation, a condition essential for success of the nation as 
a whole:
3) participatory, which allows a nation to remain an integral part of the 
world community. (Haugen, 1966. 50-71; cf. Jernudd and Das 
Gupta; Garvin and Mathiot, 1973)
An ideal national language should be able to fulfill all the three functions, 
although not every language is capable of doing this. In order to be capable of 
serving as an effective means of communication, a national language should have 
a sufficient set of varieties to reflect any aspect of the nation’s life. To serve in the 
oadicipatory function, it should have a certain number of speakers around the 
world and have the status of a language of international communication. As a 
symbol, the language should have a recognized status based upon its historical 
and present functionality as a means of intra-national and international 
communication.
Of the three functions, the symbolic one is the most important. The other two 
can be fulfilled by other languages of a special status. Such functional 
differentiation is usually temporary. Because the svmb^i: ction is directly
related to the status of a language and the other functions -  to the ability of the 
.: to fulfill the communicative and the participatory functions, there is a 
general tendency for nations to fortify their identity by facilitating the development 
of their national language in order to increase its functionality and, consequently,
its status.
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Ferguson identified 3 forms of language development:
1) graphization, i.e. adoption of a writing system and the establishment of 
spelling and other orthographic conventions, such as capitalization and 
punctuation;
2) standardization, i.e. ‘the process of one variety of a language becoming 
widely accepted throughout the speech community as a supra-dialectai 
norm -  the ’’best” form of the language -  rated above regional and 
social dialects;
3) modernization, i.e. 'the process of...becoming the equal of other 
developed languages as a medium of communication’. (Ferguson,
1968, 27-36)
By modernization, Ferguson meant first of all expantion of vocabulary and 
“development of new styles and forms of discourse” (Ferguson, 1968, 32). 
Analyzing Ferguson’s interpretation of vocabulary expansion, Fasold makes a 
comment that will be useful for our further discussion of the situation in 
Kazakhstan:
...as far as vocabulary expansion goes, it does not matter much to the 
linguist whether the new vocabulary comes from some other language (by 
borrowing) or whether it is made up of elements already in the ianguage. 
Flowever, borrowing versus coinage often becomes an emotional issue in 
actual practice. Not infrequently, a planning agency will attempt to ‘purify’ 
the language by replacing borrowing with newly coined words. As long as
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coinage does not conflict with what members of the society are prepared to 
do, it works out well... When loanwords are already in regular use by 
speakers and writers, however, an attempt to purge them will probably fail. 
(Fasold, 249)
Ferguson’s examples of “new forms of discourse" included “paragraphing, 
ordered sequences, transitions, summaries, cross-references, etc.”
Fasold correctly explains that what Ferguson meant by “the development of new 
styles of discourse” was not grammatical intellectualization, i.e. “development of 
word formation techniques and syntactic devices allowing for the construction of 
elaborate, yet tightly knit, compound sentences” (Garvin and Mathiot, 1973, 
24-73) but rather “acquisition of skill in the use of linguistic resources that a 
language probably already has” (Fasold, 249).
Although the most recognized and powerful (not necessarily successful) 
planning agency is government, most sociolinguists (Haugen; Ray; Rubin, 1973) 
agree that planning can be conducted by almost anybody. Fasold gives several 
examples of non-government planning:
1) The decision by the Roman Catholic Church in the 1960s to, which 
allowed the use of vernacular languages in place of Latin, and the 
revision in liturgical language in the Church of England in 1980s;
2) Decision-making on proper use of a language performed by language 
academies in some countries;
3) Dictionary compiling efforts of Samuel Johnson and Noah Webster 
which resulted in standardization of the meanings and spellings of
26
words in the English speaking countries;
4) Language-use decisions made by translators and publishers during 
the early days of printing -  these decisions set precedents of what 
was considered appropriate for some time thereafter;
5) Orthography-related decisions of missionaries when they attempt to 
translate the Bible into unwritten languages;
6) National non-government agencies, such as the Singapore Chamber 
of Commerce, which constructed and issued language examinations 
and a style manual for business correspondence in Malay;
7) individual businesses, such as the Shell Company, which provided its 
own Malay oil terminology and influences language development in its 
personnel and training policies;
8) Contemporary editors who help to implement government’s 
standardization decisions in practical ways by disseminating newly 
adopted rules in proofread texts;
9) Individual authors, writers and even after-dinner speakers, who 
disseminate the rules by means of their influence;
10) Individual managers, who impose a certain procedure for 
correspondence in their office, thus affecting language-planning on a 
smaller scale. (Fasold, 246-66)
These examples support the conclusion made by Ray:
...any formal organized action by an acknowledged authority, such as a
State or a Church or a learned society or an author, can be successful in
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its intention to encourage or discourage linguistic habits only if it correlates
maximally to informal unorganized action on the part of numerous locally
more accessible authorities. (Ray, 764)
Rubin outlined the four steps of the planning process:
1) Fact-finding: a substantial amount of background information should be 
available before any planning decisions are made:
2) Planning: here the actual decisions are made; "’The planner will 
establish goals, select the means (strategies), and predict the 
outcome”;
3) Implementation: the planning decisions are carried out;
4) Feedback: at this step, the planner finds out how well the plan has 
worked. (Rubin. 1971, 218-220)
Fasold also mentions the main tools that a government can use in 
language planning decisions. These include
1) Educational system, where the ways range from teaching the language 
in accordance with the newly introduced orthographic innovations to 
offering the language as a school subject, using it as a medium of 
instruction or even imposing on children the requirement to use the 
language in school;
2) Government agencies, where knowledge of the national language can 
be a requirement for employment (introduction of such a requirement 
can have a positive impact on language development in two cases:
a) when civil service employment is extremely prestigious and the status
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connected with it is a significant motivating factor for learning the 
language, and b) when the language is used in legislation and 
government-related documentation);
3) Military, which can be extremely important if the country has universal 
conscription;
4) Print and media, which can be either forced (if the regime is 
authoritarian) or subsidized/exempted from taxation to publish or 
broadcast in the national language, (Fasold, 253)
Non-government agencies that may participate in language-planning and 
their typical methods are:
1) Professional societies that can issue official terminology lists as guides 
to their members;
2) Businesses that have an effect on language planning by their personnel 
and training practices;
3) Political and cultural organizations and societies that offer public 
courses and cultural events aimed at preservation and popularization of 
the national language. (Fasold, 253)
Finally, Fasold also mentions the role of an individual speaker of the national 
language. Specifically, he claims that an active role can be assumed by writers or 
filmmakers, who choose to create in the national language, thus encouraging their 
viewers or readers to learn the language. Even an ordinary citizen can potentially 
participate in language planning by refusing to communicate with other citizens in 
a language other than the national one. Fasold gives an interesting example of a
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Welsh speaker, who “would speak slowly, but require the other person to reply on 
whatever competence in Welsh he had" (Fasold, 254).
Haugen has proposed three criteria for language planning. These are:
1) efficiency, or ease of learning and use;
2) adequacy, the ability of a form to convey information with the 
desired degree of precision;
3) acceptability, the degree of acceptance by the members of the 
society where the planning is taking place. (Haugen, 61-3)
Of the three, the last one is usually disregarded despite the fact that it is 
extremely important if the language is to fulfill its symbolic function. No matter how 
“easy to learn and use” a language might be, it will never become widely used if 
the speakers experience aversion to it. At the same time, absence of aversion is 
not sufficient for speakers to willingly switch from one language to another. The 




The questions addressed in the analysis of the historical preliminaries of the 
linguistic situation in contemporary Kazakhstan are as follows:
a) When did recognized Russian/Kazakh diglossia and societal bilingualism 
emerge?
b) How did their character change over time?
c) How did they affect and how were they affected by the dynamics of 
interethnic communication?
d) When did language shift occur and in which directions?
e) How did language shift result from and in turn cause a change in ethnic 
and national identities?
f) How did nationality and language policies became transformed in the 
context of mainstream political ideology?
Colonial Period: Emergence of Diglossia 
Overview of the Colonial Period
The question about the first appearance of diglossia is very difficult to answer. 
The extent of diglossia remained rather limited even at the eve of the Socialist 
Revolution, however, by the end of the colonial period there had emerged at least 
one domain reserved exclusively for Russian-the domain of the official colonial
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legislation and government communication-to claim the existence of digiossia. 
Therefore, it would not be a mistake to refer to the colonial period as the period of 
emerging digiossia.
Early digiossia was not accompanied by societal bilingualism because serving 
primarily as the language of written communication in the proceedings of the 
colonial apparatus, Russian assumed the functions which had never been fulfilled 
by Kazakh and which were barely necessary in everyday communication of the 
culturally unassimilated Kazakh masses. Therefore, the knowledge of Russian 
was necessary only for those few who worked for the colonial bureaucracy.
Because nationalism evolved only towards the end of the colonial period, the 
czarist administration never implemented a direct and conscious nationality or 
language policy, i.e. policy based upon an understanding of the importance of an 
interethnic dynamics and distribution of language statuses for societal stability and 
directed towards modification of dynamics and distribution of status. Political acts 
related to language development and resolution of interethnic conflicts were often 
no more than an aspect of genera! economic and social legislation as well as of 
related administrative reforms. Education and human-resource policy in the 
bureaucratic system were the main spheres for implementation of ianguage- 
related initiatives.
Most of the recognized researchers in nationality and language policy issues 
in Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union consider the pre-revolutionary period as 
non-discrete. In the specific case of Kazakhstan, however, when focusing on the 
language planning aspect of nationality policy, it might be reasonable to
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distinguish between two stages, each characterized by a specific type of socio­
economic structure, a form of power distribution, interethnic dynamics, functional 
assignment between the two languages under consideration and corresponding 
language policy approaches. Following is a discussion of the two stages in detail. 
Keep in mind that this division is artificial and the actual transition from one type of 
language policy to another, as well as the modification of functional assignment 
between the languages, occurred as a continuous process. The suggested 
division into periods might not be perfectly accurate, but its accuracy is hoped to 
be sufficient for identification of the language planning approaches that would re­
appear later during the times of emergence of Soviet multilingualism.
Early Colonial Period
The first period started in 1731, the year when Abulkhair Khan, the head of 
one of the three Kazakh tribal unions (zhuzes), accepted the terms of joining 
Russia. It lasted till the end of the third quarter of the 19th century, when the 150- 
year-long process of annexation was completed and most of the colonial 
administrative apparatus was put into place. In its turn, the period was divided into 
two more stages, which I will further refer to as the onset and the end (see Olcott, 
19S5, 28-57,).
At the onset of the process, the new colony was viewed mainly as a 
fortification line to protect the southern borders of the Empire. Although Russians 
realized the potential role of the steppe as the gate to Central Asia, since they 
were still at the stage of feudalism, they had neither significant economic interests
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in the newly annexed lands nor political power to directly influence Kazakhs’ 
internal affairs (see Olcott, 1995, 28-57).
In their turn, the Kazakh khans who were the first to accept the Russian 
protectorate viewed their agreement with the czar as a way to increase their 
political authority over the tribes under their rule, as well as to protect their people 
from Dzhungars, the war with whom had turned unsuccessful for the declining 
Kazakh Zhuzes. So the alliance took the shape of semi-dependency, with the 
Russian administration promising military and political support in return for the 
right to establish fortifications along the border, for the provisions of the 
traditional caravan escort for Russian merchants by Kazakh militia, for the benefit 
of natural exchange of agricultural for nomadic products, as well as for the 
advantage to have a word in external policy decisions 
(see Olcott, 1995, 28-57).
By the beginning of annexation, neither of the peoples had developed into a 
nationality . Russians, although already centralized and perceiving themselves as 
distinct from other culturally and linguistically related Slavic tribes, were only 
entering the epoch of imperialist capitalism, which would lead to the decline of the 
traditional family and natural economy that kept their ethnos from becoming a less 
localist nationality (Kan, 35-8).
Kazakhs had also developed an ethnic identity that allowed them to 
distinguish themselves from other Turkic peoples, except for, perhaps, closely 
related nomadic Kyrgyz. Although Kazakhs Zhuzes were disintegrated at the point 
of annexation, Kazakhs had experienced unification under a single ruier before.
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This experience created a precedent for the rise of nationalism under a colonial 
regime later in the 19th century. Unfortunately, the criterion of localism as a 
determinant of nationality status is barely applicable in case of nomadic Kazakhs. 
However, the sustaining importance of tribal affiliation required by the nature of 
nomadic economy might serve as a proof that by 1731 Kazakhs had not yet 
developed a sufficient level of individualism to rise above the level of kinship 
affiliation and had not yet acquired a strong collective supra-tribal identity (if 
strength is determined by awareness not only in the times of external threat, but 
during the times of political stability and economic prosperity, toot to qualify as a 
nationality (see Tynyshpayev, 78-123).
None of the states had evolved into a nation. Russia could not be a nation 
dominated by Russian nationality because the latter was virtually nonexistent.
It could hardly be claimed to have evolve into a nation unified on grounds other 
than ethnic affiliation because, under conditions of territorial isolation 
characteristic of feudalism, such unification was simply unnecessary. Even if such 
unification had been in any least needed, it would have had poor chances of 
success, with the indigenous peoples of the colonies being still powerful enough 
to resist any sort of cultural assimilation.
A much more important necessity was to keep the newly colonized people 
loyal to the Russian czar and willing to remain a part of the empire. As long as 
such loyalty was in place, Russians did not care whether the peoples prayed to 
the same god or spoke the same language. To fulfill their task, the imperial 
administration used different approaches with each of the colonized peoples,
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trying to be sensitive to unique cultural characteristics and individual interests, 
since it was engaged in increasing its influence and the colonies’ dependence. 
The sum of these differentiating culture-sensitive approaches, aimed at 
maintaining loyalty to the state rather than to the Russian culture, targeting the 
establishment of oolitical influence rather than at the formation of group identity 
can be treated as a precedent of the 20th century nationality policy approach of 
Sovietization (Tynyshpayev, 78-123).
In the case of Kazakhstan, the approach consisted in keeping nomadic tribes 
motivated to stay under Russia'. rule, to attract new members from the steppe 
and to increase czarist influence and presence in the life of nomads. This was 
done by playing on their intertribal conflicts, by bribing the khans, and, 
simultaneously, by encouraging migration from the Russian territories to the 
imperial periphery, as well as by building military forts for presumably common 
security purposes. The Kazakh identity remained largely intact. No attempts to 
ingrain an idea of unity with either Russians or other ethnicities of the empire were 
undertaken (see Tynyshpayev, 78-123).
The semi-dependent Kazakhs had not yet formed a nation, either. Because of 
nomadism and strong tribal affiliation, the Kazakh khanate was only relatively 
stable at the beginning of annexation with a higher degree of inter-tribal 
mobilization taking place during the times of external threats and availability of 
strong leadership. Therefore, although it was ethnically homogeneous, a national 
idea had never become a basis for political unification because of the lack of 
necessity in such an idea for the confederation of the relatively autonomous
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nomadic tribes (see Tynyshpayev, 98-115).
Hence at the beginning of annexation, Kazakh tribes lost autonomy only in 
the sphere of external policy, and economic and cultural assimilation had not yet 
achieved a pace destructive to Kazakh ethnic identity; no tensions on ethnic 
grounds took place (see Tynyshpayev, 98-115).
Under these circumstances, a special form of diglossia had evolved.
The functional roles of Russian and Kazakh had not changed within their usual 
domains, i.e. Kazakh was used in all spheres of communication among Kazakhs, 
while Russian was used as a language of communication among Russians, and 
increasingly, as the official language of the emerging Russian Empire.
Designation of Russian as the language of official communication was not 
accidental. On the one hand, it had a long written literary tradition history. Kazakh 
had such a tradition, too, but writing was used mainly in religious discourse with 
most of the regulations concerning internal affairs being preserved in the format of 
orally described traditions and practices. In general, introduction of regulations in 
the steppe was often a consequence of sufficient occurrences of a certain 
problem, so Kazakhs were not concerned about the pro-active Russian 
ordinances themselves, or about the language in which they were compiled, until 
the ordinances started to have a direct effect upon their lives. On the other hand, 
the dominance of Russian in discourse related to affairs external to the life of 
Kazakh tribes can be explained by the nature of the Kazakh-Russian partnership 
in general. Kazakhs agreed upon the use of Russian as the language of official 
communication when they signed the contracts delegating their right for decision
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making in foreign poiicy to the czarist administration (Asfendiyarov,
157-9).
Bilingualism was still at the individual level with most of communication in 
trade and political discourse taking place by means of non-native interpreters.
The only change that happened was activation of official communication between 
Russian and Kazakh speakers with Russian being assigned the formal role of the 
language of documentation.
There was one conscious effort that could be viewed as a manifestation of 
ethnic sensitivity: the preference given by the czarist administration to Tatar 
interpreters. These interpreters were close to Kazakhs in language and culture, a 
circumstance perceived as conductive to the formation of the desired loyalty to the 
czar (see Asfendiyarov, 168-177).
Thus, at the onset of the first period, diglossia was a formal rather than an 
actual state of affairs with czarist legislative documents passed by the central 
colonial administration and compiled in Russian and translated into Kazakh later 
by non-native interpreters. Bilingualism was primarily at the individual level and 
was rare among the indigenous population. Interethnic communication was rather 
stable, mostly because the two peoples were relatively isolated from each other. 
At the same time, the Russian administration had not yet developed sufficient 
interest and presence in the steppe to be able to conduct a policy completely 
insensitive to the interests of the Kazakh population. Therefore, some cultural and 
linguistic sensitivities were an integral part of the efforts in the direction of military
and economic expansion.
38
This relative stability lasted for only about 25 years, during which Russians 
were building a line of military forts and cities all along the border of the steppe. 
Towards the end of the first period, the increase of military presence changed the 
balance of power between Russians and Kazakhs. This change allowed the 
czarist administration to continue expansion, acting against the interests of the 
indigenous population by imposing official restrictions on the use of lands by 
Kazakhs and persecuting any attempts of Kazakhs not to comply. The loss of 
lands caused the first wave of dissatisfaction among Kazakhs, which motivated 
them to join peasant wars initiated by the Russian poor and to organize their own 
anticolonial upheavals in the last quarter of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th 
centuries (see Asfendiyarov, 228-56).
From 1820 to the1860s, the czarist administration conducted a number of 
administrative reforms that targeted political independence for Kazakh rulers. The 
reforms started with elimination of the institute of the khanate and ended with the 
installation of a colonial bureaucratic apparatus where all the key roles were 
occupied by ethnic Russians or by specially trained Kazakh nobility enculturated 
into Russian values and committed to czarism. These reforms were conducted 
gradually, in several steps, but each of them was nevertheless immediately 
followed by an increase in anti-Russian and separatist moods among Kazakhs, 
which again demonstrated that the actions of the Russian administration were 
now in conflict with the interests of the indigenous population.
During the second half of the first period, incipient diglossia moved from the 
potential into a consciously actualized state. This situation happened primarily
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because of the increase in interference of czarism into internal affairs of Kazakhs, 
resulting in Russian assuming some functions previously fulfilled by Kazakh in the 
sphere of administrative communication. In addition, the colonial authorities 
became more suspicious of Tatar translators, who pursued their own purposes in 
the steppe, proselytizing for Islam, which was now perceived as alienating 
Kazakhs from Russia. The concerned czarist administration started to make some 
efforts in nurturing a class of native nobility, devoted to the colonial system and 
enculturated into Russian values. As a consequence, Russian was being 
increasingly used not only for documentation, but also for oral political debate, 
since both Russian and designated Kazakh participants could speak the 
language. Bilingualism still remained at the individual level, although now there 
were more bilingual indigenous interpreters (see Tynyshpayev, 113-124).
Towards the end of the first period, diglossia, although restricted, became 
more widely spread with Russian being increasingly used in the sphere of official 
communication. Although bilingualism still occurred at the individual level, it was 
now more widespread among the native population. Interethnic communication 
became charged with some sense of intolerance of the ethnicities towards each 
other. This intolerance, however, was intertwined with dissatisfaction with the 
colonial policy and would often resolve into manifestations of protest against 
czarism together with the Russian peasantry and the exploited masses of other 
peoples in the empire. Nationality and language policy per se were still non­
existent. Moreover, with the change in power distribution, the czarist 
administration became less sensitive to the interests of the southern colony. Even
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in the attempt to train native rather than Tatar bureaucracy, it acted out of its own 
interests rather than out of the interests of the local population (see Tynyshpayev, 
113-124).
In general, the first period was characterized by diglossia restricted to the 
domain of official communication with Russian and Kazakh used interchangeably 
in economic spheres (trade). Bilingualism was still at the individual level within a 
small circle of native individuals serving colonial administration. Language policy 
at this stage was an integral part of administrative system reform rather than a 
rubric of a nationality policy consisting of a conscious effort to modify functional 
assignment between languages with the intent to affect group cohesiveness.
Late Colonial Period
The second period started in the last quarter of the 19th century, when the 
end to the continuous process of annexation was accomplished by the conquest 
of the Senior Zhuz and the rest of Central Asia and by the establishment of a 
functional colonial apparatus which distanced Kazakhs from decision making in 
both external and interna! affairs. It lasted till the fall of the Czarist Empire in 1917, 
when the nations and languages suddenly lost the statuses and roles that they 
had acquired under the imperial system and a new system of roles and statuses 
came into existence (see Olcott, 1995, 35-57).
By the middle of the 18th century, the interests and powers of both interacting 
sides--Russia and Kazakhstan-had changed. Russia was rapidly joining the 
international race for industrialization, its plants and factories, as well as
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commercialized agriculture, demanding new material, land and human resources. 
Czarist administration was no longer satisfied with indirect influence on internal 
affairs of Kazakhs. Having increased military presence and finalizing 
administrative reforms, it now had enough power to dictate its will and to handle 
any sort of resistance (see Olcctt, 1995, 57-83).
Kazakhs, on the other hand, had been weakened as a result of the 
systematic “divide and conquer” policy of czarism and the decline of traditional 
economy as a consequence of land ioss and restrictions on relocation imposed by 
the colonial administration. The relationship of limited autonomy (protectorate) 
was replaced by total colonial dependence with Kazakhs being completely 
incorporated into the larger Empire, treated similarly to the Russian masses in 
implementation of economic and social reforms and even participating in 
anticolonial upheavals together with the population of other colonies, as well as in 
peasant and worker riots in Russian villages and towns (see Asfendiyarov, 225-9).
Towards the end of the 19th century, both peoples had also started to develop 
a feeling of national identity. In the case of the Russians, the weakening of the 
parochial family and the rise of both international and country-level markets 
triggered the formation of identity, by the development of infrastructure and new 
means of communication that allowed group identity to rise above the local level 
(see Tynyshpayev, 150-67).
in the case of the Kazakhs, nationalist aspirations were primarily a direct 
outcome of a century-long experience of anticolonial movement, which, as 
Russian influence and Kazakh powerlessness increased over time, was becoming
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more and more organized and separatist in nature, thus contributing to the 
formation of a strong non-localist supra-tribal identity. Another factor that 
contributed to the formation of national identity was the weakening of tribal ties, 
partially as a result of the relocation restrictions imposed by the colonial 
administration. Some of the restrictions were introduced directly by issuing 
ordinances prohibiting Kazakhs to use lands designated for military fortresses and 
the use of Russian peasants (see Olcctt, 1995. 57-83).
In the second half of the 19th century, such restrictions were imposed 
indirectly by the division into administrative territories without regard to traditional 
distribution of pastures between the tribes. In any case, the lack of lands made 
Kazakhs change the patterns of land use and became involved in more frequent 
intertribal interactions (see Olcott, 1995, 57-83).
Another contributor to the weakening of tribal affiliation was the development 
of a capitalist economy. With the example of Russian landowners the profitability 
of trade was evident for the increasingly impoverished as a result of land- 
deprivation Kazakhs. Therefore, while the less powerful majority of them were 
turning into an easily available and cheap agricultural workforce, the financially 
able ones became motivated to adopt capitalist principles of organization for 
stock-breeding and, in some places, of irrigated agriculture. These principles 
included production not only for the purposes of satisfaction of their own needs, 
but mostly for subsequent sale, as well as the use of out-of-tribe employees in 
increasing numbers (see Tynyshpayev, 156-9).
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These moves led to changes in the social structure of Kazakh society, which 
in its turn influenced the internal organization of the people, in addition, they 
resulted in the formation of nomadic and agricultural units on the basis of social 
status rather than kinship. This process of the loosening of the kinship unit was 
accompanied with some growth in the percentage of the urban population of 
Kazakhs, as well as with the appearance of the new social class of industrial 
workers among the previously nomadic population. The sum of all the processes 
produced a formation of group identity on grounds other than kinship affiliation, 
and that is why it would be correct to claim the rise of nationalism developed 
among Kazakhs during this period. The nationalist character of the anticolonial 
war under the leadership of Kenesary Kasymov and, even more so, the national- 
liberating war of 1916, which unified Kazakhs from all parts of the steppe and 
which were motivated by the desire of re-creating an independent Kazakh state, 
are the best evidence of the fact that by the end of the colonial period Kazakhs 
had developed a strong national identity (see Olcott, 1995, 100-129).
Despite the formation of the Russian nationality and the amount of power that 
it exercised in comparison with the peoples populating its numerous colonies, the 
process of nation-formation had not yet been completed. Any attempt to 
implement anything undermining the interests of existing ethnic and emerging 
national minorities and potentially leading to the formation of a nation under the 
political control of Russians was destined to face a fierce protest. The possibility 
of unification on grounds other than ethnicity had not been discussed in Russian 
educated circles preoccupied with disputes either about the ways to preserve the
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traditional way of life or about the fastest ways of adopting the progressive 
European innovations (see Tynyshpayev, 1995, 117-123).
Although no direct nationality policy had yet emerged, the character of the 
human resource strategy of the colonial apparatus, which had been previously 
charged with some ethnic sensitivity, was undergoing more changes. At a first 
glance, the strategy was still the same: the colonial administration was putting 
much effort into educating a Russian-speaking native bureaucracy. The motives 
behind the strategy, however, had transformed. If before the Russian-language 
endorsement had been conducted with the purpose of maintaining the sensitivity 
of the administration to the interests of the indigenous population, now the main 
reason was connected with a desire to use this influential part of the native 
population for dissemination of Russian values (see Asfendiyarov, 265-89). What 
showed the change in orientation of the emerging nationality policy was the 
growing intolerance of the Russian administration towards the alternative Tatar 
schools, where Kazakh students received Russian language instruction, but 
where the latter was accompanied with indoctrination into Islamic and anti- 
Russian values. Further evidence was the hasty attempt to transform the Arabic- 
based Kazakh alphabet into its Cyrillic counterpart with the underlying desire to 
get rid of the influence from the East. This strategy was a precursor of what 
researchers in Soviet nationalism call the policy of Russification (see 
Tynyshpayev, 167-89).
As for the dynamics of interethnic communication, it would be reasonable to 
claim that intensification of conflicts on nationalist grounds caused by the growth
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in national self-awareness of both the Kazakh and the Russian peoples, as well 
as the low level of cultural sensitivity of colonial policy-making, were the main 
reasons for the Kazakh popular masses to join the Bolsheviks’ movement against 
Czarism in 1917 (see Oicott, 1995, 100-129).
The development of capitalism accompanied by the growth in intercultural 
communication both increased the extent and changed the character of the 
functional assignment of domains between Russian and Kazakh. Russian was 
now dominant not only in the sphere of official communication, it was increasingly 
becoming the language of scientific research, if in the areas of business and 
commerce both languages were still being used interchangeably because both 
Russian and Kazakh sides expressed interest in development of the domains, the 
growing scientific intercourse encouraged primarily by the czarist administration 
was gradually switching from Oriental languages to Russian. It is not that czarism 
was willing to invest money into the development of Kazakh science, but the 
growth in popularity of secular education made more Kazakh nobility send their 
offspring to secular Russian rather than to traditional Moslem schools. The young 
intelligentsia, being brought up on the values of the European civilization, and 
striving to obtain recognition among the Russian scientific circles, would choose 
Russian as the language for their scientific works, even when their works were 
connected with the exploration of Kazakh land, culture and natural resources 
(see Asfendiyarov, 245-67).
As in the case of diglossia in the first period, diglossia in the second period of 
colonization was rather restricted. The scientific domain had never been
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dominated by the Kazakhs, and with scientific discourse being foreign to the 
needs of the poor and mostly illiterate Kazakh masses, bilingualism continued to 
remain at the level of individual communication, although one could note 
increasing numbers of bilinguals among the Kazakh intelligentsia and nobility.
The penetration of Russian into the scientific domain was, of course, not 
accidental. Although not a result of conscious and direct language legislation, it 
was an outcome of the colonial administration's efforts to develop the system of 
education for the purpose of training a class of Russian-speaking, loyal natives 
that could serve the needs of colonial bureaucracy and fulfill the function of role- 
models in the early attempts of cultural assimilation. The fact that the 
administration was taking education as a serious asset in Russification can be 
demonstrated by their willingness to collaborate with a distinctive figure among 
the Kazakh intelligentsia of the time--the famous Kazakh pedagogue Ibrai 
Altynsarin. While nominally only a school inspector for the Turgai region, 
Altynsarin was in fact the architect behind the network of secular schools 
introduced in the steppe at the end of the 19th century; the network, which, 
according to Martha Olcott
...was not intended to achieve mass literacy, but to educate a small sector 
of society, a new elite, who it was hoped would become bilingual and 
accept the ‘inherent superiority’ of the Russian culture (and maybe even
the Russian fakh) (Olcott, '1935. 181'
The establishment of a network of Russian sen n  steppe was closely 
related to another indirect language-policy eftort-the attempt to transfer the
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Kazakh alphabet from Arabic into Cyrillic script. As it has been mentioned, this 
was done for the purpose of eliminating the influence of the anti-Russian Islamic 
Orient. Being not only a distinguished educator, but also a recognized linguist, 
Altynsarin was the author of the first version of the Cyrillic-based Kazakh 
alphabet. According to Olcott,
Altynsarin spent his life striving against what he feared was the imminent 
destruction of a unique Kazakh people, who unable to adapt their nomadic 
economy, would slip in status and merge with the undistinguished rabble of 
the empire. He maintained that the successful economic transformation of 
the Kazakh economy would occur only if a minimal level of technical 
education was introduced. Altynsarin often found himself in conflict with his 
Russian superiors as he attempted to achieve "enlightenment” without 
Russification. He had to be “convinced” that the Cyrillic script was better 
than the Arabic one, yet he shared the Russians’ belief that Kazakh needs 
would best be served by a network of secular rather than confessional 
schools. (Olcott. 1985, 187)
The connection of language reform with the establishment of the educational 
system was due to the fact that, according to Altynsarin’s proposal, the schools 
were supposed to teach native language literacy in Cyrillic. The educator, in fact, 
put considerable effort into the development of an instructional methodology and 
Kazakh primers. It was very unfortunate that his efforts were fruitless; in the last 
decade of the 19th century, the newly created Cyrillic alphabet fell into disuse
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mostly because of the unwillingness of the czarist administration to publish new 
instructional materials (see Olcott, 1985. 187).
Altynsarin was not the only representative of the Kazakh intelligentsia who 
was concerned about the status of the native tongue. One of the unexpected 
outcomes of the human resource policy of czarism was the formation of a class of 
educated native individuals who were brought up in the best traditions of 
European education, but nevertheless remained committed to their own culture, 
striving to bringing to the steppe the best advantages of Western civilization and, 
simultaneously, to do everything possible to prevent cultural assimilation and to 
maintain cultural sovereignty. The contribution of these individuals to the 
development of the Kazakh language was both direct and indirect. Some of them 
influenced the emergence of the modern Kazakh language by their literary, 
political and philosophical works. Others, like Baitursynov and Bukeikhanov, were 
initiating discussions about the purity of the Kazakh ianguage, and about the 
development of a script which would better reflect the Kazakh phonological 
system. The last two also made a huge contribution into understanding the 
grammatical structure of Kazakh (see Olcott, 1985, 189).
Worth mentioning is that both types language development activities were an 
integral part of the process of emergence of the Kazakh national identity. Both 
were most visible on the pages of newspapers published by groups of the national 
intelligentsia (see Olcott, 1985, 189).
Thus, the second period of the colonial era was characterized by an increase 
in functional domains assumed by Russian with the language being used not only
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in official discourse, but also in scientific communication. Although still at the 
individual level, bilingualism was becoming more widespread among certain 
circles of Kazakh society, specifically among the class of Kazakh nobility and the 
emerging class of Kazakh intelligentsia. The end of the colonial period was also 
marked by the rise of nationalism and marked tensions in interethnic 
communication. Language-related initiatives remained only a part of economic 
and social policy; increasingly, however, language development was being 
initiated by the representatives of the indigenous population.
Soviet Period: Emergence of Bilingualism 
Emerging Bilingualism
The time when Kazakhstan became largely bilingual is more difficult to 
identify. On the one hand, it can never be clear when exactly bilingualism takes 
place with respect to the degree of mastery of the participating languages by the 
speakers:
1) when most of the citizens of a particular country are able to 
communicate in two languages, although they may prefer to use only 
one of these languages when not constrained by the necessity to use 
both or;
2) when the citizens are not only proficient in both languages, but also 
have no preference for either of them in actual communication. (Crystal,
362-3)
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On the other hand, the problem of identifying the exact moment of the 
emergence of bilingualism is complicated by the vagueness of the distinction 
between individual and societal bilingualism, which are essentially forms of group 
bilingualism. The question here is how big a group should be to qualify at the 
societal level. In addition, in case of the Soviet Union, even with census results at 
hand it is virtually impossible to access either the degree of language proficiency 
and use or the actual number of speakers of a particular language because of the 
subjectivity of self-assessment used in the censuses and because of the distorted 
character of the published official reports of survey results. The only fact that is 
more or less unquestionable is that by the time of the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, Kazakhstan was bilingual (Olcott, 1985, 192-203). Since it is impossible to 
pinpoint an actual date of emergence of societal bilingualism in Soviet 
Kazakhstan, let us treat the whole epoch as the epoch of emerging bilingualism.
Traditionally, researchers distinguish three periods in the development of 
Soviet nationality and language policy. Because of some decline in interest 
towards this issue after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the relatively short but 
extremely important period of Gorbachev’s reformation was never carefully 
considered by researchers. This circumstance provides us with an 
opportunity to contribute to the field by also considering this fourth period.
What follows is a detailed description of each of the proposed periods:
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Period of Leninist Sovietization (1917-1924)
The first period of the Soviet development started in 1917 with the Bolsheviks’ 
victory in the October Revolution and ended with the death of its leader, V I.
Lenin, in 1924. It was the time when the idealistic program of socio-economic 
reform that allowed the Bolsheviks to overthrow bourgeois government was 
transformed by the complexity of reality into controversial practices which created 
the basis for the subsequent gradual transformation of the ideals themselves.
Having overthrown the dysfunctional and therefore short-lived Provisional 
Government, the Bolsheviks had not thrown away the main challenge it inherited 
from czarism. The challenge consisted in keeping together culturally diverse and 
linguistically dissimilar populations of formally one of the biggest world’s empires. 
Moreover, for the Bolsheviks, the task was now complicated by the fact that most 
of the numerous peoples of what was soon *o become the U S S R .  had 
developed some sort of national identity by 1917. It was the invisibility of this 
identity to the colonial czarist administration that had been one of the most 
important triggers and determinants of success of the October Revolution (Read, 
267-89). To make matters worse, in the case of some of the non-Russian 
peoples, Central Asians in particular, the feeling of national identity strengthened 
to the point of potential separatism as a result of experiencing relative autonomy 
during the bourgeois democracy brought about by the February Revolution and by 
the anarchy of the Civil War following the October revolt (see Olcott, 1995, 129-
57).
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in the specific case of Kazakhstan the complication originated in the ex­
colony’s experience of recognized self-governance after the February Revolution 
and during the Civil War, which made Kazakhs aware of the possibility for 
restoration of independence as a part of the autonomous Republic of Turkestan, 
envisioned as a confederation of historically and culturally related Turkic-speaking 
nationalities (see Olcott, 1995, 129-57). Inspired by the pre-revolutionary 
experience of successful anti-colonial wars, and moved by the ideas of 
sovereignty of the politically influential and popularly recognized national 
democratic intelligentsia, Kazakhs would no longer tolerate invisibility. They would 
prefer the confederation of Turks to the union of the Soviet republics, only if the 
union administration guaranteed them the right for national and linguistic self- 
determination, as well as equal treatment in socio-economic affairs of the new 
nation. The union administration had to satisfy this demand for Kazakh national 
determination conflicting neither similar expectation from other ex-colonies nor the 
purpose of building the unified Communist state (see Olcott, 1995, 129-57).
The Revolutions’ and Civil War’s impact on Russian nationalism was much 
less positive. The panic of the post-October immigration and the wartime 
extermination stripped the Russian people of an impressive number of its 
intellectuals, who carried the essence of group identity. Some of the old 
intelligentsia were still present in the country, either because of assumed political 
neutrality or because of being attracted by the promises of Bolshevism; however, 
they comprised too weak a force to be able to lobby for the interests of Russian
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nationality, thus eliminating one variable in the nationalities problem for the 
Bolsheviks (see Olcott, 1995, 129-57).
The weakening of Russian nationalist aspirations was a favorable 
circumstance for the founders of the new state. On the one hand, there was less 
danger for conflicts on nationalist grounds. On the other, there was a greater 
chance of less resistance to the formation of the new supra-national identity by 
the most numerous, powerful and self-aware nationality of the former Empire.
Whether the rise of Kazakh nationalism would contribute to centripetal or 
centrifugal tendencies depended on what the Boisheviks would make out of it.
The separatist potential of the national minorities had been well understood by 
Lenin before the Revolution, and he used it to excellent advantage in facilitating 
the breakup of the Empire (Rakowska, 72). After the revolution, however, the 
separatist potential became the main impediment to the Bolshevik reform. 
Following is a discussion of how the challenge was addressed by Lenin 
administration’s actual political practice.
In its short-term objective, the nationality policy of the early Soviet state had 
some semblance to the early nationality policy conducted by the administrators of 
imperial Russia. In both cases, the administration was confronted with the same 
temporary problem-winning the trust of the indigenous steppe population in order 
to keep it in the new political formation (empire in one case, and U S S R  in the 
other) (Besancon, 1-14).
The difference between the approaches was in the fact that, in order to 
prevent separatism in the long run, the Bolsheviks, unlike czarist authorities, had
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to cultivate a supra-national identity. Their policy’s sensitivity to cultural diversity 
was a means to prepare soil for nurturing a nation. Adherence to the socio­
economic theory of Communism was to serve as a foundation for the supra­
national identity of a Soviet people. The approach to nation-building 
based upon the supra-national identity of the Soviet citizen is conventionally 
referred to as the policy of Sovietization (Szporluk, 1-24).
Of course, given the new political reality for the Kazakhs (emergence of 
nationalism, negative colonial experience, absence of external threat) the 
approach to “trust-winning” had to be modified. Under the new conditions, 
Kazakhs, as well as other nationalities of the former colonies, had to be provided 
with some official evidence of cultural sensitivity in nationality and language- 
policy-making. Even before the revolution, Bolsheviks stated the evidence in the 
form of two program principles: the principle of full equality and self-determination 
of nations (including the right to secede) and the principle of full freedom and 
equality of languages (including abolition of the required state language), both 
were further included into the “Declaration and Treaty on the Formation of the 
U.S.S.R.” (December 30, 1922) and the subsequent U.S.S.R. Constitutions (1924, 
1936, and 1977)(Bruchis, 23-7).
As with many idealistic statements, the two equality statements turned out to 
be difficult to implement practically when the Bolsheviks came into power, 
especially during the first years, now under consideration. The difficulty in 
applying the first principle to the nationalities of the former empire lay in the fact 
that their popular masses (whose interests the Communist Party of the Soviet
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Union was supposed to serve) were either politically inert or iargely under the 
influence of frequently both anti-Russian and anti-communist indigenous 
intelligentsia, and if given the right, would most probably choose independence. 
The Communists did not perceive such an outcome as beneficial for the national 
peasantry and the working class (see Bruchis, 27).
Realization of the complexity of this reality, where implementation of social 
reforms could be impeded by compliance with the proclaimed principles of the 
nationality policy, led to legislative modifications: the principle of national self- 
determination was paraphrased to be restricted to foreign policy relations 
(see Bruchis, 26). In addition, the danger of secession of former colonies was 
eliminated by centralizing control over the regional committees of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union. During the Eighth Congress of the C.P.S.U, on the 
organizational question it was indicated that
All decisions of the Russian Communist Party and its ruling institutions are 
unconditionally obligatory for all parts of the party, regardless of their 
national composition. (Bruchis, 26)
The Congress also delineated relations between the Party and the Soviets, 
establishing the Communist Party's “full rule in contemporary state organizations 
like soviets” (Bruchis, 27).
According to Michael Bruchis
With such an absolute subordination of national Party organizations of the 
non-Russian Soviet republics to the Russian Communist Party and its 
ruling institutions, on the one hand, and of Soviet organs to the Party ones,
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on the other hand, any possibility of secession by any non-Russian republic 
was excluded. (27)
If the right of secession was eliminated from the very beginning, the right for 
equal treatment was carefully observed by Lenin’s administration. In activities 
ranging from establishing regional organs of self-governance (soviets) to raising 
money to fight hunger in the most distant regions of the country, the founders of 
the Soviet state were committed to the principle of equality of opportunity 
regardless of national affiliation (Thompson, 226-78).
Unlike the main principle of nationality policy, the Bolsheviks’ principle of 
language equality remained rather consistent with its pre-revolutionary version: 
however, just as in case of the nationality policy, it was not observed absolutely.
In a continuation of the imperial tradition, early Soviet language policy was 
conducted in two major domains-bureaucratic and educational (including cultural 
establishments with their educational function). During the Tenth Congress of the 
C.P.S.U. conducted in March 1921, there was indicated the need to
1) develop and fortify, in the native languages, courts, administration, 
organs of economy and authority, composed of local people who know 
the local ways and psychology of the local population;
2) develop the press, school, theater, clubs and general cultural- 
enlightenment institutions in the native language. (Bruchis, 30)
The first of these sub-points turned out to be aborted at the very beginning. 
Even if desired, operation of national state organs in tongues other than Russian 
was impossible for the simple reason that the organs were under party control and
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the party membership was predominantly Russian, both in the Soviet Union as a 
whole, and in each of the republics taken separately. This is not to say that the 
Soviet authorities of the first period were cautious about collaboration with 
national intelligentsia (one evidence of an interest is their extensive reference to 
national intellectuals in alphabet reforms and disseminating literacy). Rather, the 
reason for uninvolvement was connected with voluntary Party membership and 
the low level of the Kazakh masses’ pre-revolutionary and even early post- 
revolutionary participation in political activities in general. Because of the 
circumstantial character of Russian-dominauon in government structure, the 
policy, although contradicting the principle of linguistic equality, was unintentional 
Russification.
One evidence of the absence of intent regarding Russification was the 
adoption of a decree about Russian-Kazakh bilingualism in state institutions at the 
end of the first period (February 1921). In addition, in 1923, a Central Commission 
for the “indigenization" of the state apparatus of Kazakhstan and for the 
introduction of the Kazakh language for the conduct of business, was set up (cf. 
Olcott, “The Politics of Language Reform,” p.192). At the same time, it was 
authorized that the administrative languages should be Kazakh in districts and 
regions with predominately Kazakh populations, and Russian together with 
Kazakh in mixed population areas (Lewis, 70).
In the second point of its statement, the C.P.S.U. Congress recognized the 
role of education, press and cultural institutions, both in meeting the interests of 
the Soviet nationalities and in the future development of the system. The
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underlying assumption was that if the citizens of the country were able to read in 
their native tongue, they could easily be convinced of the advantages of and 
indoctrinated into the new ideology. This could be done via the press, which was 
becoming accessible to popular masses and could help to make them less 
susceptible to external anti-soviet propaganda and to provocations of the informal 
nationalist leaders dissatisfied with the new regime. In addition, a certain level of 
literacy, even in a mother tongue, was a pre-requisite for workforce development 
and for the leap to industrialism that was planned by the central administration. 
Cultural institutions were also perceived as carrying an important role in the 
formation of the Soviet nation, as well as possessing a potential danger of 
nurturing nationalism (see Thompson, 278-86).
With this realization of the importance of literacy, Lenin’s administration made, 
an enormous effort to open elementary schools for children and evening classes 
for adults, to create alphabets for previously unwritten languages and to modify 
existing alphabets (as in case of Kazakh) to better reflect the phonological 
structure, to publish books and newspapers in more than one hundred national 
tongues, to build libraries and community centers fulfilling the purpose of 
enlightenment and indoctrination, and to support theaters and moving 
entertainers, bringing knowledge to the most distant villages of the young Soviet 
state (see Thompson, 278-86).
And in this noble effort, the Bolshevik government was not afraid to resort to 
the assistance of the intellectual vanguard of its numerous nationalities. In the 
case of Kazakhstan, the national intelligentsia was involved regardless of their
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pre-revolutionary political affiliation. In fact, the former activists of the Alash Party, 
which had argued for the formation of an independent Kazakh state organized 
according to the principles of capitalist democracy before the revolution, now 
comprised the largest part of the national representation in the soviets. Concerned 
about the interests of their people, they chose to assume political neutrality and to 
collaborate with the Bolsheviks after the revolution primarily in such areas as 
education and press. Due to their high popularity among the masses, they thus 
contributed to cultivation of national tolerance and loyalty towards the new 
administration (see Asfendiyarov, 278-89).
Because of the pluralist character of the language policy, the first period 
evidenced some change in functional distribution between Russian and Kazakh. 
Although Russian remained a dominant language in administrative transactions 
and barely lost its position in education, Kazakh expanded its area of application 
with official documents translated into and literacy immersion conducted in 
the language, and with the increasing number of books and newspapers 
published by Kazakh-speaking writers and journalists (see Asfendiyarov,
278-89).
Having received a status equal with the Russian language, Kazakh was 
rapidly developing its lexicon as well as new literary forms, which were self- 
standardized as a result of the growing press and literacy.
Bilingualism was still at the individual level with the number of both Russian 
and Kazakh biiinguals growing as a result of corenization (preferential treatment 
of the representatives of the indigenous nationality in human resource decision
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making) and literacy campaigns, ‘ ^e latter producing mostly Kazakh-speaking 
Russian teachers. This increase in the number of bureaucrats and educators, as 
well as formation of the positive attitude towards the Russian culture and 
language prepared conditions for the emergence of societal bilingualism during 
the following years of the Sovietization experiment.
Thus, the Kazakh nation entered the new political reality with hopes for self- 
determination and treatment equal with sister-nationalities. Since all of the former 
colonies shared similar expectations, the new administration set the goal of 
counteracting nationalist aspirations for separatism by cultivating the supra­
national identity of the Soviet people and by ensuring equai treatment of all the 
peoples of the newly formed confederation. Although the proclaimed principles of 
national and linguistic equality were not always easy to implement in practice, in 
most of cases early Soviet nationality and language policy was more sensitive to 
the nationalist aspirations of the Kazakh people than the corresponding policy of 
the czarist colonial administration (see Szporluik, 1-24). With Sovietization 
understood as cultivation of a common identity without destruction of ethnic 
identifications and linguistic pluralism as a necessary condition for survival of 
ethnicities, the Kazakh people had emerging chances for developing its language 
and culture in the context of the new political reality. This expectation was 
demonstrated in the development of the literary language and its written literature, 
in the growth of printed material, in the penetration of Kazakh into new 
communicative domains and the growing consciousness of literary heritage and 
linguistic identity by the Kazakh popular masses. Redistribution of functional
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domains had not resulted in a loss of communicative functions by Russian. 
Instead, by allowing Kazakh into domains which were previously restricted to the 
state language of the empire and which were perceived as prestigious by the 
population of the new state, the change in the diglossic situation contributed to the 
formation of a positive attitude towards Russian by Kazakhs and towards Kazakh 
by Russians. This change in attitudes prepared a good ground for the emergence 
of societal bilingualism (see Tynyshpayev, 156-9).
Period o f Stalinist Russification (1924-1953)
The second period lasted from 1924 till 1953, from the last day of Lenin, 
whose attempts tor socio-economic reformation of the Soviet Union unexpectedly 
led to the emergence of a relatively unregulated free market economy, to the last 
day of his follower, I.V. Stalin, whose attempts to establish control over the 
economy resulted in the formation of one of the most notorious totalitarian 
regimes and centrally-planned economies in the world.
Stalin came to power when most of the peoples of the multicultural Soviet 
Union had started to gradually internalize the idea that together they comprised 
what could be referred to as an emerging Soviet nation. Of course, their new 
identity was not yet as strong as it would become towards the end of the Soviet 
epoch; however, it was significant enough to hamper separatism among the non- 
Russian population of the former empire. Because of a high degree of ethnic 
sensitivity in Lenin’s model of socio-economic reformation, the appropriate 
balance between ethnic identifications and supra-ethnic identity evolved. Absence
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of interethnic conflict could have been expected to simplify the task of further 
reformation under the leadership of Stalin; however, the advantage of interethnic 
stabilization was used by Stalin, the former Minister of Nationalities, to implement 
a completely different type of experiment (see Thompson, 289-97).
Stalin was afraid of the sprit of uncontrolled competition brought about by 
Lenin’s New Economic Policy. For him, Lenin's approach resembled too closely 
the free market concept of the ideological enemy. He also felt that capitalism 
could not implement a transition of the country from feudalism to communism in 
the shortest possible timeframe (see Thompson, 203-8). With most of the Soviet 
people having internalized the destiny of becoming the citizens of a new state and 
developing some level of trust in the Bolshevik authorities, Stalin launched an 
ambitious experiment during which the original purpose of socio-economic 
reformation was lost in the midst of personal insecurities, and centralization of 
control with the purpose of facilitating change was transformed into centralization 
with the purpose of persecuting any sort of opposition to the existing order.
The experiment started in 1925 with Union-wide planned extermination of ail 
the representatives of national intelligentsias who held views different from and, 
therefore, were perceived as dangerous for the existing system. This first wave of 
repression affected the most progressive Kazakh intellectuals, who had once 
obtained positions in the capitalist democracy and carried aspirations for national 
independence as autonomous members of the confederation of Turkic states (see
Olcott, 1995,129-76).
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Simultaneously, a wave of repressions accompanying collectivization took 
away the more entrepreneurial part of the nations~the owners of flourishing farms 
and business and those representatives of the middle class who were unwilling to 
voluntarily abandon their property in the interest of collectivism by the state, in the 
case of Kazakhstan, collectivization was conducted at the same time as forced 
settlement of nomadic tribes. Frequently implemented without regard to 
peculiarities of the nomadic way of life, the attempts to form settled collective 
farms out of transient tribes of herders resulted in otherwise preventable loss of 
stock in addition to the loss of invaluable lives of human beings (cf. Asfendiyarov, 
pp. 289-9). The famine of the 1930s resulted in 3,000,000 deaths among the 
Kazakh population (according to contemporary Kazakh statistics) Together with 
de-privatization, it also forced many Kazakh families to leave the country for 
nearby Mongolia, China, and the Middie East (see Olcott, 1995,
129-76).
Collectivization created favorable conditions for the beginning of 
industrialization, which in the case of Kazakhstan meant accelerated exploration 
of mineral and energy resources, and construction of power stations, factories and 
mines. Accompanying this were the processes of the urbanization of Kazakhs and 
the in-migration of other ethnicities, whose representatives came to the republic in 
search of employment or, by the Party’s directive, to assist those republics lacking 
in technical professionals and a skilled work force in developing their industrial 
potential (see Tynyshpayev, 187-9).
Despite the overall decrease in the tempo of industrialization in the Soviet
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Union during the Second World War. the rate of in-migration to Kazakhstan did 
not decline because the under populated republic became home to thousands of 
refugees, a place of exile to thousands of the politically persecuted, and a place of 
work to thousands of specialists, sent there to build planes, tanks, submarines, 
bombs, and weapons to satisfy the needs of the Soviet Army in its fight against 
fascist Germany (see Tynyshpayev, 189-90). If one were to look for the roots of 
the contemporary ethnic composition of the republic, it is this period during the 
Second World War that should be investigated, since during this period the 
children of occupied Russia and the Ukraine were being adopted by Kazakh 
parents; families of Korean, Chechen, Tatar, Greek, German, and other “politically 
unreliable” ethnicities were transplanted to the steppe communities, and the 
opponents of the regime from all parts of the country were being sent to labor 
camps to be used as a free working force, serving the needs of the militarized 
economy (see Olcott, 1995, 157-224).
As this account of the large-scale experimentation demonstrates, a major 
change in Kazakhstan’s demographics took place during the Stalinist period. This 
had made an important impact on the dynamics of nationalism, diglossia, and 
multilingualism (Lewis, 90-123).
Very few Kazakh intellectuals--and by this is meant individuals who asserted 
a distinct Kazakh cultural identity-survived the decade, and the few who did faded 
from the public eye (Olcott, 1985, 15). As a result of fatalities from famine, out­
migration, political extermination and purges, combined with an increase in 
representation by other nationalities and ethnicities, the number of Kazakhs
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significantly declined in comparison with all other peoples of the Kazakh S.S.R. 
The demographic loss during the famine not only turned Kazakhs into a numeric 
minority, but also, together with the development of the apparatus of political 
persecution, made Kazakhs a political minority deprived of the ability to influence 
decisions affecting their culture, lacking the courage to demand realization of the 
Constitutionally guaranteed right for equality and self-determination (see 
Asfendiyarov, 200-17). in addition, the impoverishment brought about by 
collectivization, as well as the insuficiency of the work force caused by 
industrialization, forced some Kazakhs to move to the city, thus setting off the 
gradual process of urbanization (see Lewis, 90-123). Finally, the necessity to co­
exist with all the diverse newcomers to the steppe increased the threshhold of 
ethnic tolerance that would make Kazakhs more accepting of Russification in the 
future. Thus, the combination of the demographic changes prepared conditions 
that would have a detrimental effect on Kazakh national identity in the subsequent 
years of planned Russification (see Lewis, 90-123).
Surprisingly, Russians experienced decline in their national identity, too. 
Some of the causes of the lecline were similar to those contributing to the loss of 
identity among Kazakhs These causes included numeric loss during famine, the 
loss of power to oppose cultural genocide as a consequence of using the 
accusation in “Great-Russian chauvinism” (belief in the cultural superiority of 
Russians over other peep as of the former Russian Empire) as the most frequent
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ground for political persecution during purges, urbanization 1 accompanying 
industrialization and failed collectivization, and out-migration both within and 
outside the U.S.S.R. during the Second World War. Finally, similarly to the 
Kazakhs, Russians lost the most significant, in terms of national identity, 
representatives of scientific, technical, and literary intelligentsia during purges. 
Unlike Kazakhs. Russians also lost a huge number of their soldiers in the 
battlefields and civilians on the territories occupied by Axis forces 
(see Thompson. 289-93).
Towards the end of the Stalinist era, non-Russian immigrants to Kazakhstan 
had accumulated into rather numerous groups to become role-players in the 
interethnic interaction of the republic. They were not uniform in their susceptibility 
to assimilation with either of the dominating cultures, and in this respect could be 
divided into three main groups.
The first group included refugees and work-immigrants from the Soviet West, 
especially from Ukraine. These usually came in individual families in connection 
with industrialization and, being isolated from the representatives of their culture, 
were prone to adopt the assimilating culture (see Tynyshpayev, 189-90).
The second group was comprised of individuals from other parts of Central 
Asia, as well as immigrants from the Caucasus and other area of Russia, who 
were either Turkic-speaking or historically Moslem. These people would often 
come with their extended families and settle down in rural areas in the south,
1 The reason v/hy urbanization played a role in the decline of the Russian national 
identity becomes clearer if it is recalled that, historically, Russianism was 
perceived as associated with the traditional pastoral way of life.
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where they tended to form mono-ethnic communities, often maintaining their 
culture (see Tynyshpayev, 190-1).
The third group consisted of those ethnicities who had been deported to 
Kazakhstan due to accusations of political unreliability. Representatives of these 
ethnicities were always placed into special areas of restricted access; in fact, they 
had to request special permission when they planned to leave these areas for any 
reason. Such placement of the deported was made for a number of different 
reasons, the most important of which were the necessity to keep them under 
control (since they were viewed as potentially dangerous for the Soviet regime) 
and the intent to use .hem as an inexpensive working force in economically 
problematic areas. The best example of this group would be Koreans, who were 
very good at growing vegetables and rice. The expectation of the Soviet planners 
was that they would assist in introducing the practice to the steppe. Because of 
their relative isolation, the communities of the deported preserved their culture in 
the least modified way (see Tynyshpayev, 191-3).
Of the these groups, the representatives of the third were likely to retain (if 
such was in existence) or develop a strong national identity, mostly because that 
identity was oppressed by the regime. In this group, only Tatars could have been 
considered a nationality at the time of deportation: however, the strength of their 
identity declined in Kazakhstan because of cultural proximity to and acceptability 
by the native population (seeTynyshpayev, 194).
Germans seem to have developed such an identity while in the republic. 
Partially, this can be explained by the fact that they could not assimilate with any
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of the nationalities during the war since they were treated with hostility because of 
their ethnic affiliation with the Axis, immediately after the war, assimilation was 
prevented by strong religious and cultural distinctiveness (see Tynyshpayev 194- 
5) (Assimilation could hardly be expected from them in Kazakhstan after their 
failure to assimilate to the less culturally distant Russians before the war).
The change in ethnic composition of the republic did not result in notable 
interethnic tensions, although they might have been expected in the conditions of 
war crisis and poverty. One explanation could be the effectiveness of the 
ideological propaganda machine, which helped not to only mobilize the resources 
of the country to win the war, but also inspired people for international friendship 
and collaboration (see Tynyshpayev, 197).
The rise of patriotism during the Second World War also contributed into the 
formation of a common Soviet identity in most of the ethnicities of the Kazakh 
S.S.R. and other parts of the Soviet Union. At this point, care should be taken not 
to confuse this with the results of Stalin’s nationality policy, since its actual results 
were manifested only during the subsequent period of the Cold War. The 
explanation for that was that the implementation of the new policy was not yet 
consistent enough to produce any visible changes, and insufficient time had 
passed for change to become considerable. In the same way, the earlier results of 
Lenin’s Sovietization became more noticeable after Lenin’s death. Combined with 
the rise in patriotism, which was not a direct effect of the nationality policy, but 
rather an outcome of war-related indoctrination, these later results led to the 
formation of a rather strong supra-nationality feeling of Soviet identity among the
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citizens of the U.S.S.R. This feeling might have been one of the main pre­
conditions that allowed Stalin’s cult to develop, with the cult psychology 
subsequently enhancing the feeling of common identity in return, and both cuit 
psychology and the feeling of common identity contributing to positive attitudes 
towards Russification during the Stalinist era and even more so after 1953.
Before proceeding further with the discussion of the impact of demographic 
changes of this situation of multilingualism and functional role assignment, some 
attention should be spent on the analysis of the language policy whose effects 
were expected to change the situation in straightforward ways.
In the late 1930’s, Moscow introduced a new approach to nationality and 
language policy, a policy of linguistic and cultural Russification. This approach 
was a mutation of the earlier policy of Sovietization, which had targeted the 
formation of supra-national identity on the basis of ideological affiliation in the 
conditions of cultural and linguistic pluralism. De jure, reformation was still 
conducted in accordance with the principles of national and language equality; de 
facto, however, the purpose of creating the nation of the Soviet people with 
preservation of linguistic pluralism underwent some transformation. Unlike 
Sovietization, Russification implied the formation of the supra-national identity on 
the basis of Russian values and the Russian language; it envisioned the process 
of the identity formation as assimilation of the non-Russian cultures of the Soviet 
Union to the Russian culture and as gradual disappearance of linguistic 
differences as a result of cultivation of the Russian-dominated bilingualism 
combined with expansion of the communicative domains of the lingua franca
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(see Szporluk, 1-24). The switch to Russification was caused not by the whim of 
Staiin, but rather as a consequence of his interpretation of and his method of 
implementation of socio-economic reforms, especially, as a result of his belief in 
and actual realization of centralized coordination and planning. Such 
centralization was perceived as necessary for accelerated collectivization and 
industrialization, for the quickest possible resolution of the economic breakdown 
caused by collectivization, as well as for the urgent military mobilization during the 
Second World War. It was also believed to be dependent upon the clarity of 
communication channels, the condition that could be met by the development of a 
more homogeneous culture and by the introduction of a union-wide lingua franca 
(see Lewis, 49-89).
The choice of Russian as the lingua franca was inevitable. Bernard Comrie 
mentions the following reasons:
1) Russian was the language of the majority of the Soviet citizens;
2) Russian had already assimilated modern Western technology and 
culture, and so did not have tne problem, faced by other languages of 
the U.S.S.R., of first coming to terms with these phenomena;
3) Russian had already, partly by force and partly by choice, become the 
lingua franca of most parts of the Russian Empire, and no other 
language came near to satisfying this criterion. (Comrie, 31)
Once Russian had been assigned the status and the functions of the medium 
of interethnic communication, bilingualism became a target of linguistic 
reformation. The traditional domains of official transactions and education were
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chosen as the main institutes of immersion into the Russian language.
Human resource Russification was conducted by introduction of the 
unspoken requirement for the knowledge of Russian for all the national party and 
soviet representatives on the one hand, and by increasing the representation of 
bilingual European bureaucrats on the other. An interesting fact about the latter is 
that the increase in the bilingual non-native representation was a result of the 
combination of the policy of corenization and the political purges of the late 1920s 
(see Olcott, 1985,192-6). While the purges created a deficit of sufficiently 
educated indigenous bureaucrats, the condition under which non-native 
representatives were allowed in the national party committees and soviets if 
bilingual in Kazakh provided a channel for the growing penetration of non-natives 
into these structures.
Educational Russification was conducted in several ways. The most 
straightforward one was connected with introduction of a required course in the 
Russian language as a part of all school curricula. This course was aided by 
general “enrichment” of the curriculum with values characteristic of Russian 
culture (Kreindler, 345-61). There were also more subtle means of educational 
Russification, such as through the reform of the writing system into Cyrillic, piloted 
with the stated purpose of simplification and acceleration of the literacy campaign. 
A discussion of the alphabet reform provides more detail.
At the very beginning of the literacy campaign (conducted under Lenin's 
administration), writing systems developed before the revolution and based upon 
Arabic were used for Kazakh and for other Turkic languages of Islamic Centra!
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Asia. The systems were rather complicated with each letter having several 
variants, depending on the position of the word in the clause. In addition, they did 
not accurately reflect the complex vowel and consonant distinctions of the 
harmony systems of Turkic languages. In order to improve this situation, Lenin’s 
administration undertook some attempts for simplification of the systems; 
however, with Stalin’s goal of accelerated development of societal bilingualism, a 
more radical reform of the script was required (Comrie, 23).
The reform was conducted in two steps. In 1927, the Latin alphabet replaced 
the Arabic one for writing in Kazakh, in other Turkic languages, and, in fact, in all 
languages of the Soviet Union except the Slavic languages, Georgian, Armenian, 
and Yiddish. The choice of the Latin alphabet was not accidental. One reason was 
“the necessity to avoid the impression, especially among traditionally Islamic 
peoples, that the replacement of their traditional script, with its religious 
connotations, was part of a policy of linguistic, cultural and religious Russification” 
(Comrie, 23). As Comrie indicated, “the Latin alphabet was a compromise neutral 
between the Arabic and Cyrillic scripts” (Comrie, 23).
The second reason was connected with the long-term goal of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union-the formation of a worldwide proletarian state. The goal 
made the Latin alphabet, which was used by many of the languages of wider 
communication in the world as a basis of their scripts the best candidate for the 
universal system of writing in the Soviet Union. One other reason for the use of 
Latin script originated from the attempt to make peoples of Central Asia less 
susceptible to the external influence of the Islamic world. The use of the alphabei
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as a universal system of writing was also expected to simplify the task of printing 
and publishing, and, consequently the task of providing schools with primers and 
textbooks. Finally, by devising a writing system allowing for a reflection of the 
phonological characteristics of Russian, the language reformers created 
conditions for intensive penetration of the Russian words into lexicons of ethnic 
tongues (Comrie, 23).
Analyzing the results of Latinization in terms of acceleration of the literacy 
campaign, Martha Olcott mentions:
Although in the long run the introduction of the new alphabet helped to 
serve the socialization aims of the regime, in the short run it worked against 
the rapid promotion of universal literacy, as all the primers had to be 
discarded and new ones written, printed and distributed. All this at the very 
time that the collectivization drive was being unsuccessfully pursued. 
(Olcott, 1985, 195)
The danger of complete economic breakdown that could result from the 
unsuccessful attempt of collectivization mentioned by Olcott caused a higher 
degree of centralization, which manifested itself in greater determination to 
establish Russian-Kazakh bilingualism by means of direct Russification and by 
exclusion of Kazakhs from the debate over the language reforms. As Olcott 
observes, “Kazakh linguists were accorded a purely functional note in executing 
the structural changes mandated in Moscow” (Olcott, 1985, 196).
Under these new conditions, in 1940, the second step of the reform was 
taken with introduction of the Cyrillic alphabet for all languages of the Soviet
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Union except Georgian, Armenian. Yiddish and the languages of the Baltic region 
(Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian). Comrie (32) identified two main reasons for 
the new alphabet reform. One reason was educational: with introduction of the 
requirement for Russian language instruction, acquiring literacy, which was a 
difficult task in itself, was "made only worse by the need to acquire two different 
alphabets, especially given that many letters of the two alphabets are similar in 
form, but have different phonetic values (e.g.: the Cyrillic letter c is pronounced 
[s], p is pronounced [r], b is pronounced [v])” (Comrie, 32).
With respect to the second reason, Comrie writes:
In addition to this educational reason, there was probably also a more 
political reason: at this time, the U.S.S.R. was becoming increasingly 
inward-looking, with the realization that the world revolution was not 
imminent and that the U.S.S.R. would for a long time be virtually the single 
Soviet-style state, surrounded by hostile political systems. This led to a 
consolidation of internal unity, and demarcation from outside forces, both of 
which functions was served by the Cyrillic alphabet. (Comrie, 33)
Among other reasons enumerated by the reformers themselves was the claim 
that “the Cyrillic alphabet has more letters than the Latin alphabet and is therefore 
better suited to representing languages with a large number of phonemes” 
(Comrie, 33). Comrie objects to this claim with the following counter-argument: 
...the special Cyrillic letters used to represent either a sequence of j  plus 
vowel or a vowel after a palatalized consonant are rarely needed (though 
often used) in other languages of the U.S.S.R., and some distinctions that
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can be made with the Latin alphabet are not possible with the Cyrillic 
alphabet except using diacritics (e g.: k/q, x/h, v/w). (Comrie. 33)
Although most of the new alphabets still did not reflect all the phonological 
peculiarities of the reformed languages, they were put into use right before the 
war: the proximity of a military conflict with the capitalist world required a strong 
army able to follow commands and to communicate the results of completed 
orders (see Tynyshpayev, 198).
Not only did the new alphabet fail to convey some important phonological 
distinctions of Kazakh, it was also designed in such a way that it rendered the 
ianguage distinct from all other languages of Soviet Central Asia (Oicott, 1985, 
196), thus eliminating mutual enrichment of languages and undermining the 
unimpeded exchange of ideas and forms in literatures, in addition, a lot of 
unnecessary distinctions, peculiar to the Russian language, were introduced, 
opening the gate for extensive borrowing of the Russian words into the lexicon of 
Kazakh (see Bruchis, 23-41).
Although the re-orientation of language and nationality policy towards 
Russification took place during the Stalinist period, the effects of its linguistic 
component were not yet as radical as they would become during the following 
period. With the several alphabet modifications confusing both the teachers and 
the already literate part of the population, as well as adding headaches to the 
authors and publishers of textbooks and primers, the educational system 
remained as unsuccessful in the literacy campaign as it was in the effort of 
Russian-language immersion (see Bruchis, 23-41). In most cases, bilingualism
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resulted from the mere necessity for communication between representatives of 
different nationalities, which for whatever reason happened to find themselves in 
Kazakhstan, with Russian being the only language that was more or less 
understood by everyone, and this is when the aforementioned demographic 
changes would come into play.
The demographic changes had, in fact, a greater influence on the functional 
role assignment between Russian and Kazakh than any direct act of language 
reformers. By creating the necessity for interethnic communication, they assisted 
Russian in expanding its influence to previously unoccupied and currently 
important domains, such as interaction in the workplace and everyday 
communication.
The demographic changes were also a strong reason for the emergence of 
societal bilingualism. Increase in ethnic diversity was particularly important in this 
respect with the non-Russian immigrants playing the most important role in the 
transition of bilingualism from the individual to the societal level. The three groups 
of immigrants had not only to assimilate with one of the dominating cultures, but 
also to become bilingual in one of the dominant languages. Linguistic assimilation 
followed different tracks for each of the groups. Immigrants from the European 
parts of the U.S.S.R. almost always became bilingual in Russian and gradually 
gave up their native tongue. Those from the Caucasus and Central Asia would 
adopt structurally similar Kazakh, retaining their language, especially if settled in 
rural areas. The deported peoples retained their native tongue regardless of their 
new place of residence and would, in addition, learn one of the dominant
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languages, with preference in most cases given to Russian because of its wider 
use and higher status.
Numerically no longer dominant, Kazakhs, especially with the growth of 
urbanization, were pushed to become bilingual in Russian, which was rapidly 
becoming known by other ethnic groups of the U.S.S.R.
Although no longer restricted to select individuals, bilingualism was not yet 
characteristic of the absolute majority of the population (see Bruchis, 23-41). In 
addition, the knowledge of Russian was still insufficient for the speakers to have 
no preference between using their native language or the second language 
wherever a choice was allowed, in other words, language shift, which could be 
interpreted as a qualitative change, was still to be expected.
Thus, the Stalinist period of Soviet language and nationality policy was 
characterized by a change in ethnic composition and the decline of national 
identities. In the case of Kazakhs, this weakening was caused, first of ail, by 
extermination of the carriers of the identity during political purges. It was also 
associated with Kazakhs becoming a numeric minority, due to the decrease in the 
number of Kazakhs during the famine and from the simultaneous increase in the 
number of representatives of other ethnicities who immigrated to Kazakhstan 
during industrialization, were evacuated during the war, or were deported during 
the times of attack on “unreliable" nationalities. The deflation of the sense of 
national identity was accompanied by the development of susceptibility to political 
manipulation, which resulted from the fear of political persecution, of tolerance of 
ethnic diversity and gradual expansion of the Russian language and culture.
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The decline of Russian national identity was caused by immigration and 
political purges among intelligentsia, as well as by population loss in the 
collectivization famine and casualties during the Second World War. The status of 
the Russian nationality was also undermined by the use of Russian language and 
culture for the all-Union purposes of supra-national identity cultivation. The 
practice made it dangerous for Russians to counter their culture against another 
culture because of the risk of being charged with Great-Russian chauvinism.
The numerous representatives of other ethnicities tended to intermingle with 
the ethnic majorities of Russians and Kazakhs. Their ability to sustain their 
language and culture depended on the proximity of the culture tc the cultures of 
the majorities, on the similarity of their language structure to the structure of 
Russian or Kazakh, and on their place of residence in the republic. In most of the 
cases the minorities became bilingual.
The decline of ethnic and national identities was accompanied by the growth 
of identification with the Soviet nation, which was a longitudinal consequence of 
Lenin’s nationality policy and an outcome of the rise of patriotism during the 
Second World War. The task of accelerating socio-economic reformation as well 
as the necessity of rapid military mobilization during the Second World War 
required greater centralization and more efficient communication, which could 
provide for higher control over the processes. Efficient communication 
necessitated the introduction of Russian as lingua franca and resulted in 
modifications to the approach towards nation-building and linguistic reformation, 
instead of attempting cultivation of the ethnically diverse and multilingual Soviet
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citizens, an attempt was made to enculturate the ethnic citizens to the Russian 
language and Russian-Soviet values.
The change in the character of language and nationality policy had not yet 
resulted either in a significant transformation in the functional role assignment of 
the Russian and Kazakh languages or in the character of emerging societal 
bilingualism. Combined with the consequences of the demographic change, this 
change did, however, prepare the conditions for extensive Russification, for 
emergence of absolute bilingualism, and for language shift during the next period 
of the Soviet epoch.
Penod of post Stalinist Complexity (1953-1985)
The third period in the development of the Soviet nationality and language 
policy started in 1953, after the death of Stalin, and lasted till 1985, when 
Gorbachev’s reform was launched. Although the period could be divided into 
several sub-periods in terms of socio-economic processes in terms of nationality 
and language policy it could be treated as indiscrete.
If for the previous sections of the analysis it was possible to discuss 
nationality and language policy more or less separately from each other and from 
the socio-economic life of the country, such an approach is impossible for 
consideration of the post-Stalinist period, because during this period, the Soviet 
authorities started to use language as the main mechanism for the formation of a 
common identity for the Soviet people, thus removing any distinction between the 
issues of nationalism and language-related legislation and policy implementation.
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Hence, for the purposes cf this part of the analysis, nationality and language 
policy must be discussed simultaneously. In addition, with nationality policy being 
connected with socio-economic policy, we would have to consider the language 
policy of the period not merely in the context of socio-economic changes, but in 
the realm of socio-economic legislation and political practices.
It is no longer possible at this stage to characterize language policy as 
consistently Russifying (Stalinist) or Sovietizing (Leninist), since in the late Soviet 
state, both types of polices and the resulting processes of Russification and 
Sovietization occurred simultaneously and with the process of the development of 
national identities. Russification, the formation of the identity of the Soviet citizen 
and nationalistic revivals were at times cultivated by direct political action, but in 
most cases they were a result of a combination of a multiplicity of factors, not 
always straightforwardly related to any sort of Party intent, but often produced as 
a result of the combination of political action, societal response and the mere 
chance of their mutual impact upon each other.
We should attempt to determine where the complexity of the post-Stalin era 
came, how nationality and language policy during the era could simultaneously be 
Russifying and Sovietizing. The source of this complexity is traceable back to the 
previously noted concept of centralization advocated by Stalin. Totalitarianism 
was viewed by Stalin as the fastest way of implementing socio-economic reforms. 
In order to be efficient, centralization required dear communication channels, and, 
in the context of the multilingual U.S.S.R., introduction of some sort of lingua 
franca that could fulfill the communicative function. Because Stalin was looking for
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a fast solution of socio-economic problems, his choice was Russian, the best 
widely-available language in terms of communicative function. However, his 
choice was also the worst in terms of nationality policy, because, due to its 
symbolic function of the maintenance of Russian national identity, Russian carried 
the historical load of being the state language of the Czarist empire and, 
therefore, easily could and actually did revive imperialist identity in Russians and 
colonialist identities in the non-Russian peoples (Spechler, 281-305). As attempts 
towards Russian-dominated bilingualism were being undertaken, these old 
identities inevitably started to affect nationality-related attitudes, ideas, actions, 
and re-actions of both policy-makers and policy subjects. The imperial 
“flashbacks” of predominantly Russian Stalinist policy-makers prevented them 
from seeing that even with Russian fulfilling the communicative function of lingua 
franca, now referred to as the internationalist language of the U.S.S.R., the Soviet 
identity did not have to be based upon the Russian culture. So, trying to balance 
between socio-economic and nationality policy goals, administrative attitudes 
towards language selection collapsed to the simplistic choice of Russification. 
Although after Stalin’s death the old interpretation of Lenin’s principles was 
restored and the distinction between the communicative and symbolic functions of 
the Russian language was formally re-established, this understanding did not 
protect the policy makers and the now still ideologically suppressed but no longei 
terrorized general public from the influence of the symbolic function of Russian 
(see Olcott, 1985, 192-9). So the administration was constantly switching from 
Leninist to Stalinist mindsets and methods, while the public would periodically
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become anti-Russian and anti-lingua-franca because of their perception of the 
‘big brother” as the former oppressor and the state language as the medium of 
Russification.
To conclude, the complex pattern of simultaneous Russification, Sovietization 
and national identity formation evolved because the need for socio-economic 
reformation in the multiethnic state required centralization, which could be 
implemented only with the introduction of a lingua franca, because the language 
chosen as a lingua franca was charged with a contradiction between the 
communicative and symbolic functions, because the historical and the newly 
assigned symbolisms of Russian were incompatible, because this incompatibility 
produced conflicting identities in the policy makers and those for whom the policy 
was designed, and finally, because the reactions of the policy-subjects to the 
actions of the policy-makers induced a new response of the latter and changed 
both their attitudes and the new actions based upon them.
In some aspects of the Soviet policy (socio-economic, nationalist, language), 
complexity became widely manifested creating consequences for bilingualism, 
diglossia and the dynamics of interethnic communication.
One such aspect was power distribution between the all-union and republic- 
level party authorities and the party cadre policy. Under Brezhnev, the pattern of 
power distribution was somewhere half-way between Leninist self-governance 
(realized through local soviets) and Stalinist centralization (realized through 
central party organs), a marriage of the two with national elites being given more 
opportunities in union-wide decision-making and in defining what is to be done in
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their republics, and central authorities maintaining control over all the processes in 
the country (see Thompson, 278-85). Decision-making was in the form of a 
feedback loop, i.e. it included both bottom-up and top-down elements rather than 
the mere form of directive as it used to be under Stalin. The center determined 
major directions for the country’s development for the upcoming five-year period 
and ensured control over the decisions’ implementation. The republican 
administrations were responsible for practical execution of the identified course, 
devising ways of implementation most efficient for the settings of their republics.
En addition, they had some input into the center’s decisions in the areas connected 
with the needs and interests of their republic, wherever their proposal was 
reasonable from the point of view of all-union interests (Thompson, 278-85).
Similar types of relations existed between the republican and the local 
administrations. Thus, the center and the periphery exercised their authority 
simultaneously with the degree of participation ol one :<> the ... s of the other 
varying depending on the importance of an issue and the consequences for the 
U.S.S.R. as a whole. Since neither center nor periphery dominated consistently, 
the resulting policy was neither Russification nor Sovietization, rather a co­
existence of both, each manifested at different times in different degrees.
The impact of the policy on its subjects was also two-fold. On the one hand, it 
promoted the Soviet identity in Lenin’s interpretation by lowering dissatisfaction 
with the Russian interference, but, on the other, it produced an increase in 
national awareness. As was noted by R. Szporluk, the awareness was especially 
high among the political elites. For one reason, they always had to balance
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between the interests of the center and the interests of their republic. In addition, 
the rise of nationalism among the elites was connected with the accumulation of 
unmet career expectations (With the increase in the quality and accessibility of 
education, more non-Russian individuals became capable of and willing to pursue 
professional careers, including careers in politics, however, the access to such 
careers for them was still restricted, especially in administrative positions at higher 
levels) (see Szporluk, 1-24).
In addition to the overall tendency towards de-centralization, during the years 
of Brezhnev’s administration the Kazakh political elite was given more autonomy 
than the elites of other republics, reinforced by the special connection that the all- 
llnion Party Secretary had to the republic-before being appointed the leader of 
the Soviet Union; Brezhnev was the First Secretary of the Communist Party of 
Kazakhstan. The next secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party, D. Kunayev, 
was Brezhnev s piotege and, in the course of time, he became an extremely 
influential figure in the politics arena of the Soviet Union, able to surround himself 
with a circle of Kazakh supporters and to “nativize” to a certain extent both iocal 
party administrations and the managerial bodies of major industrial enterprises. 
Nativization contributed to the rise of the feeling of national identity in the Kazakh 
elite to such an extent that in 1986, when Moscow attempted to undermine 
Kazakh nationalism by appointing a non-native Secretary of Kazakh Communist 
Party, an upheaval that shook the whole country broke out in Alma-Ata (then the 
S.S.R. capital) (see Olcott, 1995, 224-49).
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The all-Union tendency towards decentralization and Brezhnev’s favoritism 
were not the only reasons for the Kazakh Communist Party’s nativization To a 
certain extent, nativization was caused by the flourishing corruption and nepotism 
in the specifically Kazakh forms of tribalism and zhuzovshina, the forms, which 
implied bias favoring the member of the same tribe and zhuz (administrative- 
territorial union introduced by Chenghizkhan, which in the course of time became 
intertwined with the tribal system). The fact that tribalism and zhuzovshina 
penetrated the system was also a symptom of the strengthening of Kazakh 
nationalism (see Olcott, 1995, 249-99).
Education was another sphere where conflicting language functions produced 
contradictory practices. Theoretically, Khrushchev’s education laws of 1958-59 
restored juridical equality to all languages by offering parents “freedom of choice” 
in determining the language of instruction for their children. If taken out of the 
context of the time, the statement is consistent with the goal or ensuring linguistic 
pluralism as a pre-requisite for inter-ethnic stability and successful Sovietization. 
However, with parents increasingly perceiving knowledge of Russian as a 
requirement for social mobility, with higher educational opportunities in all areas 
(except for the ones pertaining to the Kazakh language, literature, music, art and 
history), existing almost exclusively in Russian, and with the quality of Kazakh- 
language education being undermined by the notorious lack of teachers, facilities, 
equipment, instructional materials and methodology, the freedom would very 
seldom be exercised (see Bruchis, 23-41). Moreover, since the responsibility for 
the provision of national-language-based instruction was assigned to the
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republican administration and the funds allocated for the purpose were always 
insufficient, while the pressure for implementation of the centrally-controlled 
Russian-language-development program was high, the policy conducted in 
accordance with the statement resulted in the decline of the use and resulting 
knowledge of national languages. This carried the potential to transform the 
process of the acquisition of Russian into cultural assimilation 
(see Bruchis, 23-41).
Stalin’s moves in the direction of a Russian-based-literate bilingualism aimed 
at creating a linguistic situation which would facilitate centralized controj over the 
process of socio-economic reformation were changed by the new administration 
into a very effective scientifically-justified and research-supported program of 
Russian language instruction throughout the system of education (see 
Tynyshpayev. 203-9).
The program was launched in 1975, when, during an all-Union congress on 
Russian language education, advice was given to pay more attention to closing 
the gap between theory and practice. The all-Union congress was followed by a 
sequence of local conferences that discussed the way of implementing the 
instruction in the conditions of their republic or locaie. In 1978, a conference was 
sponsored by the section on Russian language of the Kazakh Academy of 
Science. As a result, a list of lengthy and highly specific directives on how to 
improve instruction of Russian and in Russian was compiled. These directives 
were followed by all researchers, educators, and other practitioners (see Olcott,
1985, 196-9).
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in accordance with one such directive, the school curriculum was modified to 
include a course in Russian literature to be taught in the Russian language (see 
Bruchis, 23-41). in addition, teachers of Russian were encouraged to use the 
methods of ethno-pedagogy, i.e. not only to teach the structure and vocabulary of 
the language, but also to cultivate in their students appreciation of the Russian 
values, aesthetics and even humor (Kreindler, 344-61). From the point of view of 
the Soviet theory of second language acquisition, such changes were necessary 
to approximate Russian language instruction to the natural process of language 
learning as enculturation.
Another directive led to the rapid increase in the number of pre-school 
institutions where Russian was taught not only to six-year olds in special 
preparatory classes, but also to much younger children in kindergartens and 
nursery schools 23-41). baseci upon psychological findings about the
ontogenesis of linguistic ability, which identified early childhood as the age of 
maximal instructional sensitivity, the practice was a much more efficient guarantee 
of Russian-based bilingualism development and a much more dangerous threat 
for the national languages than the 1975 decree requiring dissertations to be 
written in Russian (Lewis, 333).
In addition to the conventional schools with Russian language instruction, two 
additional experimental types of schools were introduced. In the schools of the 
first type, children instructed in Russian were to be educated in the same building 
as children instructed in Kazakh. In the second type, children were to be 
instructed in both languages with half of the courses offered in Russian and half of
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the courses offered in Kazakh. Both models were built upon research findings, 
one emphasizing the importance of play and out-of class peer communication for 
language learning in childhood, and the other recognizing the mechanism of 
language learning as knowledge acquisition (Kreindler, 189-98).
In accordance with another directive, the quality of the Russian-language 
instruction in national schools was to be improved. The efforts for this directive 
were limited to increasing the length of the school day in Kazakh language 
schools to provide for more hours of Russian and to establishing the sped''! 
Scientific Research Institute for Teaching Russian  ̂ , Schools to
ensure research supper* 1 th<_ endeavor. The fact that the research activity of the 
ibuiute was mostly involved in justification and popularization of the idea that the 
use of Russian is not inconsistent with a sense of Kazakh self-identity, while the 
additional instructional and learning load worsened the quality of teaching and 
learning in national schools, explains why the number of Russian and bilingual 
schools was rapidly increasing while the national schools were disappearing 
because of the absence of demand (see Kreindler, 144-61).
From this account of the language-related educational processes, educational 
Russification was not caused by a direct intent of Moscow, but rather by a 
combination of different factors. On the one hand, the needs of socio-economic 
reformation dictated the necessity for promoting the lingua franca. This task was 
fulfilled by teaching the language through the most effective medium, i.e. the 
educational system, in the most effective way, i.e. using the methods of ethno- 
pedagogy, and to the most sensitive category of population, i.e. children.
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Simultaneously, national-language-based instruction, although juridically allowed, 
was not financially ensured or encouraged to be sustained at the same level of 
Russian-language-based instruction. Combined with the parents’ positive attitudes 
towards Russian and the quality of Russian-language-based instruction, as well 
as with the absence or poor quality of Kazakh language instruction in Russian and 
bilingual schools, the innovations in the lingua-franca-based education and the 
disregard of the Kazakh-language-targeting and national-language-based 
alternative resulted in a situation in which Russian was pushing Kazakh out of 
communicative domains instead of assuming intended co-existence. This 
increased the process of bilingualism emergence, characteristics of linguistic 
assimilation and created conditions for subsequent language shift, resulting in 
Russian monolingualism among educated Kazakhs (see Kreindler, 344-61).
Another field exemplifying this complexity was Kazakh language 
development. The necessity for national language development was enforced by 
the principle of linguistic equality. Maintenance of the Kazakh language as a 
symbol of national identity dictated taking certain steps to improve its existing 
resources to keep it functional in communication, able to reflect all the 
phenomena of contemporary times. In order to use Kazakh as a medium of 
instruction, modernization of the Kazakh lexicon (corpus building) was required, 
as well as exploration of the language’s grammatical (word formation and syntax) 
resources to make it functional in the changing conditions of the modern world.
Cne other reason for modernization of Kazakh was linked to the task of 
establishing societal Russian-based bilingualism. Here the idea was to facilitate
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language contact in such a way that some sort of universal word stock based 
upon Russian lexical items and shared by all the languages of the Soviet Union 
was constructed and introduced into use. This task was extremely challenging, 
since the planners ran the risk of switching from internationalization to assimilation 
while creating and introducing into languages such a common stock. It was, 
nevertheless, possible to implement, since as along as no interference into the 
structure of the national languages took place, the integrity of languages would 
not be affected.
How were the ideas implemented practically? In terms of lexicon 
development for the purpose of language maintenance, native linguists displayed 
a renewed interest in finding ancient Kazakh terms to replace vocabulary from 
Arabic, Persian and other Turkic dialects. Such vocabulary purification served as 
a permitted outlet for realization of Kazakh national identity, and, therefore, had 
consequences for the rise of nationalism. There was also a trend to re-substitute 
Kazakh terms for Russian ones, especially in such areas as politics and economy. 
This tendency could be explained by the fact that the Kazakh political elite was 
given some autonomy at the time, as well as by the development of the Kazakh- 
language television and press as the major instruments of indoctrination and the 
necessity to convey the message through the media in the way most 
understandable to the masses (Olcott, 1985, 196).
Two other goals of language development, modernization and 
universalization, were to be met by a special commission of the Institute of 
Linguistics of the Academy of Sciences, which was supposed to implement the
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so-called internationalization of the national language. In 1959, the commission 
produced a list of “all union" terms to be adopted by all the Turkish-speaking 
peoples of the U.S.S.R. Most of these terms belonged to the scientific area, 
politics and economy. The majority of them were Greek and Latin-based terms 
used in the rest of the world with phonologically different modifications (Olcott, 
1985, 198). The act would not have been a contradiction to the stated principles 
and identified goals if the terms had not been introduced into the lexicons of the 
Turkic languages together with the morphology and pronunciation characteristic of 
Russian, which served as the source for borrowing. However, as Comrie 
indicates:
The policy was basically that such words should be taken into the local 
language in their Russian orthographic forms (even, in general, where this 
conflicts with the orthographic norms of the local language), and should be 
pronounced in the Russian way, or at least as close as is possible for 
speakers of the language in question. In this way many phonetic features 
of Russian found their way into other languages, such as palatal 
consonants, and free stress, though for the most part they remain restricted 
to those loan words. (Comrie. 33-4)
Understanding that language is subject to evolution in the same way as the 
society it serves, Brezhnev, unlike his predecessors, maintained that linguistic 
reform should be an on-going process. In accord with this belief, a standing 
commission on language reform was organized in Kazakhstan in 1972. This 
commission was composed primarily of Kazakh linguists, and also included
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representatives from both party and state (note that the composition of the 
commission reflected the pattern of power distribution). Because of Brezhnev’s 
loyalty to Kazakhstan, the work of this commission more closely reflected the 
Kazakhs’ concerns than its predecessor had done; however, the efforts of the 
Kazakh members of the committee were often fruitless. Although the new 
phonemes and orthography were restricted to loan words, the penetrating 
structures of morphological word formation became productive in the same way 
as syntactic structures, which invaded Kazakh as a result of translation from 
Russian. The syntactic structures included the use of conjunctions and 
subordinate clauses where normally special verb forms, verbal adverbs (gerunds), 
verbal adjectives (participles) or case forms of verbal nouns (nominalizations) 
were used (Comrie, 34).
In the same way as in the previously discussed domains, the domain of 
language development contained elements which could at different times, under 
different rulers, in different aspects of lexicon, grammar, and function provide 
evidence for the effort of Russification, the result of a rise in national identity rise 
or even a manifestation of the emergence of Soviet identity.
National literature, television, radio, music, choreography, and art were other 
areas demonstrating the complexity of interplay between the processes of cultural 
assimilation, national identity maintenance and Soviet identity formation. Out of 
the three, music was very important as a mechanism of culture preservation. One 
explanation for that would be the fact that music was perceiv od as the least 
dangerous of all the cultural forms for conveying ideas threatening the existence
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of the Communist system. However, another reason why the power of the musical 
form was so strong in Kazakhstan was because of its nomadistic-related 
characteristics. Nomadic Kazakh tribes did not have literature and music existing 
as two separate entities; instead, the two always co-existed in different 
combinations, song, epic, aitys of akyns, etc. In such combinations, music served 
not only as an expressive but also as a mnemonic function allowing the singer to 
easily recall the associated literary form through lyric or recitation, in its turn, the 
literary form was not stable; rather, it was a living idea transferred from author to 
author and from generation to generation in the form of a plot re-told to every new 
group of audience in new poetic representations. The unusual characteristics of 
traditional Kazakh music allowed it to not only be preserved in an intact form, but 
actually to develop further in relative isolation from Russian folk, popular and 
classical music. Because literature was part of the musical form and because 
Kazakh poetry was improvised, the form was not easy to censor, and as a result, 
it left room for the nurturing of national identity and the development of the Kazakh 
language (see Tynyshpayev, 178-89).
Kazakh music also benefited from the Soviet rule in terms of development of 
new genres, especially classic and popular. By creating new interpretations of 
traditional themes, as well as by incorporating some structural characteristics of 
folk music, these new genres contributed to the sense of national pride. At the 
same time, by their mere existence throughout ali the republics of the Soviet 
Union, they built up the sense of shared cultural values and, therefore, the sense 
of common Soviet identity.
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Choreography was another art which benefited during the Soviet period. Its 
emergence was one of the positive outcomes of the activity of the Party 
ideologists, since it was created for previously nomadic Kazakhs for 
universalization of cultural forms, as it was in all the republics of the U.S.S.R. Out 
of all the genres, Kazakh ballet was especially important for it was an object of 
national pride due to the high quality of training provided at the Kazakh Ballet 
School for several generations by world famous dance teachers (see 
Tynyshpayev, 190).
Television and written literature were two forms whose gains and losses were 
more difficult to estimate and to compare. The greater importance of these forms 
for the purposes of indoctrination ensured greater interference of Party ideologists 
into the natural process of literature’s development shaped by the tastes of 
readers and the aspirations of the writers. The leaders seeking ideological control 
attempted to tame these aspirations and to shape tastes to conform to the Party’s 
program (see Tynyshpayev, 167-8).
One way to establish control was to popularize those writers and poets who 
conveyed the ideas supporting or, at least, not contradicting the Communist 
agenda. Thus, the 19th century author, Abai Kunanbaev, was idolized for his 
loyalty to the Russian culture (a quality necessary in connection with Russian- 
bilingualism promotion) and his protests against czarism, colonial rule and the 
degrading influence of Islam and patriarchal society (an activity perceived 
favorably due to the example that it could provide in promoting the socio­
economic program of the Party); while 20th century author, Dzhambvl Dzhabayev,
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was raised almost to the rank of a saint for the inspiration that he offered to the 
people of occupied Leningrad during the Second World War (his ccntribution was 
thought essential because it provided inspiration to the victims of Leningrad and 
promoted the ideas of unity, relatedness and friendship between the Soviet 
people during and after the Second World War).
In a similar fashion, Kazakh writers and poets of the second half of the 20th 
century were noticed whenever the themes of their works happened to 
correspond with the current focus of the party’s attention, either in dissemination 
of new ideas and values or in extermination of the old ones.
No matter how random the choice of such writers and poets was, it was 
beneficial for the maintenance of the Kazakh national identity and, in some 
respects, even contributed to its revival by raising the pride of the Kazakh people 
for their literary contribution into the common Soviet culture. The negative 
consequences of the practice were not limited to the randomness of the choices, 
but also consisted in the fact that all the richness of the Kazakh literary tradition 
was reduced to a couple of repeatedly mentioned names and, combined with the 
constant emphasis on the fact that Kazakhs had not had a written tradition prior to 
the 19th century (which was not accurate), led to inevitable stigmatization of 
Kazakh literary culture as immature and underdeveloped in comparison with 
Great Russian literature, as well as promoted chauvinism towards Kazakhs, 
undermining their national self-esteem, and caused disintegration of the nation of 
the Soviets (Oicott, 1990, 43-72).
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Another way to establish control was censorship implemented through two 
institutions-the writers’ unions and the publishing houses. In both cases, Moscow 
might use either economic levers or direct intervention. Writer’s unions served as 
professional organizations, membership in which was essential for being able to 
get published, and, therefore, to make a living. Being a part of the union was to 
comply with the literary standards imposed by Moscow, often at the expense of 
the quality of work and one’s own beliefs and values. Publishing houses served as 
economic regulators of the development of the national literature because they 
were run, not by the principles of economic profitability, but rather by the 
ideologically motivated directives from the party authorities, who determined how 
many books would be published each year, how many of them would be in 
national languages, how many of the latter would be translations and on certain 
topics or by certain authors (Olcott, 1985, 142-5).
The popularization efforts, as well as the two institutions of ideological control 
favored the development of Soviet identity and Russification, with the first being 
promoted by literary planners by means of encouraging writing on topics 
connected with internationalism, friendship among Soviet peoples, etc., while the 
second being facilitated by providing more financial support to publication in the 
language of interethnic communication. Under these conditions, Kazakh 
nationalism could be expected to decline. Contrary to this expectation, however, 
Kazakh authors continued to write and to publish, as well as to remain popular 
among their readers by exploring topics dealing with the issues of preservation of 
the Kazakh culture and national identity. These were interesting for the native
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population, and, although they were not encouraged, they were not banned from 
discussion either. Most of the authors of the time attempted to restore the 
historical past or tried to explore and to develop traditional Kazakh forms and 
genres; some wrote in Kazakh, while others did not, but treatment of national 
themes did not appear to be correlated with the language of the text. Moreover, all 
the works were translated into both Kazakh and Russian and so all 
were accessible to the entire Kazakh community (Multilingualism, 201-2). Some of 
the authors, such as M. Auezov and O.Suleimenov achieved U.S.S.R.-wide 
recognition.
The situation with television was similar. On the one hand, the programs of 
Kaz TV and the movies and the documentaries of the KazakhFilm Cinema Studio 
were subject to a scrutinizing censorship in the same way as literary works, and 
the amount of production was also set from above, with the genera! tendency of 
promoting Russian-language programs at the expense of the quality and amount 
of Kazakh-language productions. On the other hand, Kaz TV served as one of the 
most important tools for maintaining traditional culture with the majority of 
entertainment programs presenting a movie or a musical competition of some 
kind. With most of the movies produced by the Kazakh Film cinema studio being 
based upon folklore and traditional topics, cinematography had an important role 
in maintaining national traditions, history, account of role models, etc. Musical 
programs were even more important in that respect, since most of them were in 
the form of the traditional aitys ofakyns, a competition of improvising singers, 
competing in wittiness, poetic skill and singing, often discussing contemporary
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social issues in the traditional musical way As it has been mentioned, aityses 
were important for the development and preservation of the Kazakh language. 
Both indirectly, through language, and directly, through the content of the 
programs, TV facilitated the growth of national identity.
TV also became important in terms of the development of new musical and 
other art forms. Thus, TV provided wide access for Kazakhs from different parts of 
the country to the developing national classic and instrumental music, to the 
growing art of national dance and ballet, to the new form of humor in the 
extremely popular program Tamasha (Good Mood), which in the most entertaining 
form criticized issues in the Kazakh and Soviet societies that otherwise could not 
be discussed.
A control similar to that over literature existed not only for all major art forms 
(theater, cinema, visual art, the circus, etc.), but was also established over major 
museums and exhibition facilities. In case of the latter, not only the content of 
expositions would be monitored, but also the re-distribution of material funds 
would be implemented by Moscow. In fact, it is due to such a redistribution 
favoring central Russian museums and exhibition halls that Kazakhstan lost many 
valuable artifacts from its archeological sites, private collections, museums and 
other sources (see Tynyshpayev, 175-89).
Another context where the complexity of the situation was manifested was in 
the military. In 1938, the Soviet government introduced universal military 
conscription. In accordance with the innovation, all male citizens were subject to 
military obligation based on individual recruitment and the service in ethnically
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mixed units away from their places of residence. The ianguage of the forces was 
exclusively Russian, and ethnic Russians predominated in the professional cadre. 
Such an organization of the army was initially expected to serve the mission of 
"internationalization," or to use the terminology of this study, of the formation of 
the supranational Soviet identity; later there was added the purpose of second 
language promotion. However, in the course of time, with the U.S.S.R.-wide 
spread of the stereotype of Moslem ethnicities as lagging behind in their 
development, with the numeric increase of Moslem populations in the army as a 
result of demographic changes in Central Asia, with the discriminatory practice of 
assigning draftees to their divisions according to the prestige of the division and 
the status of the ethnicity of the draftee, and with the notorious under-funding of 
the army and the flourishing of violence as a sign of dissipation, the army became 
an instrument of fostering ethnic discrimination and chauvinism as a form of 
xenophobic national identity, rather than a way of facilitating internationalization. 
In realization of this problem, with the rise of nationalism, the army launched a 
campaign to recruit Moslem youth for officers schools, one aspect of which was 
building military ethos using the example of Moslem participation in the Second 
Worid War (Lewis, 80). The declining economic and disciplinary conditions in the 
army, however, made the prospective of military service unattractive for Moslems, 
thus undermining the efforts made by the administration. During the war in 
Afghanistan nationalism increased even more, since at the time Moslems came to 
be viewed as politically unreliable. The experience of forced devaluation of the 
Central Asian soidier during the service, especially strong if the soldier were
100
assigned to serve in stroibats (construction brigades) would develop into strong 
feeling of dislike of everything Russian or, in some cases, of everything non- 
Moslem (Rakowska, 91).
Economic policy during this period was closely connected with and 
contributed into the complexity of the nationality and linguistic situations and 
policymaking. As Schroeder mentions
...not only the nationality factor constrained decisions about how best to 
organize the administration of the economy, but it also politicized and 
sharpened the inevitable conflicts over budget allocations for social 
services and investments. (Schroeder, 43-72)
Until the early 1960's, the central leadership remained committed to “massive 
transfer payments from the more developed regions to the less developed 
ones” (Burg, 33) to level out differences in the socio-economic development of 
the republics. At the very beginning, this approach benefited Kazakhstan, which 
was considered an underdeveloped area. It was subject to special treatment in 
budget allocations and received influxes of a much needed working force in the 
form of seasonal student brigades and the re-location of professional employees 
for longer periods. (One of the biggest of such influxes occurred during the Virgin 
Lands Raising Campaign in late 1950s) (see Asfendiyarov, 278-95). This special 
treatment contributed to the formation of positive attitudes towards Sovietization.
However, the commitment (for securing economic integration of the less 
developed periphery) declined as the most outrageous inequalities were reduced 
arid a concern for the economy as a whole increased in the second half of the
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period. Moreover, the inefficiency of the regional economy and the catastrophic 
ecological problems of the time revealed the colonial character of the socio­
economic policy of the first half of the period and the failure to comply with the 
principle of national equality claimed as a basis of the socio-economic policy’s 
development and implementation. The efforts to raise the economy of Central 
Asia resulted in making the region dependent on external allocations, in spite of 
all the allocations, the region had “by far the least manufacturing per capita, with 
the relative level actually declining in every republic...” and “its esources... shipped 
overwhelmingly to the European U.S.S.R. and for export in virtually unprocessed 
form” (Hetcher model of internal colonialism). During the Cold War, Kazakhstan 
was also turned into a huge testing facility, exploding nuclear bombs and 
launching spaceships at the expense of its populations health, ecological balance 
and without substantial increase in the professional work force with most of the 
key staff for the secret military objects being imported from the European part of 
the U.S.S.R. (see Tynyshpayev, 190).
The desperate state of the economy was primarily reflected most in the
✓
republic’s living standards (per capita expenses), which were lower in Central Asia 
than anywhere else, and in the state of the national work force with titular 
nationalities being poorly educated and therefore more likely to be employed in 
low-wage sectors such as agriculture and food-processing industries, and the 
trade and service areas (Schroeder, 46)
The dissatisfaction with the combination of all the negative consequences of 
internal colonialism taking place in Kazakhstan would manifest itself in the form of
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national front movements during the next stage of the development of the Soviet 
Union, once Gorbachev’s glasnost would disclose information and remove the 
ban on open discussions of the drawbacks of the existing system (Marshall, 7-41). 
Long before 1985, the negative outcomes of extensive economic development 
would force Moscow to increase centralization of control, which would lessen 
relative autonomy of the republic in economic, social and other sorts of decision 
making, the result of which would lead to the rise of nationalist aspirations and 
anti-Sovietism.
Another major area of controversy was the policy of the C.P.S.U. with respect 
to religion. During the post-Stalinist era, as a result of the decline in political 
perseci ion on the basis of religious affiliation, all religious denominations in the 
Soviet Union experienced some sort of revival with a number of believers growing, 
and educational institutions for religious servants increased in numbers. In 
Kazakhstan, Islam and the Russian Orthodox Church in particular were 
expanding (Bociurkiw, 148-75).
This revival was only indirectly a result of a political action. More importantly, 
the development of previously oppressed religious aspirations was facilitated by 
the atmosphere of ideological thaw as well as by unintended results of political 
actions in other spheres. For example, the rise of Orthodox Christianity was 
connected with the promotion of the Russian culture as a part of the bilingualism 
campaign, the governmental approval of the celebration of the millennium of 
Christianity in Russia being particularly notable in this respect, while the growth of 
Islam was a side effect of the prolonged war with Afghanistan.
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in addition, isiam was not a national religion; rather, it was transnational and. 
therefore, it was perceived as more dangerous by the Soviet authorities due to its 
potential in unifying all Turks of Central Asia amongst themselves and also with 
the rest of the Islamic world. An aggressive policy against Islam was viewed as 
carrying a potential for causing separatism, and, as a consequence, Moslems had 
more freedom to build their mosques and to train clergy than any other religion of 
the Soviet Union. Although nomadic Kazakhs had never practiced Islam as 
obediently as their neighbors, mingling Islamic practices with their own 
cosmological shamanism, in the conditions of the Soviet ethnic de­
individualization Islamic revival played an important part in the growth of national 
awareness, especially closer to the end of the post-Staiinist period during the 
years of the Afghan war. In combination with national identity promoting the role of 
Christianity, Islamic revivalism contributed to polarization of the two major 
nationalities of Kazakhstan by the end of the post-Staiinist era (Lewis, 161-2).
Despite all the complexity of the nationalist and linguistic situations during the 
post-Staiinist period discussed above, it is still possible to identify in the most 
general way the end-result of the direct and indirect language-related legislation 
and political practices.
By the end of the period, as a result of an intentional effort for developing 
societal bilingualism in Russian, the language of international communication 
significantly expanded in terms of the number of functional domains. Apart from 
dominating the fields of bureaucratic discourse and science, it came to dominate
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the system of education, and, in addition, penetrated the field of everyday 
communication at work, in mass media and, at times, ever' in family 
communication. Kazakh continued to be used simultaneously with Russian in all 
the domains (see Olcott, 1985, 183). With both languages used in all the possible 
functions of domestic communication (this excludes the functions of the language 
of inter-republican communication and the language of negotiations with other 
countries fulfilled exclusively by Russian), the existence of diglossia might be 
questioned if it were not for the difference in the frequency of use of Kazakh and 
Russian in a specific function. If calculated in terms of the numeric majority of 
speakers, Russian was used more frequently in ail the domains except 
communication with family members (extended family included). This absolute 
domination of Russian is evidence of the establishment of Russian-based 
bilingualism in the republic. However, it cannot serve as evidence for the decline 
in the use of Kazakh. The frequency of the native language’s use in particular 
domains depended on the geographic location of the speaker, and on the ethnic 
composition of the region, as well as on a number of other factors. A set of 
functional domains for Kazakh characteristic of a particular speaker ranged from a 
very small one including restricted symbolic use with family members for 
extremely Russified Kazakhs of the industrial north to a large set of all existing 
functional domains with Russian used only out of necessity for communication 
with Russian-speakers not conversant in the national tongue in the scarcely 
populated rural south.
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One other matter of interest should be noted: Russian had an influence on 
the development of increasing diglossia within the Kazakh language itself. 
Because under Russian pressure Soviet linguists often tended to create a literary 
standard based on urban dialects, which often bore only limited similarity in some 
important respects to rurai dialects, there appeared increasing divergence 
between the literary and spoken Kazakh language (Lewis, 51).
By the end of the third period of the Soviet era, there had evolved different 
patterns of language use:
1 ) monolingualism -among the youngest generation, whose members are 
brought up in the native language at home (in early childhood);
2) national-Russian bilingualism -among school children and among 
workers in urban areas;
3) other variants o f bilingualism -for instance Kazakh-Uzbek bilingualism 
among the elder generation;
4) multilingualism -  for instance Kazakh-Uzbek-Russian multilingualism 
among Uzbek workers in rural areas and in ethnically mixed families. 
(Haarman, 314-19)
In the case of national-Russian, specifically Kazakh-Russian bilingualism, the 
situation was similar to the situation with diglossia. It could be claimed that 
societal bilingualism had been eventually achieved, although language shift had 
not yet happened. This conclusion can be confirmed with the available statistical 
data provided by Lewis:
According to the 1979 census, 52.3% of the Kazakh population “freely
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speaks” Russian (proof of societal bilingualism). Nonetheless 97.5% of the 
Kazakh population still considers Kazakh to be their native language (proof 
of absence of shift). (Lewis, 200)
However, just as in the case of diglossia, this generic statement would not 
necessarily be true if one started to analyze the nature of the bilingualism in a 
specific linguistic community. The structure of this type of bilingualism 
differentiated with respect to the demographic milieu.
The language behavior (including varying preference of language choice, 
language maintenance and integration processes) of the urban population differed 
considerably from that of the population in rural areas. Normally the urban 
population used Russian more widely as a second language component of the 
national-Russian bilingualism than did the rural population (Lewis, 156-80). The 
level of language maintenance (maintenance of the native language in its status 
as a primary language or mother tongue) frequently showed a special correlation 
to the second language component, so in urban bilingual groups, which were 
characterized by a higher rate of (Russian) second language use, the rate of 
Kazakh language maintenance was lower and language shift to Russian was 
more likely to occur.
The female population preserved the national language better than males 
(see Lewis, 156-80). One may find an explanation for this general tendency by 
taking into consideration the unequal level of education among males and females 
in the Soviet Union; there were more members of the male population who 
obtained qualifications as special workers and of the university level than females.
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Both education and the experience in Russian-dominated work-piace 
communication made males more likely to adopt Russian as a second language.
Assimilation was strongest in the age group 12-25, the years of secondary 
and higher education, where Russian was either the only language of instruction 
(higher education) or was intensively taught as a second language (secondary 
education) (see Lewis, 156-80). In general, Russian as a second language 
component was widespread among ail age groups with the exception of the 
youngest and oldest members of the speech community. The youngest members, 
predominantly infants and toddlers were monolingual in the language used by 
their mothers, while the older generation might have failed to acquire the second 
language during their youth and early adulthood because of the different linguistic 
situation at the time (see Lewis, 156-80).
Thus, the extent of bilingualism and language maintenance varied according 
to the geographic location of the specific language community. There we-e more 
bilingual and Russified Kazakhs in the urban areas of the Russian-dominated 
north than in the predominantly Kazakh south (see Lewis, 156-80).
If we were to identify types of Kazakh-Russian bilingualism depending on the 
degree of assimilation, then the following would be the result:
1 ) co-existence of languages caused by geo-proximity, no distinction, 
indifference to what language is used (on the border with Russia);
2 ) dynamic bilingualism-assimilation (role differentiation) (in the north of 
the republic among the younger generation);
3 ) overlapping (assume overlapping functions, one in group, the other in
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the civic cultures) (in the south of the republic among working adults);
4) almost complete assimilation (the native language performs only 
symbolic role) (in multiethnic families, outside the republic, in 
communities dominated by Russian among younger generation). 
(Lewis, 276)
Regarding this state of bilingualism in the Kazakh republic, it should be noted 
that the situation with language maintenance and assimilation was complex and 
unstable, showing a high degree of variation, depending on the demographic 
factors and geographical location of the linguistic communities. By the beginning 
of Gorbachev’s reform, Kazakh and Russian had equal chances of dominating the 
structure of bilingualism, and subsequent development of their role distribution 
depended on the implementing of further policy related to issues of language and 
nationalism. On the one hand, the majority of Kazakh bilinguals in Russian were 
still maintaining their language, on the other, “the pressure of Russian exerted on 
the locai languages tended to weaken their position as a primary language and 
thus functioned as a factor in dissolving the structures of national-Russian 
bilingualism” (Lewis, 326) to make language shift possible in the nearest future 
among the younger generation of speakers.
There is a need to characterize the state of national and supra-national 
identities and the dynamics of interethnic communication.
By 1985, most of the peoples in the Soviet Union had developed rather a 
strong sense of common historical and cultural identity, the identity of the Soviet 
People. The extent of identification with the group varied, depending on the age of
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a person, his/her ethnic affiliation, level of education, type of occupation, and 
social status. As a result of the consistent attempt to cultivate societal Russian 
language bilingualism, and the increasing role of the Russian language as a 
means of interethnic communication, an important part of the identity was 
associated with the Russian culture. Due to the systematic practice of 
emphasizing the role of Russia in the progressive development of the former 
colonies of the Russian Empire, as a consequence of the applications of the 
methods of ethno-pedagogy in teaching Russian as a second language, and as 
an outcome of extensive media support of Russian literature and art, most of the 
citizens of the Soviet Union internalized a belief in the cultural superiority of the 
ethnically Russian big brother. This belief, however, should not be conf> sed with 
cultural assimilation. Despite the cultural exchange between the peoples of the 
Soviet Union, leading to the inevitable unification of life-styles, rituals, values and 
tastes during the process of the formation of their Soviet common identity, most of 
the larger ethnicities and nationalities outside of the Russian Soviet Federative 
Socialist Republic, especially those comprising the majority in the republics, 
continued to maintain their cultural identity. This identity, of course, was preserved 
to different degrees. Below is the discussion of the state of different ethnic and 
national identities in Kazakhstan.
At no other point of Soviet history up to the period of Gorbachev’s reform, had 
such an impressive amount of the Kazakh population experienced awareness 
about the importance of their language and culture. While the number of the 
consciously aware had grown as a result of the increase in the level of education
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and general public’s political participation, the extent of awareness was different 
for various groups of the Kazakh population. Thus, the national intelligentsia 
remained the main carriers of the distinct Kazakh national identity characterized 
by the memory of the heroic past and concern for the troubled future. It was 
reduced to a mere indication of ethnic affiliation in the Soviet passport for some of 
the assimilated individuals in the Russian-dominated regions of the republic. In 
the majority of the population, however, this feeling of national identity was 
balanced with affiliation with the larger group of Soviet citizens.
Whenever the two affiliations were not in conflict most of the Kazakhs would 
willfully admit their membership in both groups; in situations of conflict, however, 
the consciousness of national identity would always be stronger. Thus, most 
Kazakhs were likely to experience nationalist aspirations when their rights were 
endangered in favor of other ethnicities of the Soviet Union or whenever other 
nationalities, out of their nationalist aspirations, perceived and acted towards 
Kazakhs on the basis of belief in Kazakh inferiority (see Tynyshpayev, 167). With 
this explanation in mind, it will not be difficult to understand why nationalism often 
appeared in the armed forces and among the lower class, especially the rural 
population. In the first case, the representatives of the Kazakh nationality often 
became aware for the first time of the wide spread prejudice of the European 
population of the Soviet Union towards Central Asians and Kazakhs in particular, 
while in the second case, the underprivileged status of the predominantly 
uneducated, minimally bilingual and culturally assimilated rural Kazakhs made 
them extremely conscious about their national identity when they compared
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themselves with their perceptually Russified urban counterparts (see Rakowska. 
72-95) This is net to say that urban Kazakhs were not aware of their national 
identity. The point is that awareness was conscious only when it was not taken 
in'o consideration by the Soviet nationality policy planners.
As early as the 1960s, Russian nationalism became the main threat to the 
common identity of the Soviet people and the main factor contributing to the 
gradual dissipation of the Soviet system as a whole (see Spechler, 281-305). 
There were three major sources that contributed to the rise of nationalism. One 
was the internal decline in the economics of R S F S R  especially the problem in 
agricultural development and the death of Rusrr.n • p'-rceived by 
Russians as the center of the R~-. d ' -« scu! This -^ u s s  of the agricultural 
catastrophe was accompanied by tne feeling of reverse discrimination, perceived 
as resulting from the affirmative action program providing special support to the 
underdeveloped economies of the former colonies. There was also a general 
devaluation of the Russian culture, resulting from its exploitation in the attempt to 
achieve societal bilingualism and promote a sense of common identity in the 
Soviet people. This attempt was narrowed down to ideoloucc! “ "amotion" of the 
Russian language and Vu-rure by means o' on of politically correct truths
and ready-to-use speech samples. Such promo.ion Uhi to trivialization of the most 
important achievements of the Russian people There w** J'so .-mother reason for 
devaluation. As mentioned ear Hot, because : 5 symbolic function, the Russian 
language had the potential for being destructive of the feeling of supra-ethnic unity 
in the Soviet people. This potential was a result of the imperial past and the
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negative attitudes of the non-Russian population towards czarism. in order to 
prevent the negative influence of past associations, the Soviet nationality and 
language policy planners tried to prevent the manifestation of any feeling that 
even distantly resembled Great Russian chauvinism. Under the conditions of the 
blind rule of ideological doctrine, these attempts often resulted in attacks on any 
display of respect towards Russian culture by anyone ethnically Russian 
(Szporluk, 12-4).
Other ethnicities of Soviet Kazakhstan underwent a higher degree of 
assimilation than the indigenous population, because of the lower status that they 
were assigned in the nationality policy game. The tendency for assimilation with 
one of the majority groups characteristic of the previous period continued further. 
This assimilation was strongest in linguistic respects with most of the groups 
retaining some sort of ethnic traditions at least at the level of family 
communication. Out of the national groups that evolved during the period in the 
Soviet Union, a group of Russian Germans was particularly strong in Kazakhstan. 
Germans consistently claimed the right for autonomy in the territory of the republic 
and maintained very strong nationality-based group networks (see Tynyshpayev. 
178-95).
As for the dynamics of interethnic interaction during the post-Staiinist period, 
although there were no open nationality based conflicts in Kazakhstan during this 
time ethnic intolerance did exist at the level of individual encounters and teatime 
conversations between family members and friends (see Tynyshpayev, 178).
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The post-Stalinist period in the development of the nationality and language 
policy in Kazakhstan saw greater complexity in the overall situation and in the 
controversial character of the resulting strategies and practices. Although 
centralization of control over the process of socio-economic reformation was less 
totalitarian than during the time of the personality cult, it was retained and required 
further effort to promote societal bilingualism. The importance of the development 
of bilingualism in the lingua franca made language policy central in the nationality 
concerns of the Communist Party. The attempts to promote bilingualism became 
more systematic and were justified and supported with scientific research, 
monetary input and media support. At the same time, the danger of disregarding 
non-Russian nationalism was well understood and the attempt to at least allow for 
the exercise of the right of linguistic and national equality was undertaken. Not 
accompanied with financial or media support and supplemented with the increase 
in the status of the Russian language, the right to Kazakh language use was not 
frequently utilized by Kazakh people, who often chose Russian-language 
instruction and, subsequently, the Russian way of life for the promise of high 
status guaranteed to bilinguals and those brought up in the values of the Russian 
culture. The complexity of the situation was manifested in all aspects of the 
society, starting from the traditional domains of institutes of political control and 
education to such domains as the military, media, economic policy and religion. 
Language related acts varied from direc* ones, connected with language 
development and promotion, to indirect ones, implemented through untraditional 
domains. The resulting functional distribution between Russian and Kazakh
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prepared the conditions for the formation of societal bilingualism by producing an 
overlap of communicative domains and variation in terms of use between 
speakers of different demographic characteristics and geographic origins. 
Although societal bilingualism had finally emerged, the language shift had not and 
the extent of bilingualism varied with regards to demographic and geographic 
characteristics in the same way as in the case of diglossia.
Both Kazakhs and Russians had also developed a strong supra-national 
identity of the Soviet people, although both also became more extensively and 
intensively aware of their national affiliation. Sovietization was also based upon a 
high degree of enculturation into the Russian values and traditions, although this 
enculturation took the form of cultural exchange rather than assimilation.
Minority groups in Kazakhstan were also experiencing the sense of common 
Soviet identity and managed to preserve their cultural identities to a different 
degree. Interethnic conflicts were manifested only at the level of interpersonal 
communication and their intensity depended on the presence of conflict between 
the Soviet and national identity of the involved sides. Overall, further development 
of the interethnic dynamics as well as the character of societal bilingualism and 
functional role assignment depended on the directions of further nationality and 
language policy: actual legislation and practices in implementation.
Period of Gorbachev's Bilingualism Reversal 
The last period of the Soviet era lasted for only six years; however, because 
of the role the six years played in the evolution of Kazakh-Russian. bilingualism, it
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should be given separate consideration. The period began in 1985, the year of the 
beginning of Gorbachev’s reform, and finished in 1991, when the reform resulted 
in the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the formation of the independent 
Republic of Kazakhstan. The importance of the period was as a turning point, 
radically changing the distribution of language roles and statuses, as well as the 
nature of Kazakh-Russian bilingualism. This period reversed the flow of ethnic 
and linguistic assimilation of the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union, set the 
process of formation of culturally distinct nations and put an end to an almost 
century long endeavor of generating a unity of historically, culturally and 
linguistically diverse ethnic groups.
Gorbachev’s reform was a natural end to the prolonged period of economic 
stagnation that had been keeping the Soviet Union far behind its ideological foes. 
Stalin’s idea of centralized control as a necessary condition of a successful socio­
economic reformation with the goal of catching up with the development of the 
capitalist world turned maintenance of control into an end in itself. With the rest of 
the world developing at accelerated rates because of scientific progress and 
freedom of creativity under the conditions of unregulated competition, the 
U.S.S.R., encapsulated into ideological isolation, was suspended in economic 
stagnation while the living conditions of its population, rapidly expanding and 
growing in expectations, were approaching the threshhold of potential by mutual 
intolerance.
Under these conditions, the new Secretary General, M.Gorbachev, had to 
take steps towards economic reformation. The solution to economic stagnation
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was comprised of two components. One was economic restructuring, perestroika, 
aimed at replacing central planning and control over the regionally implemented 
unified economy with central coordination of locally planned, controlled and 
implemented independent economies. The second component was ideological 
liberalization, glasnost, aimed at creating a level of pluralism that would enliven 
economic creativity. This combination of decentralization and liberalization from 
the very beginning had the potential for destroying the two most important 
foundations of the Soviet Union-economic interdependence and ideological unity 
ensured by the leading role of the Communist party (see Thompson, 300). By 
removing the two foundations, it released the centripetal forces originating from 
the aspirations of the various nationalities for maximal self-determination. 
Deprived of the common ground, the nationalities saw no reason for membership 
in the supra-national entity of the Soviet Union (Marshall, 7-41). A more detailed 
explanation of the mechanism that released the centripetal forces in Kazakhstan 
is worth examining.
The solution of economic problems was seen in increasing the efficiency of 
republican economies by separate management of regional resources and local 
funds, inter-republican economic relationships were to be based upon mutual 
interest and profitability for the participating sides rather than on centralized 
redistribution. Decentralization put an end to the practice of preferential treatment 
of Central Asian republics. The practice was declared to have produced the 
positive results of bringing the republics to the level where they could successfully 
participate in unaided union-wide economic development (see Schroeder, 43-72).
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The decision regarding economic decentralization had both favorable and 
unfavorable consequences for Kazakhstan. On the one hand, the republic lost a 
considerable amount of financial inflow into its struggling economy and was facing 
the challenging task of successfully competing with the more efficient economies 
of European republics while facing growing social problems of unemployment and 
declining living standards, amplified by population growth among the indigenous 
nationality. This had the side effect of breaking the ethnic balance and the stability 
in interethnic communication dependent upon socio-economic situation. On the 
other hand, the republic received an opportunity to control its financial and 
material resources, and to use them for the benefit of its population, including their 
use for the solution of social problems. The success of the reform depended on 
whether the conditions for self-governance were created. Gorbachev’s 
administration failed to create such conditions, because of the internal 
contradiction of their concept of economic reformation (see Schroeder, 43-72).
In order to maintain the coordinating role of the center, Gorbachev conducted 
a cadre policy that favored ethnic Russians or local officials with experience in 
Moscow. This policy was destined to faii because it did not take into consideration 
the ethnic aspect of policy-making. On the one hand, the new appointees were 
perceived negatively by the general public, who expected immediate improvement 
of living conditions and could not see the promise of such improvements from the 
leaders who had not had experience in the republic. On the other hand, this policy 
was disfavored by the local political elite, whose expectations of greater control 
over the republic had not been met. The combination of these two factors resulted
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in a demonstration of protest in December 1986, which caused Gorbachev’s 
administration to commit another major error-to use military and subsequently 
political persecution against the demonstrators, acts that led to mobilization of 
national fronts in Kazakhstan and, in fact, all around the Soviet Union (see Olcott, 
1995, 249-71),
In its turn, glasnost’ “had been more effective in arousing nationalist 
sentiments than it had been in mobilizing a constituency for economic reform” 
(Bessinger, 301-23). Freedom of speech brought about two important forums 
related to nationalism. One was connected with the legalization of the political 
ideas from the past, which included the ideas of national autonomy and of the 
discriminatory practices of the previous union administrations. The other was 
connected with open discussion of nationality specific problems then current. The 
combination of the two produced a marked rise in nationalism. According to 
Bessinger:
Though ostensibly created to aid the party’s goal of restructuring, these 
fronts in a number of cases succeeded in becoming the leading political 
force of their republics, commanding the allegiance of the overwhelming 
majority of their population, toppling local party secretaries, and in some 
cases capturing local party organizations and turning them into vehicles for 
the expression of nationalist demands to the center. (Bessinger, 314)
This increase in the political influence of the national fronts undermined the 
leading role of the Communist party, and with the further decline of its role as a 
consequence of the worsening of the economic situation, allowed the national
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fronts to take full control of republican administrations and, in 1991, claim their 
republics' sovereignties.
The short period of Gorbachev’s reformation had a detrimental effect on the 
feeling of common Soviet identity, carefully cultivated by all previous 
administrations. Dissipation of the interconnecting economy and the crisis of the 
unifying Communist ideology cut the ties connecting the republics, while the 
redistribution of regional control, as well as an increasing struggle for limited 
resources, produced ethnic tensions within each of them. This is not to say that 
the cultural and linguistic unity disappeared within a moment; rather the conflict 
between the ethnic and Soviet identities resolved in favor of ethnic affiliation 
{Marshall, 7-41).
Each of the peoples of the multinational Kazakhstan experienced a rise in 
nationalism. For all the nationalities and ethnicities the rise was caused, first of all, 
by the spiritual revival brought about by the unconstrained and self-feeding 
discussion about history that people had the previously been prohibited from 
recalling and the problematic and controversial present of the group unleashed by 
ideological liberalization. Each of the peoples was restoring names, events, 
traditions and ideas which had been banned during the years of Soviet rule. In the 
case of Russians and Kazakhs of Kazakhstan the rise of nationalism was 
reinforced even more by the redistribution of control over the resources of the 
republic. Kazakhs were empowered by the promise of political autonomy and 
dissatisfied with the continuing practice of preference for Russian or loyalty 
towards Russian cadres in the republican administrative organs. Russians were
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empowered by legalized Russian nationalism and the experience of autonomy in 
the Russian Federation and frustrated at the increase in political influence of the 
national political elite. These two major ethnic groups of the republic had different 
views with regard to the future of nationalities and language legislation. However, 
at the moment of dissolution, they both wanted to remain in a political unit with 
Russia.
Initially, neither nationality nor language policy were on Gorbachev’s agenda. 
In fact, the discontinuation of the principle of affirmative action in economic 
regulation and of the principle of corenization in the party cadre policy was a 
manifestation of a total disregard to nationality issues. Only in 1987, after two 
years of being in office and having had an opportunity to observe the negative 
consequences of the politics of nationality-blindness he came to the conclusion 
that ’’not a single major issue can be resolved ...without taking into consideration 
the fact that we live in a multinational country” (Bessinger, 306). In Kazakhstan 
the change in Gorbachev’s nationality policy took place after the events of 
December 1986, when Gorbachev’s Russian-speaking appointee Kolbin 
undertook efforts to learn the national language and to familiarize himself with the 
national culture. However, even after the change in the party’s attitudes towards 
the nationality policy, its involvement in the resolution of the nationality issues was 
restricted to proclamations and passive observation of wnat was happening as a 
result of the loosening of ideological control. Most of the actual policy making was 
implemented by another political power of the time - the participants of the 
national fronts. These founded cultural centers, organized celebrations of
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traditional holidays, sponsored the publication of new books and filled the role 
previously reserved for the Communist Party-shaping the political opinion of the 
popular masses.
One of the most important direct language policy decisions of the time was 
introduction of the required training in Kazakh as a second language in schools 
with Russian language instruction, as well as enrichment of the school curriculum 
with separate courses in revised Kazakh literature and history including the 
names, dates and events blacked oui during the years of ideological suppression.
The ten years of reformation were insufficient for any sort of visible change to 
occur in the structure of bilingualism or diglossia. Russian and Kazakh continued 
to have overlapping communicative functions and maintain the existing character 
of bilingualism. What changed was the character of linguistic attitudes that would 
affect the future of language reform in independent Kazakhstan.
The importance of Gorbachev’s reformation consisted in several facts: it led 
to a polarization of the ethnic structure of Kazakhs society by generating an 
intense awareness of national identity; it changed the statuses of ethnicities in 
terms of political influence (changed majorities and minorities); it undermined the 
feeling of unity among the culturally and linguistically diverse peoples of what was 
to become an independent Republic of Kazakhstan; it reversed the process of 
ethnic and linguistic assimilation and changed attitudes towards the two major 
languages participating in societal bilingualism. Whatever course the new leaders 
of independent Kazakhstan were to assume, they had to take into consideration
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the complexity of the ethno-linguistic situation and the historical origins of this 





This section is devoted to the contemporary stage in the development of 
bilingualism, diglossia, and language policy in Kazakhstan. What we refer to as 
the contemporary stage in the development is the period starting from December 
25, 1991, when Kazakhstan became an independent state, lasting up to the 
present moment, more than 10 years, time enough for considering it in a historical 
perspective. However, we will treat the early days of independence as a part of 
the present because the current state of bilingualism, diglossia and language 
policy in the country is in most respects a result of the strategy assumed and the 
acts undertaken by the government at the early stages of independence.
The Republic of Kazakhstan was formed as an outcome of the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union. This did not happen by the will of the Kazakhstani people 
(represented by their government), who until the last moment had attempted to 
retain membership in the Soviet Union re-organized on the basis of a new type of 
interaction between the comprising republics. The formation of the independent 
state of Kazakhstan was a historical necessity, which made it more beneficial for 
the republic to leave the union rather than to become a part of independent 




Although few years have passed since Kazakhstan acquired independence, 
many changes ihat affected the state of digiossia and bilingualism in the country 
have been implemented. There is need for a detailed evaluation of the results 
achieved and for subjection of the chosen course to scrupulous re-consideration. 
This chapter attempts to provide an analysis of this sort, taking into consideration 
the existing theory, historical preliminaries and some relevant extra-linguistic 
contexts.
Let us start with the description of the initial conditions, under which the goals 
of the language policy were to be stated and the strategies identified.
At the moment of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the total population of 
Kazakhstan was 16,464,464. Of the total, 6,535,000 (39.7%) were Kazakhs, who 
were only sligh-ly greater in number than the 6,228,000 (37.8%) Russians. Other 
major ethnicities represented were Ukrainians, 896,000 (5.4%); Uzbeks-332,000 
(2.0%); Germans—958,000 (5.8%); Tatars-328,000 (2.0%); Uigurs-185,000 
(1.1%); Byelorussians-183,000 (1.1%); Koreans-103,000 (0.6%); Azerbaijanis- 
90,000 (0.5%), and Turks-75,900 (0.5%) (1989 census, Agency of the Republic 
of Kazakhstan on Statistics). As a result of Soviet nationality and language 
policies, these people entered their new citizenship either monolingual or bilingual 
in Russian in such a way that almost 100% of the population were using Russian, 
the language of interethnic communication in a wide range of functional domains, 
while the language of ethnic majority, Kazakh, restricted both in use and the 
number of speakers, was known primarily, but not universally, by Kazakhs
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themselves and was used equally with Russian only in communication with family 
members among most of the native speakers (see Bruchis, 23-41).
The complexity of the ethnolingusitic situation for further nationality and 
language policy-making rested on the fact that all of the peoples of newly 
independent Kazakhstan had developed a rather strong ethnic/national identity 
during the years of Soviet rule, especially during the era of restructuring and 
glasnost. At least three groups--the titular nationality, Russians and Germans -- 
had developed a strong feeling of nationalism, particularly relevant for a potential 
break-down in interethnic dynamics.
As a result of the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., the national identities of the 
peoples increased even more. Kazakhs became more aware of their identity 
having eventually become not only the numeric, but also the political majority in 
the country. The main source of nationalism of Kazakhstani Russians was 
twofold. On the one hand, it was connected to the fact that Russians had lost their 
positions as the political majority that they had assumed in the non-Russian 
Soviet Republic of Kazakhstan. On the other, it was amplified by the acquisition of 
independence by their historical motherland across the border. Kazakhstani 
Germans’ aspirations for preservation and further development of their language 
and culture, as well as for re-unification with their co-nationals in Germany, 
originated from the repatriation and diaspora-support policy conducted by the 
German government towards all the representatives of their nationality from the 
former Soviet Union. Finally, as a consequence of the liberalization processes that 
had been taking place on the eve of dissolution, all other ethnic minorities had
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high expectations from the government with respect to protection of their right for 
the preservation of their national identity and language.
In addition, the new language policy had to be put into practice together with 
reformation of the economic, social and political systems, simultaneously with new 
supra-national identity building, in the conditions of under-funding, attitudes of 
resistance to change, in general, under the circumstances of the complex 
interplay between contradictory forces and goals, and in the context of 
interdependence with other former Soviet republics and the increasing pace of 
globalization and accelerated differentiation between the developed and the 
developing worlds.
At the same time, some of the initial conditions were favorable; one such 
condition was the culture of relative interethnic tolerance, which had been 
cultivated, due to or in spite of the efforts of the Soviet government for 
Sovietization. This tolerance was, of course, very fragile and easy to break with 
ethnically insensitive experimentation of political, economic, social or other kinds. 
Another facilitative factor was a well-developed societal bilingualism, which 
reflected the ethnic representation of the country. If it were not for this 
bilingualism, the wounds of ethnic minorities caused by language reformation in 
Kazakhstan would have been much more.
Another factor was the relative secularism of the society, which prevented 
interethnic conflicts on religious grounds with ethnicities and nationalities 
belonging historically to different confessions. Still another contributing factor was 
absence of reasonable grounds for separatist claims, which saved the new state
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from destructive wars and upheavals. Finally, there was also the geopolitical 
location of the country, which made it too important a buffer between Europe and 
Asia for a single powerful country, such as Russia, the United States or China, to 
interfere with the internal affairs of the republic too much. Indirectly, Kazakhstan's 
language and nationality policy-makers benefited from the combination of factors 
that made the country attractive for a multitude of serious international partners— 
its vast territory, the potential promise of its natural resources, the appropriate 
level of development of its science and educational system, relatively developed 
infrastructure and, initially, even the mere fact of presence on its territory of the 
considerable amount of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear reserve and one of 
the world’s largest in the world launching facility for spacecraft. The combination 
of these factors created a relative advantage in the implementation of economic, 
political and social reforms compared with some of the partners from the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, and, consequently, less potential for 
interethnic conflicts and better conditions for linguistic reformation and nation­
building.
The success of language policy-making seems to depend on the nation’s 
leaders’ ability to make the most of the advantages and to come up with a well- 
thought through way of dealing with disadvantages. It also seems to depend on 
the ability to take into consideration gains and losses from the nation’s past and 
the experience of language reform in other countries at present. A successful 
language policy needs to be consistent, i.e. built upon a set of consciously and 
intentionally defined goals, based on regular progress evaluation, and an absence
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of contradicting reforms in the nationality policy, economics, social and political 
spheres. It has to encourage extended forums of discussion involving all the 
relevant groups of the society. Now let us see whether the contemporary 
language policy in Kazakhstan has met these criteria (see Fasold. 246-66).
One of the first problems facing the early Kazakhstani policy-makers was 
determination of the official language of the new state. The difficulty in choosing 
the language came from contradictions in the goals posed by nationality, 
language and socio-economic policies. The goal of the nationality policy was to 
build a new sense of nationhood that would keep the multiethnic society together. 
The achievement of the goal was not easy because of the co-existence in the 
country of several groups with nationalist aspirations which counteracted the 
cultivation of Kazakhstanis’ new identity. But even more importantly, the 
complication was posed by the fact that the intentional process of nation-building 
was accompanied by the continuing natural process of the rejuvenation of the 
national identities of the comprising nationalities, the process which had started 
during Gorbachev’s reformation and which in many ways counteracted the goal of 
the nationality policy. Kazakhs and Russians were particularly relevant in this 
respect, because the former were gaining power at the expense of the latter, who 
perceived the loss even more acutely with the strengthening of Russianism in 
their historical motherland across the border.
The linguistic situation added to this complexity. With language being an 
important element of national identity, the goal of the language policy was to 
choose, develop and promote a language which would provide for the fastest
129
formation of interethnic unity in the republic, necessary for its successful socio­
economic development.
Due to the efforts of the Soviet language policy-makers, societal Russian 
bilingualism had become a reality in Kazakhstani society, with all the population 
speaking Russian. Because of the numeric prevalence of these speakers,
Russian was a potential candidate for the new nation’s language. The problem 
with Russian, however, was connected with the fact that it carried with it the 
stigma of having served as the state language of the Russian Empire, the Soviet 
Union and, in the future, the Russian Federation-all serving as impediments to 
the formation of the new identity, especially with non-Russian peoples having 
some negative associations with the Russian rule in the case of the Russian 
Empire and the Soviet Union, and with the possibility for the contemporary 
Russians of the mainland to consider restoration of the Empire or to exercise 
political, cultural or economic influence over the former colonies and, 
subsequently, union republics.
With the majority of the population being Kazakh, and with the uniqueness of 
the language itself, Kazakh was a possible alternative to Russian. However, after 
the years of Russification, often based on cultivation of a belief in the inferiority of 
non-Russian languages, most of the non-Kazakhs, who, in addition, were not 
conversant in the language, were likely to resist its promotion. Besides, since the 
process of the formation of the Soviet identity had never been completed.
Kazakhs were still perceived by the representatives of the minority ethnicities and 
nationalities as historically indigenous people, who, under the new conditions,
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were likely to push the process of restoration of the national identity further 
towards the prevalence of the Kazakh rather than Kazakhstani nationalism. Thus, 
the choice of the Kazakh language would be inevitably interpreted as an attempt 
to buiid the nation of exclusively Kazakhs rather than multiethnic Kazakhstanis. 
This, of course, would be a political mistake with Kazakhs not being particularly 
numerous and with the country's professional workforce being predominantly 
ethnically Russian, especially taking into consideration the danger of expansion 
posed by overpopulated China behind the back door.
Whether Russian or Kazakh were chosen, the choice would have been poor, 
since if either of the two identity-defining languages had been given the special 
status of the state language, this selection would have immediately destroyed the 
relative balance of power between the two major nationalities and, therefore, 
would have counteracted the major goal of the nationality policy.
Not only did Kazakh not have as many speakers as Russian, but also, 
because of the Soviet diglossia, it was not developed enough to successfully fulfill 
all the communicative functions of a state language, especially in suui, domains 
as business, official communication and science, which were undergoing radical 
transformation during the process of democratization after the acquisition of 
sovereignty (see Olcott, 1995, 271-99). Thus the choice of Kazakh on nationalist 
grounds would work against the goals of socio-economic reform, while the choice 
of Russian in order to comply with the necessities of the economic reform would 
offset the attempts of building a new supra-ethnic identity.
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Because of this complexity, a monolingual model, assumed in most other 
republics of the Soviet Union, would never work for Kazakhstan either in its 
Russian- or its Kazakh-based versions. The selection of the Kazakh language 
would be interpreted as linguistic discrimination by the majority of monolingual 
Russian-speakers, The assignment of the official status to the widely used 
Russian language would contradict the goal of nation-building, with Russian being 
the main cause of the weakening of Kazakhstanis’ formally colonial, more recently 
union and perspective new autonomous identity. In addition, absence of a 
legislative confirmation of a special status for Kazakh posed the danger of reviving 
the process of the inevitable linguistic assimilation of Kazakh to Russian, reversed 
during the years of glasnost and restructuring. Hence, at the beginning of nation­
building and linguistic policy-making, both languages needed to be somehow 
reflected in the Constitution, in such a way, however, that de jure Kazakh had a 
higher status than Russian to compensate for the lack of actual distributional 
prevalence over the realm of functional domains among the majority of speakers.
The first attempt to put this into practice was conducted in the first 
Constitution adopted in 1993. This Constitution proclaimed Kazakh the state 
language and Russian as the language of interethnic communication following the 
Law about Languages in its 1989th edition (Kim). Such a solution, which had 
worked perfectly fine for the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, was not the best 
possible for the newly independent Republic of Kazakhstan. In the Soviet Union, 
Russian was assigned the status of the official language at the union level and the 
fact that it had a lower status in the Constitution of a comprising republic had not
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affected its actual position in comparison with Kazakh. Since, during that period 
Russians were more influential in Kazakhstan, their attitudes were not as negative 
towards the assignment of the status of the official language to Kazakh, this 
designation was perceived as an affirmative action, directed towards preservation 
of the language of the numeric majority. Under the new conditions, such a 
distribution of statuses could not be successful, since Russian had lost the status 
of the official language at the state level and Russians became both a numeric 
and political minority.
Unlike the leaders of the other formerly Soviet republics, the Kazakhstani 
administration mentioned Russian in the Constitution, but no clarification was 
provided about the implications of the language’s special status for its destiny in 
the political reality of language use (Constitution of 1993). The status of Russian 
was purposefully formulated in a vague way. This was not done because the 
administration of independent Kazakhstan did not understand the danger of 
disregarding Russian, but out of the optimism about the tempo of reformation 
characteristic for the first years of independence and an underestimation of the 
complexity of the interethnic dynamics.
In addition to the fact that the first legislative document of the country was 
unclear about the status of Russian, its practical implementation was extremely 
complicated in the absence of a clearly formulated strategy, in a state of disarray 
at the very beginning of economic and administrative reforms, and in the process 
of renovation of the educational system, in the re-organization of mass media and 
re-alignment of all other societal institutions directly or indirectly related to
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language policy. In fact, the first attempts to impose Kazakh as a state language 
in governmental structures complicated their adaptation to the new conditions 
even more.
Political scientist Berik Abdygaliyev. whose opinion reflects the official point of 
view, lists some of the successes and failures of the first attempts of the new 
administration in the domain of language policy (31-8). To demonstrate positive 
outcomes, he mentions the statistical data provided by the State Statistical 
Agency for 1993. During that year, 262,511 children in the republic attended 
Kazakh-speaking kindergartens, while 478,490 children attended Russian- 
speaking ones. In 52 pre-school institutions, in 130 groups there were 7,000 
children being taught in Korean, German, Tajik, Tatar, Uzbek and Uigur. 806,100 
children attended Kazam i-speaking secondary schools, while the number of 
students in schools with Russian as the medium of instruction was 1,033,900. 
Mixed instruction in Kazakh and Russian was offered in 2092 schools. In addition, 
there were 73 schools with instruction in Uzbek, 17 in Uigur, and 3 in Tajik.
Twelve languages (Azeri, Greek, Dungan, Korean, Kurdish, German, Polish,
Tatar, Turkish, Ukrainian, Uigur and Chechen) were also offered as native in 
regular schools. It was claimed that 189,416 students in the republic were enrolled 
in groups with Russian-language instruction at the post-secondary level. The 
corresponding figure for Kazakh-ianguage instruction was 77,243. Abdygaliyev 
also mentions the fact that in a number of universities in the country, a 
specialization in minority languages education was offered, including methodology 
of teaching of or in German, Korean, Polish and others (31-8). There might be
134
some doubt as to whether this data actually illustrate the success of the new 
language policy, since the increase in the number of Kazakh-based educational 
institutions and in the number of students receiving education in their native 
tongues or studying the language of their ethnicity or nationality could be a 
delayed outcome of Gorbachev’s later policy, which had become more sensitive 
to nationality issues towards its end. The increase in numbers could be also a 
result of the initial enthusiasm (in the case of Kazakhs) or concern (in the case of 
non-Kazakhs) caused by the change in the de facto (as opposed to de jure) 
statuses of the Kazakh and Russian languages. What the numbers do indicate is 
the starting conditions for the next stage of language policymaking, i.e. the 
situation when approximately only 1/3 of secondary and 1/4 of post-secondary 
education is conducted in the state language, with instruction in minority 
languages also remaining rather limited in the number of schools, hours and 
students.
Abdygaliyev provides some data on mass media, since the “Law about 
Languages” contained a special article about language-related regulations in this 
sphere. He mentions that in accordance with the law, 1,044 periodicals were 
published in Kazakhstan, 2672 of which were in Kazakh, 396 in Russian, 357 in 
both, and 29-in other languages. Of 238 radio and television stations, 2 were 
broadcasting in Kazakh, 9 in Russian, 171 in both, and 56-in other languages (31- 
8). Unlike the questionable significance of the statistics for education, the data for 
mass media does look impressive, because even if we disregard all the 19 
regional companies, and the state Kazakhstani and Russian ones, the number of
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broadcasting and publishing firms will still be quite large. With the new private 
publishing and broadcasting firms opening in the conditions of freedom of speech, 
Kazakh-speaking readers and viewers benefited, since in the environment of the 
initial accumulation of capital, they were treated as important customers who 
could pay regardless of the language they spoke (Abdygaliyev,31-8).
In the list of positive outcomes, Abdygaliyev also mentions the opening of 165 
national-cultural centers, which contributed to the development and restoration of 
national languages, culture, customs and traditions. These, of course, were 
created with the government's encouragement, but with little state financial 
support.
The two facts mentioned above undoubtedly evidence, as Abdygaliyev 
concludes, that “the overall character of language policy conducted in the republic 
is that of linguistic pluralism and that the laws of the republic assure rights, 
guarantees and respect towards all the languages in the country” (33). This 
conclusion is correct if the word "guarantee” is understood as provision of 
legislative support. The data does not prove that the practical actions of the 
government were at all successful. The number of schools and students, as well 
as the amount of print and broadcasting do not tell anything about the actual 
quality of the educational and information dissemination services in the state 
language.
Abdygaliyev mentions a number of negative outcomes of the first steps in the 
nation’s language policy. His major concern is the fact that the conditions had not 
been created for successful functioning of the state language. To support the
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idea, he provides the statistics of the State Languages Committee for the year 
1994, according to which of 55,008 state agencies only 16.6% conducted 
paperwork in both Kazakh in Russian, while 70.3% continued to use exclusively 
Russian. Of the 223 republican administrative districts (oblasts), 131 ran the 
official correspondence in Russian only. Abdygaliyev also points to the fact that 
“in many districts in elimination of the ‘Law about Languages’ the principle of 
bilingualism is not observed in the sphere of commercial transactions and 
services” (33). Only 6 republican departments and ministries out of the assessed 
37 conduct official transactions in two languages. The remaining 31 use only 
Russian (Abdygaliyev, 33).
From the same source comes data which serves as evidence of the restricted 
use of the state language in higher education. According to the State Committee 
on Nationalities, 78% of university students received instruction in Russian in
1994.
On the basis of the analysis of the statistical data, Abdygaliev makes an 
important conclusion that “the language proclaimed as the state one de facto does 
not fulfill the assigned role. For a number of objective reasons, the Kazakh 
language Is not developed enough to implement all the complex of state 
language’s functions” (34). This conclusion nicely demonstrates the 
administration’s realization of the complexity of the linguistic situation in 
Kazakhstan and the reason for its eventual decision to change the course of
actions.
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What Abdygaliyev’s assessment does not uncover, however, is the figures for 
the increased outward migration of the non-Kazakh population during the first 
years of independence, the figures that were partially dependent on the effect 
produced by the first language-related legislative act and the actual political 
practice on the resulting language attitudes and expectations about the future of 
nationality policy.
In January of 1994, according to sociologist M.Kaizer, Kazakhs comprised 
44.3% of the population (compared with 39.7 in 1989); Russians, 35.8% (37.8), 
Germans, 3.6% (5.8), Ukrainians, 5.1% (5.4), Uzbeks, 2.2% (2.0), Tatars, 2.0% 
(2.0); Byelorussians, 1.1%. The negative balance of migration calculated for 1,000 
individuals, according to the same source, comprised 24.52 individuals leaving the 
country for all nationalities, 42.66 for Russians, 160.20 for Germans. 38. 54 for 
Ukrainians (Kaizer, 1-13).
A number of formal and informal attitude studies identified different factors for 
outward migration (Abenov; Tatimov; Sergiyenko). P. Svoik wrote that
...opinions about the causes of out-migration vary considerably: the official 
sources claim that it has a purely economic nature, that as sociological 
surveys indicate, tensions in interethnic communication are not the primary 
reason (they occupy 10th-20th place according to their importance). 
Independent experts insist that the main reason for out-migration is 
political, connected with the nationality policy of the state ‘pushing' the 
Russian-speaking population out of the country. (Svoik)
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In actuality, however, the decision to leave the country was caused by a 
complex of factors, one of which was economic with the majority of the individuals 
who were leaving the country expecting to find better conditions of life in the new 
country of citizenship. This fact is well supported by the difference in the numbers 
of emigrants for certain nationalities. The numbers are highest for Russians, 
Germans, and Ukrainians, who were leaving for countries which had a perceived 
higher economic promise and opportunity. Germans were particularly prone to 
leave with Germany being one of the most developed countries in the world. On 
the other hand, the out-migration was low for minorities from Central Asia, which 
were perceived as less economically promising. In fact, the numbers were 
surpassed by the numbers for in-migration from the neighboring republics, 
especially for the republics’ ethnic Russians, who were driven to Kazakhstan for 
the same reasons that Kazakhstani Russians were driven to Russia.
Among other important reasons were the desire to return to the historical 
motherland and family re-union (Kvyatkovskiy). This motif was more important for 
those who had arrived with the last wave of in-migration to Soviet Kazakhstan 
during the Virgin Land campaign, as well as for the former Soviet military 
personnel and engineering professionals, who had been sent to the republic on 
an individual basis to resolve the problem of the lack of a professional workforce 
in Kazakhstan. These recent immigrants had not developed a strong attachment 
to the new place of residence by the time of the dissolution and, therefore, were
more likely to leave.
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Finally, although the reason of language-discrimination was one of the least 
frequently officially quoted ones, it can be inferred that for most of the emigrants, 
dissatisfaction with the new political status of their ethnicity and the 
constitutionally finalized change in the status of languages contributed to finalizing 
their decision to leave the country.
In general, the more realistic explanation is probably the one provided by 
Sergiyenko, who indicated that the main attitude underlying emigration was 
"deficit of predictability (of the future)” (Sergiyenko). If this reason is correct, then 
the lack of clarity in the definition of the status of the Russian language was one of 
the contributing factors.
Another such factor was a change in the attitudes of Kazakhs themselves. 
Returning to Abdygaliyev’s evaluation of the results of the first steps in language 
policy in Kazakhstan, the political scientist noted the “tendency for extreme 
purism” implying the rush of onomastic changes, and the extremities of the first 
attempts of vocabulary construction (35).
The deficit of predictability amplified by the overall economic and political 
crisis led to relative instability in interethnic communication, with the culmination of 
the Russian-speaking population’s dissatisfaction reached in December of 1992 in 
Ust-Kamenogorsk, where a demonstration was organized by Russians who 
demanded reconsideration of the status of the Russian language. Similar 
demonstrations were then conducted in the similarly predominantly Russian city, 
Petropavlovsk (Kaizer, 5).
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The failure of the first attempts to change the linguistic situation to meet the 
needs of nationality policy and socio-economic reformation pushed the 
Kazakhstani administration to assume a more serious approach to the problem 
posed by Russian bilingualism and Russian-Kazakh diglossia. This new approach 
was initiated by the change of status assignment to the Kazakh, Russian and 
minority languages in the new Constitution adopted on August 30th, 1995. In 
article 7 of the new Constitutions, it is stated that:
1) The state language of the Republic of Kazakhstan is Kazakh;
2) In all governmental organizations and in the organs of local 
administration, the Russian language is officially used on equal terms 
with Kazakh;
3) The state assumes the responsibility for the provision of conditions 
necessary for teaching and development of languages of the peoples of 
Kazakhstan. (Coinstitution of 1995)
In addition, in rubric 2, article 19 of the new Constitution, it is mentioned that 
“everyone has the right for the exercise of their mother tongue and culture, for the 
free choice of the language of communication, education and creative expression” 
(Constitution, 1995).
As is clear from the new formulation of the section devoted to the status of 
languages quoted above, the new Constitution assigned a special status to the 
Russian language. A good interpretation of the difference between status was 
provided by G. Kim, Professor of History of the Kazakh State University, in his 
speech about languages in Kazakhstan:
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in the international practice, the terms “official language” and “state 
language” are used synonymously. The official language is defined as the 
main language of the state, used in legal and governmental discourse. The 
difference of the state language from the official one is in the fact that while 
the latter does not need any formal, constitutionally ensured proclamation, 
the status of the state language requires such normative confirmation,
(Kim, 1)
Thus, the new Constitution achieved the goal of the first one in a more 
successful way: it managed to assign equal status to both languages, but, at the 
same time, to provide special protection for Kazakh, ensuring its use as the 
language defining supra-national identity and Kazakhstani patriotism, despite its 
lower prestige among the citizens in Russian-dominated bilingualism.
In November of 1996, an important document formulating the new strategy in 
language policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan was adopted in continuation of the 
general principles stated in the Constitution. This document is the Conception of 
the Language Policy in the Republic of Kazakhstan (Concepciya...), whose 
content and the results of practical implementation will be discussed in more 
detail.
This conception was extremely important for planning--a guarantee of 
success in any large-scale change— because it provided a general theoretical 
framework and guidelines for language policy-making, i.e. an overview of pre­
conditions, of the most general goals and objectives based on the interpretation of 
the pre-conditions, a course of action to be taken in order to achieve the goals, a
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mode! of the target linguistic situation, the primary directions of political legislation 
and practices, and a convincing plan to counteract the public’s resistance to 
change.
In this conception, the authors recognized that “the main pre-requisite for the 
optimal development of social processes in the contemporary world is stability of 
interethnic communication” and that “language policy should facilitate the 
preservation of stability in interethnic communication” (Concepciya.,.,1). In other 
words, the connection between nationality and language policy was well 
understood.
The conception was based on a realization that “new socio-economic 
conditions of Sovereign Kazakhstan demand a language policy that would be able 
to meet the needs of the country’s multiethnic population and to take into 
consideration the peculiarities of the linguistic, demographic and political situation” 
(Concepciya...,1). .
One of the important characteristics of the new approach assumed by the 
language policy-makers, as is clear from the strategic document, was 
understanding that the goals and objectives as well as deadlines for language 
reformation should be derived from the analysis of the actual linguistic situation, 
i.e., the context of the actual use of the language; and that the context itself “is 
determined by a multiplicity of factors both linguistic and extra-linguistic (historical, 
psychological, social, economic, political, geographic and etc)" (Concepciya...,1).
Providing a general estimation of the linguistic situation in Kazakhstan, the 
authors of the strategy used the results of a uciolinguistic investigation
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conducted in April of 1996 by the Parliamentary Center of Information Analysis in 
collaboration with the State Committee on Nationality Policy, whose role was to 
assess the place of the state language and other languages in the communicative 
system of Kazakhstani society, the level of mastery of each of the languages by 
the population, preferences in language use in different spheres of life, and the 
state of language instruction in educational institutions and in the workplace (see 
Kim, 2). On the basis of the results of these investigations, the following overview 
of pre-conditions was given:
Presently there exists a variety of languages: over 100 of them fulfill 
some sort of communicative function. The languages are not equal in the 
volume of the fulfilled communicative functions...The status of the Kazakh 
language remains of a merely declarative character and is not supported 
sufficiently with a mechanism that would provide for its extended use and 
acquisition. Official correspondence and work-related communication are 
still conducted in Kazakh as a secondary language.
The problems of Kazakh are not limited to the necessity of development 
of the actual rather than a declared status as a state language In the 
center of attention, especially, the attention of teachers and researchers, 
there should be the actual state of the Kazakh language itself, the 
problems of its development and maintenance. What is meant here is 
improvement of the language’s ability to reflect the new sociocultural reality 
by means of mutual enrichment in close contact with other languages of 
the world and by utilization of the internal potential of the language...
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The needs of the ethnic groups in pre-school and secondary education 
are not fully satisfied. There exists a lack of instructional materials, facilities 
and qualified personnel...
There exists a need in improvement of contacts with foreign countries, 
where most of the representatives of the Kazakhstani ethnicities reside..
There is also a necessity to create a more consistent and detailed body 
of laws and other legislative documents, as well as to provide for better 
coordination in the work of governmental and non-governmental structures. 
(Concepciya...,1)
As is clear from the abstract, the conception of language policy was built on a 
more objective rather than politicized assessment of the initial context of language 
policy. This assessment resulted in identification of both the general state of 
diglossia and bilingualism (stated here in non-technical terms) and the specific 
areas of concern as perceived from the point of view of the results of previous 
attempts of language development and maintenance.
The next section of the strategy was devoted to the proposition of the model 
of the “functional development of languages” (Concepciya...,2). What was 
referred to as functional development o f languages was the attempt to determine 
and to achieve the most optimal functional distribution between languages of 
different ethnicities of Kazakhstan. Thus, primary attention was given to the status 
of the state language:
State language fulfills the most important functions in the state and public 
life. It is first of all the language which is used for the formulation of all
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legislative acts of the state. It is an obligatory language of official meetings 
and correspondence. It is to be used in responding to citizens’ letters and 
petitions. The state language should be also used in all governmental 
institutions, organizations and in the military. All the statistical, financial and 
technical documentation should be filed in this tongue. It is to be used in 
jurisprudence as well as in compiling written agreements between physical 
and juridical persons. The language should be used in diplomatic 
consulates and embassies, in conducting international negotiations and 
official receptions. The use of the state language should be obligatory in 
means of mass communication, with the use of other languages being less 
than the use of the state one. The state language should be also used in 
issuing passoorts, identification documents, birth certificates, documents 
proving complet'on of education and other official paperwork; in 
organizational letterheads and stamps, in labels, blanks, announcements, 
and visual information of other sods. The status of the state language 
implies the creation of conditions for universal acquisition of the required 
level of skills in the language by all citizens of the state. Employment in 
government structures should require possession of the skills at an 
identified obligatory minimal level. Upon creation of the appropriate legal 
basis, the protection of the state language is to be ensured by means of 
constitutional persecution of the individuals who do not comply with the 
state’s regulations concerning the language. (Concepciya.,.,3)
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Foliowing the Constitution, the new strategy also guaranteed the Russian 
language “preservation of all the communicative functions fulfilled by the language 
at present” (Concepciya... ,3) by allowing official utilization of the language on 
equal terms with the state language in all the spheres of government 
communication. In perspective, Russian will “remain the main source of 
information in many fields of science and technology, a means of communication 
with the countries of CIS and the rest of the world” (Concepciya...,3).
According to the conception, the u 'e  of minority languages would have to be 
restricted to the domains of everyday and family communication. Understanding 
the importance of the native tongue for ,he preservation of ethnic identity made 
the authors of the strategy assign to the government responsibility to facilitate the 
creation of conditions for the use and acquisition of minority languages 
(Concepciya...,3).
At this point, it should be clear that in the new strategy, the administration 
managed to propose a more promising model of multilingualism and diglossia. In 
this model, the issue of supra-national identity building was resolved by 
assignment of the status of the state language to Kazakh with the status to be 
legally protected and the conditions for its actualization created by introduction of 
the obligatory bilingualism in Kazakh and imposition of the legal responsibility for 
compliance with this civil responsibility. The issues of Russian nationalism and 
negative attitudes of other non-Kazakh Russian-speaking population were 
resolved by assignment of a special status to the Russian language. By 
proclaiming Russian the official language of the republic, the state ensured
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preservation of the currently existing communicative functions of Russian. The 
problem of potential separatism and impediments to the process of formation of 
the Kazakhstani identity by the centripetal influence of Russian nationalism was 
addressed by making the status of the Russian language lower than the status of 
the Kazakh language. (The alternative approach would be to merely proclaim two 
state languages.) Finally, the rights of languages of ethnic minorities were not only 
recognized, but also protected by the government.
So, overall, the proposed model was reasonable enough to be able to resolve 
the issue of the multilingual and multiethnic complexity in the country. Further 
analysis will have to determine whether the model became workable in the 
process of implementation.
The last section of the conception was devoted to the statement of the 
specific objectives for language construction.
The role of the state was understood as “correction of the current hierarchy of 
languages in the direction of the primary development of the state language” 
(Concepciya... ,4). On the basis of this understanding, the conclusion was made 
that the responsibilities of the state will vary for different languages in the 
hierarchy. Below is the translation of the section of the conception devoted to the 
objectives of the new language policy, which is included unabridged because of 
the importance of understanding the objectives for the subsequent analysis of the 
results of their implementation.
The state assumes responsibility for the creation of conditions for the 
practical realization of the status of the state language. For this purpose it
148
should mobilize all the necessary financial, material, and organizational 
resources. In the case of the state language, the efforts of the government 
should, in fact, supercede the efforts of individuals and public 
organizations, as only the state is able to resolve the problems associated 
with the development, maintenance and use of Kazakh.
One of the most important directions of language policy-making should 
be the provision of conditions for universal acquisition of the state language 
at a certain identified minimal obligatory level by all the citizens of the 
republic. In order to fulfill this task, special centers should be opened 
offering free courses in the Kazakh language differentiated for various 
ethnic, demographic and professional characteristics of the learners. State 
means of mass communication should also offer Kazakh language lessons 
in the form of TV and radio programs and newspaper rubrics. In all 
institutions of pre-school, secondary, and post-secondary education, a level 
of instruction in the Kazakh language should be ensured that wouiq allow 
for successful communication in the spheres of interpersonal, business and 
official communication. The process of acquisition of the state language 
should be supported with mass publication of accessible and effective 
methodologies of language teaching and learning, textbooks, and 
dictionaries oriented to different categories of users. The successful 
experience of language centers in implementation of instruction according 
to original methodologies should be disseminated across the country.
Special minimal language requirements should be determined and
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introduced as a pre-requisite for employment in the government, as well as 
in the spheres of health services, science, culture, education and 
community life organization. A system of material reinforcement of those 
who successfully acquired the minimum should be designed.
The use of the state language should become a norm in the practice of 
communication at the international level. All events involving participation 
of official foreign representatives should be conducted in the state 
language, with synchronous translation into other languages provided 
whenever necessary. All legislative acts, reports by officials and other state 
documentation should be prepared in state language. In order to provide 
interethnic communication in state organs, special state translation 
services should be introduced. The staff of all governmental institutions 
should include positions of interpreters from and into the state language. 
The amount of training of such interpreters in institutions of higher 
nation should be in. used. The Eu, Jniversity and the Kazei-. 
State University should become centers for the preparation of such 
interpreters as well as centers for the training of specialists in languages 
and cultures of the peoples of Kazakhstan.
The prestige of the state language should be raised to such a level that 
its acquisition becomes a vital necessity for every citizen of the country, a 
defining element of Kazakhstani patriotism. The state language needs 
support not only from the officials, but also from the rest of the society. It 
makes sense to create a special fund for the support of the state
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Language, maintained coliaboratively by the governmental and non­
governmental organizations and institutions, by financial, and business 
structures.
State support of the official language consists in providing conditions for 
its utilization equally with the state language in the organs of state 
government. Its status is ensured by translating into Russian all legislative 
acts and other documents, by interpreting into it official correspondence 
and by using the language in a secondary role in financial and statistical 
documentation. Preservation of the Russian language’s communicative 
spheres is ensured by the intention of Kazakhstan to participate in the 
processes of integration, and to preserve cultural and educational 
collaboration with other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States.
Provision of the conditions for the development of the languages of other 
peopi-oc Kazakhstan implies the creation of opportunities for learning 
native languages by all willing to do this. This is implemented by providing 
secondary education in the mother tongue or offering instruction in the 
language as a required subject, by training native-language instructors, by 
ensuring assistance in publication of instructional materials, fiction and 
periodicals. Such activities can be successful with active participation of the 
ethno-cultural centers able to express the interests of their nationality or 
ethnicity. There is a need to establish partnerships with the countries of 
origin of the Kazakhstani ethnic minorities, as well as with the European
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Bureau of Minor Ethnicities and similar international organizations.
Foreign language instruction also requires state support. Financial 
reinforcement should be provided for government employees conversant in 
a foreign language. The practice of intensive foreign language instruction in 
specialized language schools should be continued.
Language construction would be impossible without scientific analysis of 
the state of ethnic languages in the republic as well as of the overall 
linguistic situation. Sociological and sociolinguistic monitoring should 
provide for on-going correction of the language policy able to reflect the 
dynamics of the language processes and its regional differentiation 
according to demographic, social and ethnic criteria.
In the case of research on Kazakh, an important task is to develop a 
system of orthographic and orthoepic rules, ensuring the language’s 
unification and standardization. It is also essential to create a corpus of 
Kazakh terminology. For the purpose of standar^a* - 
language, publication of orthographic, orthoepic and semantic dictionaries 
should be implemented. It is also necessary to provide for the production of 
video and audio-lingual materials for Kazakh language learners.
The realization of the conception would be successful only if it is 
supported by legislative acts and organizational activities. The conception 
is submitted with a proposal for the law “On Languages in the Republic of 
Kazakhstan”. Subsequently amendments should be introduced into the 
Civil Code, Administrative Code Labor Law and other laws. The
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mechanisms of the development of the state language should be reflected 
in governmental programs of development of Kazakh and other languages. 
(Concepciya... ,5)
The new law “On languages in the Republic of Kazakhstan.” mentioned in the 
Concept was passed on July 11,1997 (Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan o Yazike). 
This document created a legal basis for the implementation of the strategy 
providing definition of the status of the languages of Kazakhstan in juridical terms, 
defining rights and responsibilities of the state and of the individuals with regards 
to language development, maintenance, knowled<, ' and use, determining the 
exact spheres where the state language should be used, and describing the 
mechanism that would ensure implementation of the law itself. As was planned in 
the conception, the law served and continues to serve as a foundation for 
formulation of language-related articles in other legislative acts and executive 
ers of the government and organs of local administration to provide for 
consistent implementation of the defined strategy. Thus, since the adoption of the 
new law on languages, language-related articles were introduced into such 
important laws as:
1) “On Labor” (1999) (Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan o Trudej-prohibition 
of discrimination on the basis of language knowledge and use;
2) “On Mass Media” (1999) (Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan o Sredstvah 
Massovov Informacivi^-determination of the volume of broadcasting in 
the state language: the time of broadcasting in other languages should 
not exceed the time devoted to programs in the state language;
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3) ‘On Education" (19991 (Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan ob Obrazovaniyi) 
-requirement for ensuring the knowledge of the state, the official and a 
foreign languages, as well as for the provision of instruction of or in the 
mother tongue in the areas with a high concentration of the population 
of minority nationalities or ethnicities.
An article about languages (requiring the use of the state and official 
languages together with a language of the advertiser's preference) is expected to 
be included into the law “On Advertisement” (proposed in 2002) (Provekt Zakon 
Respubliki Kazakhstan o Reklame). Changes determinino , ^r
elimination of the laws have also been iced into the Civil and Administrative 
Codes
Parallel to the modification of the legislative basis for the language reform, 
there is taking place the process of re-structuring the central and local 
administrative organs responsible for implementation of the new strategy is taking 
place. Thus, in 1999 the Languages Development Department was created in the 
Ministry of Culture, Information and Social Harmony. The Department is supposed 
to fulfill the major planning and coordinating role in implementation of the adopted 
programs of languages development. In addition, two other special language- 
policy related coordinating bodies were introduced in the central government 
structure. One is the State Terminological Commission, opened in 1998 by a 
special order of the Government of the republic of Kazakhstan. The other is the 
Republican Center Accelerated State Language Instruction, formed in 1999. The 
functions of the commission include provision of counsel and advice to the
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Government in the sphere of terminological construction as pertained to various 
branches of economy, science, technology, and culture (Postanovlemve 
Pravitel'stva Respubliki Kazakhstan ot 21 Aprelva 1998 qoda). The center is 
supposed to “create all the necessary organizational, material and technological 
resources, as well to guarantee the required scientific and methodological support 
for organization of the accelerated instruction in the state language for all 
government employees" (Postanovleniye Pravitel’stva Respubliki Kazakhstan ot 9 
Oktvabrva 1998 qoda). An important role in the implementation of the language 
policy also belongs to the Ministry of Science and Education, as well as to the 
Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan created by the President’s ordinance in 
1995 and entitled to serve as a consultative organ for the President of the republic 
expressing the interests of different ethnic and national groups of Kazakhstan, to 
coordinate the activity of the ethno-cultural centers in the maintenance of ethnic 
cultures and languages, to initiate and to facilitate partnership of such centers with 
the countries of historical origin of the minority ethnicities of the country, as well as 
to promote general atmosphere of internationalism, ethnic tolerance and 
Kazakhstani nationalism. Each of the described government agencies has local 
branches and subdivisions to allow for reflection of the local specifics in 
implementation of government programs.
The provision of the basic legislative foundations and the system of 
coordinating organs prepared favorable conditions for planned language reform.
In accordance with the principle launched by the issuance of the major ideological 
document of the republic~“The State Program of Development of the Republic of
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Kazakhstan until the year of 2030” (Nazarbayev), planning in the area of language 
development and maintenance should be implemented in the form of 
programming for certain periods of time (long-term for 10 years and short-term 
plans of action-biennially), as well as for specific ranges (state vs. regional and 
general vs. specialized for a particular area) based on the objective analysis of the 
linguistic situation and the results of implementation of the language policy during 
the previous years conducted on a regular basis in the form of a standardized 
sociolinguistic survey by the Parliamentary Center for Information Analysis 
(Arenov and Kalmykov).
The most recent 10-year-long program of this type was adopted by the 
Government in 2001 (Gosudarstvennaya Programma...).The program states the 
following objectives of the language policy:
1) provision of functioning of the state language as the language of 
state governance, i.e.
• development of the legislative foundations;
• taking actions that would ensure acquisition of the required 
level of skills in the state language by the government 
employees;
• ensuring of the use of the state language as the main means 
of communication in the government;
• ensuring state-language-use in the court and in legislation;
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• taking actions for the use of the state language in the military 
of the Republic of Kazakhstan, in all types of military 
formations and units;
• provision of functioning of the state language in 
communication in all organs of local administration;
• ensuring utilization of the state language in international 
relations;
2) creation of the conditions for learning the state-language in the 
republic:
• organization of a unified system of free instruction in state 
language skills funded from the local budgets;
• provision of material, technical and legislative conditions for the 
acquisition of the state language acquisition by employees in 
such spheres as science, culture, education, public health, and 
service;
® provision of the maximally high level of the knowledge of the 
state language among the students of the pre-school, secondary 
and postsecondary educational institution regardless of their 
form of property;
3) provision of the unification of the norms of the contemporary 
Kazakh literary language by means of intensification of the scientific 
research and practical implementation of its results:
• systematization on the scientific grounds of the rules of word
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formation in the Kazakh literary language, including the rules for 
terminological construction;
• implementation of a functional Kazakh language terminological 
apparatus:
• formalization of the norms of the Kazakh literary language;
• taking steps to ensure the improvements of the Kazakh alphabet 
and orthography in such a way that it would better reflect the 
phonological structure of the language;
® scientific support of onomastic changes;
4) provision of functioning of the state language in the spheres of
culture and mass media:
• development and implementation of a system of actions directed 
at production or renting of movies and video materials in the 
state language, including animation and programs in translation;
« provision of issuance of periodicals and other printed materials in 
different branches of culture, science, fiction and art;
• ideological support (agitation and propaganda) of the activities 
directed at the promotion of the state language;
® ensuring the use of the state language in the means of mass 
communication;
« resolution of the problem of computerization of the state
language;
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For the purpose of the implementation of preservation of the functions 
the Russian language to provide for
• functioning of the Russian language as a language officially 
used in the governmental organizations and organs of local 
administration; provision of functioning of the Russian language 
in the spheres of science and education; provision of functioning 
of the official language in the spheres of culture and mass 
media;
® research support of the functioning of the official language.
For the purpose o f the implementation of preservation o f the functions 
minority languages to provide for
• state support in teaching representatives of ethnic minorities 
their native tongues;
• creation of conditions for minority languages in the cultural 
sphere
• facilitation of the use of the languages of ethnic minorities in
mass media. (Gosudarstvennava Proqramma.... 1-5)
The program also determines the mechanism for its implementation (the 
principle of short-term vs. long-term, state vs. regional, general vs. specialized 
programming mentioned above), as well as the source of funding (3087,7 million 
tenge frc m local and republican budgets for the current 10-vear long period).
Now, before analyzing the actual practice and the results of implementation of 
the language policy, it is necessary to evaluate the efforts of the government
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directed toward the provision of the legislative foundations for the political practice 
aimed at a change in the linguistic situation and towards the establishment of the 
system of coordinating and executive bodies.
All the ideas, models, systems and programs concerning the legislative 
foundations and organization of control, planning and coordination seem to be 
reasonable. They are justified from the point of view of civil rights, attainable with 
respect to the official analysis of the linguistic situation, well balanced in terms of 
relationships between their different parts and with the elements of societal 
reformation in related spheres (education, economy, political structure and etc.), 
consistent with the Constitution, general national ideology and the course of 
development identified by the President until 2030; they are based upon historical 
experience of language construction in the Soviet Union and in other countries; 
and they are flexible enough to allow for on-going modification for the purpose of 
achieving better and faster results under changing conditions of language use, 
developing language attitudes and the goals of nationalist and language policy, in 
the absence of external interferences and on condition of consistent 
implementation, the models, programs and systems could be expected to lead to 
the achievement of the stated goals. Following is the account of the actual results 
of the recent political practice in the sphere of language construction.
According to the official view, the best results have been achieved in 
implementing the task of introducing Kazakh in communication within 
government structures. A more critical analysis, however, would manifest a 
number of facts that would make one question whether the proclaimed
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increase in the use of the state language in the government structures was a 
result of the efficiently implemented language policy.
On the one hand, the officially claimed increase was observed mostly in 
the regions of the republic where the Kazakh-speaking population traditionally 
supercedes Russians in numbers, and it was often accompanied by the 
increase in representation of ethnic Kazakhs throughout the hierarchy of 
organs of state and local administration. The latter situation can be accounted 
for by the presence of discrimination on the basis of competence in the state 
language, which would be an evidence of the failure of the language policy, 
which prohibits such discrimination. However, a more plausible explanation for 
the situation is a process that has nothing to do with the language policy per 
se— it is increase in tribalism, zhuzovshina (preferential treatment in the basis 
of zhuz affiliation) and nepotism, which has been accompanying the rise of 
Kazakh nationalism since the times of Gorbachev’s glasnost and re­
structuring.
In addition, despite introduction of the requirements for language use and 
the presence of a system of administrative responsibility, Kazakh continues to 
be the secondary language with all paperwork completed in the official 
language and subsequently translated into Kazakh. Moreover, with the lack of 
the sufficient quantity of Kazakh-Russiari interpreters and inadequate 
knowledge of the Kazakh language by government employees, the imposition 
of the requirement for the use of the Kazakh language in official 
correspondence creates and impediment to communication and the process
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of reformation in the administrative system itself. One of the interesting 
directions in the search for a resolution of the problem of state language use 
in governmental organizations is research in machine translation, which has 
already resulted in development of a special computer program that allows for 
automatic translation of documentation from Russian into Kazakh and 
backwards. Although presented as an achievement of language policy, the 
software can be also interpreted as a potential danger in case it becomes 
powerful enough to eliminate the need for the knowledge of the state 
language by an individual.
No consistent requirements for state language use have been developed 
yet and no system of assessment has been designed for free state language 
courses to be effectively organized for government employees. Such courses 
were opened in many organizations throughout the country at the beginning of 
the new stage of the language policy; however, given the lack of instructional 
methodology for effectivly teaching adult learners, the lack of instructional 
materials and instructors, and no mechanism of reinforcement developed to 
ensure motivation in participation on a voluntary basis, the courses are no 
longer either financed by organizations or find their learners (see Abdygaliyev, 
31-6).
Another frequently mentioned area of success is state language 
instruction, in accordance with the new model of the state ianguage 
development, ail the learners of the Kazakh language were divided into two
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groups. These groups face different expectations in terms of the level of 
knowledge of the state language that they have to achieve.
The first group includes all people who were born before 1995. These 
learners are expected to master the language at some minimal level and they 
include Kazakhstanis of older generations, for whom language learning 
presents a challenge because of their age and other responsibilities 
connected with adulthood. The main rationale behind the minimum language 
proficiency for this category of the population (mostly active workforce) is to 
ensure the environment of state language use that would be conductive for 
acquisition of the Kazakh language as a second language by the younger 
generation.
These persons are expected to learn the language by means of voluntary 
instruction at the workplace, in mass media and different educational 
community centers, such as public libraries and ethno-cultural centers. As 
already mentioned, the workplace courses were rather unsuccessful. Free 
courses of Kazakh are offered in community centers; however, they are not 
promoted enough and, in general, face the same problem of the lack of 
methodology, instructional materials and instructors as in the case of 
workplace instruction. Newspaper courses seem to be popular among 
Kazakhs who already know some Kazakh and try to work on the development 
of their literary language. Such courses often provide lists of new terminology 
and explanations of the grammatical phenomena, which are of interest for the 
category of language learners. TV courses, especially “Tilashar" broadcasted
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by the most popular state channel "Khabar,” are designed for viewers at the 
beginning levels of acquisition of the state language. They are implemented in 
the form of entertaining dialogues and cover primarily topics connected with 
everyday communication, basics of grammar and pronunciation. With the 
characters in the short video streams being of different ethnic backgrounds 
and demographic characteristics and the units organized around topics related 
to the contemporary Kazakhstani rather than traditional Kazakh life with oniy 
some elements of ethnopedagogy included (an exclusive methodology in this 
respect), the TV courses are extremely successful not only in teaching basic 
Kazakh, but also in promoting positive language attitudes and the notion of the 
Kazakh language as the attribute of Kazakhstani nationalism. Finally, the 
internet is becoming an important tool of Kazakh language instruction for 
independent learners, although at this moment only a small amount of the 
republic’s citizens can afford the use of the internet for the purposes of 
language learning. Most of the Kazakh language-learning websites are visited 
by learners of the Kazakh language residing abroad.
In general, as statistical data indicates, at the beginning of the new stage 
in ianguage policy there was an increase in the interest towards the Kazakh 
language both among Kazakhs and non-Kazakhs. However, in the course of 
time, the interest of both groups declined, although the total number of 
Kazakhs who consider themselves articulate in the state language slightly 
increased mostly due to the individual efforts directed towards language
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learning undertaken by those who could speak their native tongue but were 
unable to read and write in it (see Arenov and Kalmykov, 21-33),
The second group of learners of the state language learners includes the 
younger generation, essentially everyone who was born after the year 1995, 
These learners are expected to master the language at a level that would 
make them functionally bilingual in Kazakh, in perspective, to the extent of 
knowing the state language at the level of their mother tongue. In current 
practice, most attention is paid to the Kazakh language instruction at the 
secondary level (see Arenov and Kalmykov, 21-33).
Up until recently, kindergartens did not play any significant role despite 
the fact that psychologically the age of children attending these educational 
institutions is the most sensitive for language instruction. This lack of attention 
to pre-schoolers can be explained by two reasons. On the one hand, 
education at the kindergarten level is not universally provided for all children in 
the republic, and during the period of economic crisis, most of the parents 
could not afford sending rheir children to the educational institutions. In 
addition, during the first stages of the reformation of the educational system 
insufficient attention and funding was provided for the reformation of the 
methodology of pre-school instruction because it was more important to 
modify the system of secondary and higher education. At the present moment, 
when the process of reformation of the two upper systems have been 
successfully initiated, more attention is being paid to kindergarten instruction
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and the methodology of teaching Kazakh as a second language to pre­
schoolers (see Arenov and Kalmykov, 21-33).
In higher education, instruction in Kazakh as a second language 
continues: although its quality usually declines because of the low level of 
development of androgogy in the country and the lack of methodology of 
teaching Kazakh as a second language at the advanced levels. In addition, 
the problem of lack of instructional materials and professional instructors is 
even worse than at the secondary level. Although the number of groups with 
Kazakh-language based instruction have increased, it continues to be very 
small in comparison with the Russian language groups, so that post­
secondary education is still dominated by the official language. This situation 
might be one of the main reasons for the decline in interest in Kazakh- 
language-based secondary education (see Arenov and Kalmykov,
21-33).
School children are differentiated in terms of their first language of 
instruction into those who learn Ka2:akh as a native tongue and those who are 
offered courses in Kazakh as a second language. Discussion of the state of 
Kazakh as a second language instruction at the secondary level of education 
will be limited to the second category (see Arenov and Kalmykov, 21-33).
Following the Soviet practice, Kazakh as a second language instruction is 
provided in two types of schools-those where Kazakh is offered only as a 
separate course, and those where it is used together with Russian as a 
medium of instruction. The former type is more widespread and is now
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increasingly being incorporated into the system of bilingual schools, i.e. 
schools where children instructed in Kazakhs are placed in the same building 
with children instructed in Russian, This is done out of the belief that Kazakh 
as a second language acquisition will be facilitated for the Russian-speaking 
learners if they learn it in the environment where the second language is used. 
There might be some doubt whether the mechanisms is working, because of 
the continuous domination of Russian in the distribution of communicative 
domains; Kazakh-speaking children are more likely to use Russian than 
Kazakh in the bilingual school environments.
According to the official figures, the number of parents who choose to 
send their children to schools with Kazakh as a language of primary instruction 
tends to decline compared with the initial stages of implementation of the new 
language policy. This fact can serve both as evidence of a higher quality of 
instruction in the Russian language schools and as a manifestation of the 
3Ctua! attitudes of the citizens of the republic towards the importance of the 
state language: compared with the first years of independence, more people 
feel that the knowledge of Kazakh is not essential for successful functioning in 
the Republic cf Kazakhstan (see Bekturganov, 1 -16).
In terms of quality of second language instruction in Kazakh, some 
improvements have been made as a result of the accumulation of efficient 
teaching experiences and an effort put into publication of the instructional 
materials. However, intermediate and advanced level instruction continue to 
be lower in quality, compared with the beginning levels. Methodologically,
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Kazakh is taught within the framework of the communicative method of 
teaching foreign languages, which is very popular in the post-Soviet countries, 
with the application of some of the methods of ethnopedagogy. It is 
accompanied with instruction in the Kazakh history and literature implemented 
in Russian. Judging from the fact that the training of instructors in Kazakh as a 
second language is still conducted by the Departments of Kazakh Philology, 
the conclusion can be drawn that the difference between second, first and 
foreign language acquisition is not completely understood. Further evidence is 
that very few teachers use the actual environment in their instruction and bring 
native speakers to the classroom. Among some of the achievements of the 
recent years, it is important to mention the creation of an electronic fund of 
best teaching practices, as well as attempts at incorporating modern 
technology and the internet into Kazakh language instruction. One of the 
significant innovations was the introduction of standardized Kazakh language 
and history tests used for assessment at the secondary level and in 
application for post-secondary studies (see Bekturganov, 1-16).
Another domain where implementation of the new language policy is 
claimed to be successful by the officials is mass media. Here reference is 
usually made to the increased use of broadcasting in Kazakh on radio and TV. 
With the introduction of the requirement for the amount of broadcasting in the 
state language, the number of hours did increase, however, motivated by 
profits, owners of TV and radio stations, who are aware of the fact that 
broadcasting in Russian is attractive to a wider range of viewers and listeners
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and consequently advertisers, resolve the controversy between the necessity 
of surviving in the market and the necessity of complying with the state 
requirement by broadcasting in Kazakh during the unpopular hours, e.g. at 
night or early in the morning. In addition, the quality and the variety of 
programming is significantly lower than in case of Russian (see Arenov and 
Kalmykov, 21-30).
The requirement for the use of the state language in advertising, if 
adopted as a part of the law ”On Advertisement” might become a tool for state 
language learning with the ad strings repeated over and over several times a 
day. The situation with the use of the state language in newspapers might be 
further evidence of the fact that the official claims about the increase of the 
use of the state language in mass media are not consistent with reality. 
Because there is no requirement for the use of a minimum ainount of the 
material in the state language for the newspapers, the volume of news 
published in Kazakh is much lower than that in Russian (see Arenov and 
Kalmykov, 21-30).
The number of Kazakh-language newspapers is significantly lower. The 
fact that the government has not introduced any minimum requirement on the 
use of languages in periodicals might be accounted for by two facts. On the 
one hand, the printed word (reading) is much more difficult to learn than a 
spoken one, so by default, newspapers are less efficient in promoting the 
national language than TV and radio (see Arenov and Kalmykov, 21-30).
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The internet continues to be dominated by Russian; although, due to the 
effort of the Kazakh scientists and computer engineers, Kazakh scripts have 
been developed, although the state language is used primarily on the 
websites of the government. In perspective, these will be less numerous in 
number than the sites of businesses, commercial and financial institutions, 
which are even now coded predominantly in Russian. In general, the Internet 
seems to produce more danger for the status of the Kazakh language than all 
other means of mass communication taken together. This crisis is not going to 
happen in the near future with most of the Kazakhstani population having only 
a restricted access to the internet; however, the problem of the near future is 
asking for a solution at this point of time.
The military still remains only a potential mechanism of Kazakh language 
endorsement. On the one hand, it is still undergoing organizational reform. On 
the other, its popularity among the young people remains very low with the 
effect that only the poorest members of the society, mainly the young men 
from Kazakh-speaking rural areas willingly join the army in search of better 
opportunity than their auls (small rural settlements) can or rather cannot offer.
The use of the state language has not been brought to the appropriate 
level in the sphere of service and commerce, either. Although most of the 
labels and instructions accompanying goods are now provided in both Kazakh 
and Russian, the use of the Kazakh language remains insufficient in the 
service area, specifically in organizing window displays in small shops, in
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providing price tags and as indicators of directions. The use of the Kazakh 
language did increase in billboards and street displayed signs and ads 
(see Arenov and Kalmykov, 21-30).
Corpus building and the sphere of onomastics are probably the most 
successful domains of language policy implementation. As a result of the 
collaborative efforts of a number of different research institutions, the rules of 
the Kazakh orthography, punctuation and orthoepies have been revised. The 
grammar of the Kazakh language has been carefully investigated; the 
prescriptive rules have been modified to be included into the newly published 
grammar references, orthoepic and orthographic dictionaries (Kim, 4-5).
Unlike the case of automatic translation software, the special computer 
programs designed to implement grammatical and spelling correction might 
play a positive role in the process of the standardization of the Kazakh 
language as well as in the promotion of positive attitudes and respect towards 
the state language.
The State Terminological Committee is conducting the hard work of 
introducing new terms into the state language so that it can successfully 
implement the assigned functions. The lexicon developers have overcome the 
state of extreme purism and presently implement their task by utilizing a set of 
specifically defined rules of word coining, transliteration and calquing, using 
the stock of the primary Kazakh morphemes, the stock of internationally-used- 
for-terminology-creation Latin and Greek roots and affixes, the stock of Arabic 
and related Turkic languages, and, finally, the resources of the Kazakh
171
dialects. The results of the research groups’ collaborative effort are reflected in 
the Kazakh encyclopedic dictionary and are systematically published in the 
official newspapers in the lists of new terminology (Bekturganov, 1-16).
One of the issues in linguistic research associated with the use of the 
state language which keeps coming back as a topic of scientific forums, is the 
reform of the Kazakh alphabet. The existing Cyrillic based alphabet does not 
accurately reflect the phonological structure of the language, and in addition 
presents problems in computer coding. The research on the topic follows two 
routes. One goes in the direction of Latinization of the alphabet; this option is 
presently seriously considered by the Kazakh Academy of Sciences upon the 
request of the government. The other leads towards modification of the current 
Cyrillic script to include letters representing phonemes which were not 
included before, to simplify writing by the application of diacritics in 
accordance with the rules of harmony, and some other minor modifications. 
One radical but in fact very innovative and easy solution for computer coding 
was suggested by one Russian-speaking programmer who s . ggested a way 
of writing the specific sounds of the Kazakh language with the help of 
palatalization and disjunction signs. The New Kazakh Cyrillic script, as the 
author called it. could be written with the existing 33 letters of the Russian 
alphabet, thus eliminating the problem of codification already resolved for the 
official language. The idea of the New Kazakh Cyrillic script, although 
convincingly presented during one of the conferences devoted to the problems 
of the state language development and promotion, was not implemented in
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practice for the simple fact that it is perceived as carrying a potential danger 
for the Kazakh language and nationalism. The question here is whether the 
idea is more dangerous than is the fact that Russian is already far ahead of 
Kazakh in expansion throughout the World Wide Web (Sergeyev).
Some of the actions of the government are directed at improvement of 
speakers' attitudes towards the state language; these include celebration of 
the Day of Languages, and conducting Student Olympiads in the knowledge 
of the languages of the peoples of Kazakhstan. Television in particular plays 
an important role in the promotion of the Kazakh language and nationalism 
(Nazarbayev).
In accordance with the plan presented in the State Program of the 
Development of Languages, efforts are being taken to provide for the 
preservation of the Russian language. Maintenance and development of 
Russian is ensured by keeping Russian language instruction at the 
appropriate level, by conducting conferences and workshops for the teachers 
of Russian, by conducting competitions among students aimed at determining 
their Russian language skills, by celebrating significant dates and names of 
the Russian history, and by collaborating with the administration of the 
Russian Federation, which is interested in support of their Kazakhstani co­
nationals (Nazarbayev).
The political practice with respect to minority languages seems to be 
consistent with the initial goais. Opportunities have been created for the 
representatives of the less numerous ethnicities of the republic to receiving
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education in their mother tongues as well as for classroom (at specialized 
schools) and individual (through ethno-cultural centers) learning of the native 
languages. The task of the promotion of national cultures and languages is 
implemented by the subdivisions of the Assembly of the Peoples of 
Kazakhstan, seeking partnership with co-nationals abroad and raising funds 
from the public, individuals and private foundations.
In the same way as during the years of Soviet rule, the contemporary 
linguistic situation is not only directly affected by language policy conducted by 
the central planning authorities, it is also indirectly influenced by the nationality 
policy and by the socio-economic processes.
The relationship between the overall nationality and language policy is 
twofold. On the one hand, the ideas of interethnic tolerance (peaceful co­
existence of various ethnic groups on the territory of Kazakhstan),
Eurasianizm (Kazakhstan as a transition point between European and Asian 
worlds), and cultural and economic integration with other countries of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (some of which are homelands for the 
ethnicities of Kazakhstan), which are emphasized by the nationalism doctrine, 
are all conductive to the formation of positive language attitudes which 
facilitate the changes in tne states of diglossia and bilingualism targeted by 
the language planners. On the other hand, promotion of bilingualism and, 
especially, the use of the methods of ethnopedagogy in teaching both the 
state and the official languages provide for better interethnic understanding 
and, consequently, societal stability. At the same time, because the process of
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re-juvenation of the Kazakh national identity connected with gaining of 
independence from the Soviet Union is still in progress, and because the 
development of the Kazakh language as a symbol of national identity of 
Kazakhs is happening simultaneously with its promotion as the- symbol of 
supra-national identity of Kazakhstanis, language policy favoring Kazakh is 
often perceived as favoring the ethnicity for whom the language is native, or, 
in other words, as discriminating on grounds of nationality and language. In 
this respect, the existing language policy contradicts the goals of the 
nationality policy, targeting the formation of the identity of Kazakhstanis.
Socio-economic processes are also closely associated with both 
nationality and language policy. The links are multiple. Economic processes 
affect language policy directly by determining the amount of money that is 
expended on language development and maintenance purposes, by defining 
which of the language planning initiatives are feasible and which are not, by 
creating demand for knowledge of a particular language, thus producing 
negative or positive language attitudes, conducive to or impeding the process 
of language acquisition. They also affect language policy indirectly by 
increasing the level of nationalism in case of economic decline, by causing 
migration and by initiating the process of urbanization.
In the case of Kazakhstan economics, destabilization during early 1990s 
lowered the level of nations’ sensitivity to experimentation with their 
languages, it was very difficult to promote the Kazakh language in the 
conditions of disarray, when citizens’ existence was complicated by many
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other problems, such as unemployment, inflation, crime and impoverishment. 
In the second half of the last decade, as a result of radical reforms 
implemented in economic, administrative and social spheres, Kazakhstan 
achieved a certain level of stability when the words of the President about the 
interethnic stability suddenly started to be perceived as making sense rather 
than airing political hypocrisy. Once the foundations for economic 
development were created, there emerged conditions necessary for the 
successful promotion of supra-national identity and, consequently, for the 
promotion of the state language. On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, 
corruption in the government structures--an outcome of political 
destabilization— could not help but produce discrimination on the basis of 
language competence. Redistribution of the workforce caused by the natural 
economic demand, as well as by central planning (for example, in the case of 
the nation’s capital re-location) and associated migration trends affected the 
map of language use and, therefore, indirectly the results of language 
planning (Zhdanov).
Migration was, in fact, one of the most significant factors that 
counteracted the efforts of the language planners. Thus the efforts of Kazakh 
language promotion were undermined by the general trend for urbanization 
and consequent Russification of the population. While the language planners 
were putting effort into increasing knowledge of the Kazakh language, new 
urban Kazakhs were learning and increasingly switching to the use of Russian 
in every day communication.
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While the government was trying to re-distribute the Kazakh-speaking and 
the Russian-speaking population, as well as the population of three different 
Kazakh zhuzes, in such a way that they are more or less evenly dispersed 
across the country as one of the purposes of the nation's capital re-location, 
natural economic trends (increase in the importance of Almaty as the center of 
Central Asia and turning of the Caspian region into one of the world’s biggest 
oil fields) emerged that drove the Kazakh populations in the opposite 
directions from the planned ones-westwards and southwards— so that the 
existing situation with concentrations of Kazakh speaking population in the 
south and in the west and the Russian speaking population in the north and in 
e.'/A hove only increased (Gafarly).
A - ill, if we look at the course of implementation of the language policy 
in the Republic of Kazakhstan, it seems to be successful at this point of time. If 
the success of language planning depends on the degree of accord of 
language legislation and practice with the tempo and goals of economic 
reformation and the efforts of nation building, as well as on the absence or 
presence of negative or positive influences of socio-economic factors and the 
dvr.. ; ,*s of interethnic communication, then at this particular point of history 
•A the Republic of Kazakhstan, the language policy can be treated as well 
S ilanced in all respects. Its goals are consistent with the goals and the 
policy and are reasonable from the point of view of economic 
conditions. Its implementation is well planned and is flexible enough to allow 
for the introduction of necessary modifications as linguistic situations change.
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Despite of the complexity introduced into the state of digiossia. bilingualism 
and interplay of ethnic, national and supra-national identities by the years of 
the Russian and subsequently Soviet Rule, as well as by the necessity of 
continuing collaboration with the former union republics, the new language 
policy seems to be successful, finding a golden mean between all the positive 
from the Soviet past, the experience of the Soviet politicians' mistakes and the 
useful findings of other countries resolving similar problems.
Thus the contemporary idea of Kazakhstani nationalism is an attempt to 
built a new version of American internationalism on the basis of the existing 
identity of the Soviet people cultivated by Lenin’s vision of internationalism -  
the idea of Sovietization. Stalin’s idea of the necessity of centralization and 
planning for successful coordination of the process of reformation is 
interacting in the present Kazakhstani society with the American idea of local 
autonomy, unregulated competition and freedom of speech as the 
mechanisms of the socio-economic evolution. Lenin’s concept of the native 
tongue as a symbol of ethnic identity and Stalin's idea of the language as a 
unifying and mobilizing force of the nation are given equal consideration in the 
new language policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, in the attempt to build 
common supra-national identity without undermining national identities and 
especially their symbolic representations -  native tongues. These efforts are 
often counteracted by natural socioeconomic trends, by the tendencies in the 
development of languages and by the change in the attitudes of their 
speakers, but there is no doubt that overall the new language policy of the
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republic of Kazakhstan is extremely successful, especially if compared with all 
the previous attempts to resolve an even lower level of complexity in the 
Soviet Union and in the peer-republics in the Commonwealth of Independent 
States. Whether the success is going to be sustained is, in fact, highly 




The model developed by the contemporary policy makers involves four 
languages. Most of the communicative functions including the functions of 
interethnic communication within the country are to be fulfilled by two major 
languages-Kazakh and Russian. The only difference between the languages is 
that the state language is expected to carry the additional function of the symbol 
of the supra-national identity of Kazakhstanis, while the official language wouid be 
expected to fulfill the function of the language of interaction in the Commonwealth 
of independent States, essentially the symbol of Eurasianism. It is also expected 
that two more languages will be involved. One is English, which is to fulfill only the 
function of communication with the external world outside the C.I.S. The other is 
the language of one’s ethnicity, which is to serve as a symbol of ethnic group 
identity and which, in case of Russians and Kazakhs, would correspond to one of 
the languages of wider communication.
At the present moment, two of the languages are still not in the places 
reserved for them These are Kazakh and English. Whether the chosen mode! is 
to be achieved depends not only on the actions of the language policy makers, 
but also on the dynamics of interethnic communication, on the development of the
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socioeconomic situation in the country, on the character of internal administration 
and the state of the external political climate.
No radical changes in either the political or economic situation of the republic 
can be expected in the nearest future: Kazakhstan will continue to be a buffer on 
the crossroad between Russia, China and US-controlled Asia. Until the northern 
or the eastern neighbors become powerful enough to independently challenge the 
United States, Kazakhstan will be looked upon as an important partner by each of 
the three parties, thus being ensured relative political independence, playing on 
the differences between the interests of these parties. Since the interna! political 
power has to comply with the interests of the national economic magnates as well 
as with the interests of the external pressure groups investing money into the 
economy and politics, change of the existing leadership, if it happens soon, is 
unlikely to affect the direction of the political course and socio-economic 
reformation. With the existing distribution of the political power unchanged, the 
pace and the direction of the political reforms is also going to be the same. Under 
these conditions, the selected general model of linguistic reconstruction will 
remain the most reasonable one, although, not necessarily as successful as at the 
current moment.
The pace and the success of implementation of the model depends largely on 
the distribution of status between the Kazakh and Russian nationalities, on the 
continuity of economic growth of Kazakhstan in comparison with Russia, and on 
the policy of the Russian government conducted with respect to Russian co­
nationals abroad, as well as on the future of integration in the post-Soviet world.
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Changes in any of these areas have the potential of upsetting the balance in 
interethnic communication--the basis of the nationality policy and the main 
condition of successful implementation of the language policy. It would be helpful 
to consider the likelihood of changes in the identified areas and the effect they 
may have on the distribution of language status and the extent of actual use.
The first factor, as earlier mentioned, is the dynamics of Kazakh and Russian 
nationalism. Presently, these processes are becoming increasingly integrated with 
the process of the formation of supra-national identity, especially among 
Russians. The number of Russians who consider Kazakhstan their motherland 
grows and they are connecting their lives with their present country of residence 
rather than with their historic country of origin. This tendency, as indicated by the 
results of some studies on language attitudes, is observed even among the 
youngest generation. This optimism is, on the one hand, an indicator of the 
success in nation-building, and, on the other, the evidence of the existence of 
positive expectations about the opportunities in Kazakhstan, the feeling, resulting 
from the successful attempt of shock therapy at the beginning of socio-economic 
reform in the republic, which is allowing to catch up with and at times even exceed 
the pace set by the Russian Federation, where such a therapy would not have 
been successful because of greater disunity among the larger and more ethnically 
diverse population and the higher complexity of ihe economic and social 
structures. The feeling of optimism is extremely important in maintaining 
interethnic stability and developing pride in the Kazakhstani identity. This feeiing 
of identity is also important for the formation of positive attitudes towards learning
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the state language. Therefore, as long as the reforms are conducted at the current 
tempo, language policy is going to remain relatively successful.
Once Russia achieves a certain level of economic development, it may start 
to express imperial aspirations and attempt to use ethnic Russians in the former 
Soviet republics as pressure groups. Such attempts would be extremely 
destructive for Kazakhstani nationalism and, consequently, for the state language 
promotion attempts. Such attempts, however, are unlikely to happen in the near 
future, especially with the skillful tactics of the current government of the Republic 
of Kazakhstan playing on the conflicting interests of its powerful neighbors. 
However, the Russian Federal government is likely to put some effort into 
maintaining a strong Russian presence in Kazakhstan by favoring the integration 
initiatives of the Kazakhstani president and by playing an active role in the 
development of Kazakhstani science and education, which play the most 
important roles in maintaining Russian nationalism in the republic. Extremely 
successful is the policy of brain draining conducted by the Russian government in 
the Central Asian republic. By providing educational opportunities for Kazakhstani 
youth, Russia “kills two birds with one stone”-weakens the country by 
appropriating its most intelligent individuals and by providing a constant influx of 
intelligentsia who is enculturated into Russian values. These people are likely to 
be politically active and to favor pro-Russian rather than pro-American orientation 
in Kazakhstani foreign policy. By affecting the degree of Russian nationalism, the 
policy of the Russian federal government towards Kazakhstani Russians has an 
indirect impact on the dynamics of reversal of bilingualism.
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The final factor which is likely to influence the status of the major languages is 
the extent of integration of the post-Soviet block. Intensification of integrative 
processes and further increase in cooperation between the republics is likely to 
raise the value of the Russian language, thus counteracting the attempts of 
bringing Kazakh to the level of equal functional and communicative importance as 
Russian. Thanks to the successful attempts of promoting new Kazakhstani 
ideology, to the successes in the reformation of the socio-economic system and to 
cultivation of loyalty towards the country, integration is unlikely to develop into 
cultural assimilation of the strengthening new Kazakhstani culture. A more likely 
outcome is cultural exchange and co-existence. In case the efforts of the 
Kazakhstani language planners continue to be relatively successful with more 
attention paid not only to the improvement of language instruction, but also to 
cultivation of positive language attitudes, the processes of integration, especially 
with the idea of Eurasianism built into the nation’s ideology, are not going to 
counteract the formation of Kazakhstani identity and the attempts to reverse 
diglossic functional distribution and bilingualism.
CHAPTER V!
SUGGESTIONS
This chapter will attempt to answer one question in only a relatively exhaustive 
way. The question is: What could be done by the language planners to improve 
the efficiency of policy implementation? Below are some suggestions that they 
might find useful in their work.
Currently, the implementation of language policy consists primarily in 
attempting to extend the use of the state language in all functional domains. Such 
an approach is evidently not effective, since in the conditions of a lack of financial 
and material resources combined with the attitudes of resistance to change, it 
produces only exasperation and loss of interest in the Kazakh language and in 
respect for the Kazakh culture. An alternative approach could be intensification of 
the efforts of language promotion in particular communicative domains where 
expansion can happen relatively painlessly and quickly, thus contributing to the 
change of the overall linguistic situation. This would prepare conditions for further 
change in other; more problematic domains, such as education, mass media and 
communication in the workplace.
Another way to change the linguistic situation in such a way that it will 
become more conductive to the spread of Kazakh bilingualism among Russian 
speakers is to put more effort into improving the knowledge and promoting the
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use of the Kazakh language by Russian speaking Kazakhs. Learning the 
language by ethnic Kazakhs presents less of a psychological challenge for them 
than for Russian speakers, who might not be intrinsically motivated to learn the 
tongue. Unlike Russians, Kazakhs have the advantage of greater proximity to the 
natural environment of language use. They are more likely to successfully learn 
and subsequently use the language, thus potentially contributing to societal 
bilingualism and to preparing conditions for the development of bilingualism 
among other ethnicities. In addition, the increase in the number of Kazakh-' - j  >
speaking Kazakhs will have an affect on the language attitudes of Russians. For 
many of them, one of the excuses not to learn the state tongue is that fact that it is 
not used by the representatives of the titular ethnicity. The risk of a rise of Russian 
nationalism should be also taken into consideration, since polarization of 
nationalist aspirations could be expected with Russian losing its dominance and 
Kazakh acquiring stronger positions.
More attention should be also paid to strengthening the knowledge of the 
Kazakh language among the younger generations. Because environment in which 
language is isedof language use is conductive to the second language acquisition 
process, the use of the language among the older generations should be 
promoted, too, but this promotion should have a secondary importance. Rather 
then becoming a goal in itself, it should be a means for increasing the efficiency of 
cultivating Kazakh bilingualism among younger people. What is most important for 
older generations is a change in attitudes, especially in terms of their ideas about 
the importance of the knowledge of the language for the successful functioning of
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their children in the Kazakhstani society of the future. Since parents have an 
important influence on the language attitudes of their children, they should be the 
first targets of efforts to promote language prestige. The success of these efforts 
depends on the degree of understanding of the purposes of language policy 
rather than on manipulation with quotations from the President’s speeches. After 
the years of Soviet brainwashing, many of the representatives of the older 
generation are desensitized to such manipulations.
Some of the specific improvements could be done in promotion of the state 
language use in official and business communication. First, the obligatory use of 
the state language by government employees should be more consistently 
utilized. For that purpose, the exact list of the required language skills and the 
expected level of mastery, the timeframe for acquisition and the consequences for 
nonc.ompliance with the language requirement by a stated deadline should be 
identified and stated in detail and disseminated among all the parties involved in 
implementing the requirement, so that the parses have the same understanding of 
the final goal.
A means of assessment of the initial skills in the language should be 
determined and whenever possible, the instruction should be individualized. One 
way of doing this is by grouping learners according to their level of knowledge of 
the language.
Training could be conducted by an independent agency, which would have 
better chances of finding the best way of organizing the courses in accordance 
with the needs of the adult learners, and with the requirements of the profession
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and of the particular employee, by collaborating closely with the organizations 
requesting service and with educational institutions, especially institutions where 
research on androgogy is conducted and effective methodologies of instruction 
are developed.
Such training can be conducted as a part of workforce development and does 
not have to be financed from state or local budgets. It can be implemented by a 
for-profit organization provided with tax relief or other economic advantages on a 
competitive basis. Such an agency will also be able to provide specialized training 
for Kazakh language instructors specializing in adult learners.
In order to provide for a relatively balanced and even dissemination of the 
knowledge of the Kazakh language across the country, a standardized system of 
assessment of proficiency in the Kazakh language should be designed. It makes 
sense if such an assessment system is created by the agency which provides 
preparation for the assessment, because then the agency would be able to 
formulate the goals and the procedures for instruction in the most efficient way.
In addition to improving the mechanism of ianguage instruction, organizations 
should create conditions for the use of the state language in the workplace. For 
many adult learners, especially the Kazakh-speakers who can understand but 
have never used their native tongue, the main problem is not a lack of motivation 
for learning or the lack of language learning ability, but the psychological barrier of 
language use. Such a barrier can be gradually broken by introduction everywhere 
throughout the country of a tradition of using conversational Kazakh in the 
workplace during a designated day every month. During this day, various activities
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could be conducted, aimed at promotion of Kazakhstani patriotism and awareness 
of the Kazakh culture. If such a tradition is turned into a pleasurable experience 
associated with food and entertainment, if at the end of the day groups or 
individual competitions are conducted to determine the level of proficiency in 
Kazakh or familiarity with the Kazakh culture and history, and if such days involve 
members of the employees’ families or partners from other organizations, then 
they would contribute to the improvement of organizational culture, to the overall 
satisfaction with employment, and to the formation of positive attitudes towards 
the Kazakh language and culture. They would also facilitate the formation of 
Kazakhstani patriotism, would promote actual language use and, therefore, would 
contribute to the overall implementation of the goals of the nationality and 
language policy and socio-economic reform. To ensure the equality of languages 
and cultures, similar activities could be conducted for Russian and the other 
languages and cultures of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The important objective 
here is not to deteriorate into indoctrination and not to turn the activities into a 
routine. In order to maintain a stable level of interest and motivation, employees 
should participate in planning the events.
Considerable improvement could be made in language instruction at schools. 
One possible improvement is to increase the number of schools where Kazakh 
language classes are located in the same building as Russian-language classes. 
Bringing together children for whom the primary language of communication is 
Russian, with children for whom the primary language of communication is 
Kazakh, might lead to the creation of a language environment beneficial for the
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development of bilingualism in both groups. It is important, however, for the 
pattern of language use outside the classroom not to become the same as the 
pattern characteristic for the society as a whole with all children eventually using 
the official language. Special efforts should be taken to somehow motivate 
children to use their second languages in communication outside the classroom 
with the peers for whom the language is the primary means of communication. 
One way of doing this is by organizing the instructional process in the form of 
peer-tutoring, bringing children from different language groups together for a 
discussion in one of the languages, organizing out of class activities in such a way 
that children from different language groups have to work together and are 
expected to use only one of the tongues. If the theories that children learn mostly 
from each other and that the best way to master a language is by communicating 
with native speakers are correct, then mixed schools could become the best way 
of promoting bilingualism.
A number of improvements could be implemented in the organization of the 
instructional process. First of all, grouping children according to the level of 
language proficiency should become universal. The groups should be also fewer 
students. This task is difficult to implement with the lack of instructional personnel. 
Such groupings could be attempted, however, with the use of additional 
assignments for the children who come to class with a better level of the 
language, as well as by grouping children in the classroom according to the levels 
of proficiency and by using a language assistant to help the instructor to 
implement the task of individualization.
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One way to resolve the problem of the lack of instructional materials is to 
change the approach to its publication and use. At the present moment, 
universalization of instruction is implemented by the use of standardized 
instructional materials. The textbooks are created by specially appointed 
commissions and are published by designated publishing houses.
There exists an alternative way of approaching the problem of 
universalization, in this approach, the government would establish certain 
standards similar to expectations for state employees about the level of language 
skills and the topics that are expected to be covered by a student at the 
secondary level. School districts should be given more autonomy to determine 
what books to buy and what methodology to use in order to comply with the 
established standards. In order to control the quality of instructional materials, a 
special committee could be created at the Ministry of Education that would 
evaluate the new textbooks and assess the efficiency of newly designed 
methodologies, as well as grant copyrights to the authors of the textbooks and 
methodologies. The authors, in their turn, could sell their ideas to independent 
publishing houses that would compete in the market to sell the instructional 
materials. Thus, the publishing houses would be motivated to improve the quality 
of print, paper and illustrations. Such a mechanism would be based on free 
competition and should contribute to the improvement of the quality of instruction 
as well as to development of small business in the country, thus facilitating 
economic reforms, whose course indirectly affects the results of the language
policy.
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The system of teacher training and professional development should be 
modified, too. First, instructors in Kazakh as a second language should be trained 
separately from instructors in Kazakh language and literature. Second language 
instruction is based upon a special methodology different from native language 
instruction. In fact, this methodology is closer to foreign language instruction and, 
therefore, training of teachers of Kazakh as a second language should be 
conducted in special groups at the Departments of Foreign Languages.
The departments training Kazakh language instructors should be supported 
(by research grants) in conducting research on instruction in Kazakh as a Second 
Language, in the efforts targeted at the development of language learning 
methodologies, and in the accumulation and dissemination of the best practices 
through direct rather than indirect interaction with school districts.2
Professional development of teachers should also be modified to provide for 
a faster resolution of the problem of the deficit of instructors of Kazakh as a 
Second Language. The suggested way of re-organization of professional 
development for teachers also requires de-centralization of school districts. 
Professional development should become not only a means of quality control, but 
also a way of re-training teachers in other subjects for instruction of or in the 
Kazakh language. The new system should also allow for the constant 
improvement of the quality of Kazakh language instruction by insuring an efficient 
means of disseminating the new research findings and best practices, in order to 
provide for such professional development, a closer connection between
2 by a third party agency (such as the Institute for Teacher Professional 
Development)
192
universities and schools should be established, so that universities could use the 
experience of school teachers in implementing research, and teachers could have 
easy access to newly designed methodologies and instructional techniques. 
Universities could become responsible not only for traditional instruction, but also 
increasingly for the provision of continuing education and extension services. With 
the establishment of a direct I nk between the university and school district, a 
number of different problems could be resolved. On the one hand, new sources of 
funding would be created for the institutions of higher education. On the other, 
research would become more attended to practical needs and practice better 
equipped with research findings. A greater and consequently a better variety of 
services would be provided for the users of workforce development services. The 
universities will have to compete for school districts in order to ensure an 
additional source of profit and, as a result, will be more motivated to meet the 
needs of the instructors. More teachers will become motivated to take continuous 
education courses if a standardized system of continuing education requirements 
is introduced with motivation for professional development, ensured by salary 
schedules and sets of benefits. Because the system of professional development 
will be connected with universities, which implement basic training of instructors, 
special programs could be created allowing short-term re-certification for teaching 
of or in the Kazakh or other ethnic languages.
One way to improve instruction is to better utilize modern technology, 
especially audiovisual equipment and the Internet. The newly designed 
instructional materials should not necessarily be in print. With the possibilities
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promised by contemporary technology, and with the faster printing and re­
reproducing capacity of the contemporary information technology, each school is 
able to produce instructional material necessary for the support of quality 
instruction on the condition it is provided with the opportunities for autonomous 
decision-making and financial management.
Use of the Internet, especially with its communicative capabilities, could be 
very helpful in increasing the efficiency of the Kazakhs in a second language 
instruction. The price for the Internet could be decreased by unification of the 
educational system of the country into a common network. Such unification would 
also make the use of the Internet more affordable, improve the speed of 
connection and enable the sharing of instructional and organizational know how. 
Such a network would facilitate the development of distance education, which 
could become an important mode of professional development, bringing together 
instructors from different parts of the country, allowing for teleconferencing and 
therefore easy exchange of research information and best practices.
instructional methodology in a second language should be differentiated not 
only on the basis of the level of language competence, but also on the basis of the 
cognitive style, age and individual needs of the learner. This communicative 
method should be balanced with the methods of ethnopedagogy; however, 
familiarization of the learner with the cultural context should not supercede the 
primary purpose of instruction: achieving competence in the language at a level 
appropriate for successful functioning in contemporary society. Cultural and 
historic information should be included into the instructional materials for language
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courses only to the extent of its relevance to an understanding of a linguistic 
phenomenon. All other information related to culture should be taught in Kazakh 
literature and history courses. The progression of instruction across the levels of 
proficiency should be from everyday/cultural awareness use of the language to 
the more specialized language of scientific and official communication. Younger 
learners should be taught the basics of grammar, pronunciation, everyday lexis 
and the cultural background of the language, while advanced learners should be 
assisted in the use of actual language by greater incorporation of natural 
language materials, such as TV programs, movies, newspapers, and lectures.
The Kazakh language and literature or a specialized course in culture study aimed 
at promotion of Kazakhstani supra-nationalism could be taught to the advanced 
level learners.
Language promotion in the mass media could be also improved On the one 
hand, the requirement for the use of certain levels of the Kazakh language could 
be extended to include periodicals. On the other hand, new, market-based 
mechanisms of motivating broadcasters and publishers could be designed that 
would encourage them to use the Kazakh language programming more frequently 
and during more popular hours, as well as to improve the quality of the 
programming in the state language. One way of doing this is to provide tax-cuts or 
other benefits to TV and radio companies that are willing to extend the hours and 
to improve the quality of programming. Instead of poorly managed programs in 
the state language on the Kazakh-language based central channel, the 
administration could conduct a tender on the free use of the broadcasting hours
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and slots for advertisement by any company that could provide programming on a 
certain topic. Of particular interest should be programs devoted to language 
instruction, cultural topics, and analytical programs devoted to the current issues 
of Kazakhstani society that would be of interest for adult populations, animation 
and feature movies for children dubbed into Kazakh, bilingual news, etc. A special 
channel, financed from the educational section of the budget, could be devoted to 
programs used in language instruction at different levels, so that any citizen of the 
country could watch the programs at a convenient time and find a program for any 
level of proficiency. Similar radio channels could be also created. Such channels 
could be financed by advertising and by the use of public donations. The channels 
could provide programs not only in Kazakh, but also in other languages of the 
republic and other countries of the world. The programs could be linked to the 
distance education network to allow for live broadcasting of important language- 
related conferences and innovative courses.
In general, within the coordinating role of the government, the role of 
individuals in implementation of the language policy should increase. This should 
happen not by imposition, but by providing better opportunities into the actual 
process of language planning, by allowing for the release of the creative energy of 
the rising Kazakhstani supra-nationalism.
CHAPTER VII
IMPLICATIONS
There are a number of practical and theoretical implications of the suggested 
analysis of bilingualism, diglossia, the dynamics of interethnic communication and 
language policy in the Republic of Kazakhstan.
This analysis should contribute to an understanding of the linguistic situation 
in the Republic of Kazakhstan, to a determination of the historical and 
contemporary linguistic and extra-linguistic factors affecting the contemporary 
linguistic situation and the results of language planning, development and 
promotion, to explanation of the place of the language policy with respect to the 
more general nationality policy and socio-economic reform, and to the resolution 
of the problem of finding the relationship between the role of an individual and the 
society in the successful implementation of a language reform.
The results of the analysis should serve as a confirmation of the validity of the 
existing theory of nationalism and language planning. The insights about the 
course of development of societal bilingualism in Kazakhstan might be useful for 
the purposes of further research in this area.
The analysis and the list of suggestions for policy improvement could assist 
Kazakhstani language planners and practitioners in successful achievement of the
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goal of cultivation of Kazakhstani patriotism, and in their effort to develop and 
to promote the state language of the newly independent state of Kazakhstan.
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